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The Task 
Suppose we were looking forward t o  y e t  ,another, uncertai? year  
i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  of our country--whichever country i t  is--and, 
w e  wanted t o  reduce our uncer t a in ty .  For t h a t  year and t h a t  country,  
how could we go about es t imat ing  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of two condi t ions :  
a) t h a t  a revo lu t ion  would occur;  b )  t h a t  more than some minimum 
propor t ion  (say t e n  percent )  of the  coun t ry ' s  populat ion would take  
d i r e c t  p a r t  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  v io lence?  
These a r e  more o r  l e s s  meteorologica l  quest ions:  what w i l l  t he  
p o l i t i c a l  weather b e  l i k e ?  Should I g e t  ready f o r  a  storm? We might 
a l s o  complicate the  problem by tu rn ing  the  two i n t o  engineering ques- 
t i o n s .  Suppose we want t o  produce a revo lu t ion ,  o r  more than a 
minimum involvement i n  c o l l e c t i v e  v io lence ,  o r  both, w i t h i n  t h a t  
country-year. What would i t  take?  
The tu rbu len t  twen t i e th  century  has  brought p lenty  of  a t t e n t i o n  
to  bea r  on both the  meteorologica l  and the  engineering ve r s ions  of 
t h e s e  ques t ions .  Yet t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  of our  answers t o  them has not 
GENERAL NOTE: The Canada Council and the  National  Science Foundation 
supported t h e  research  i n t o  p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t  i n  Europe which l i e s  
behind t h i s  paper, and the  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Advanced Study gave me the  
t ime t o  w r i t e  i t .  A t  s e v e r a l  p o i n t s  i n  the  paper I have drawn f r e e l y  
on a n  unpublished paper, "The H i s t o r i c a l  Study of P o l i t i c a l  Conf l ic t  ,'I 
presented  t o  the  conference on new t r e n d s  i n  h i s t o r y  sponsored by 
Daedalus and the  Ford Foundation, Rome, June 1970. David Bayley, 
Henry Bienen, Harry Eckstein,  Daniel  Headrick and Edward Shor ter  have 
a l l  g iven me valuable  c r i t i c i s m  of e a r l i e r  d r a f t s ;  I must confess ,  
however, t h a t  I have been unwil l ing  and/or  unable t o  make a l l  t h e  
changes t h a t  any one of them proposed. 
improved notably over those offered by Aristotle at the very dawn 
of systematic thinking about revolution and political violence. 
(With no particular embarrassment, indeed, a respectable political 
science journal once published an article treating the Quantifica- 
tion of Aristotle's Theory of Revolution; see Kort 1952.*) I don't 
mean to belittle Aristotle. He was a master political analyst. 
His formulations have lasted twenty-four centuries. Some formula- 
tions in this essay will be thoroughly Aristotelian. Still, one 
might have thought in twenty-four centuries men could have improved 
on his politics, as they have on his physics. No doubt Aristotle 
would have been baffled by the enormous, powerful national states 
which populate today's political world; his theories tend to lose 
their shape when stretched over twentieth-century politics. But 
the same thing happens when current theories of revolution are 
exported to the city-states with which Aristotle was familiar. 
In this strict'sense ofpredictability, the systematic formulations 
of political scientists improve little on the haphazard formula- 
tions of common sense. And the formulations of common sense 
improve little on casting dice or reading omens. 
I am talking about systematic knowledge; the acid test is 
whether it helps us anticipate what will turn up in some as-yet 
*Citations in this form refer to the list of references at the end 
of the essay. 
unexplored corner of experience with less error than other ways of 
thought. That sort of knowledge overlaps with several other kinds 
which have a lot to do with revolution and collettive violence. 
Political philosophy, in examining the principles according to 
which men attempt to organize their public life, and comparing them 
with the alternative principles men might employ, has much to say 
about conflict. Statements of political programs and credos usually 
include strong ideas concerning the justification--or lack of it-- 
for violence and revolution. Theoreticians and practitioners have 
created a vast tactical literature: how to make revolutions, how 
to foil them, principles of guerilla, principles of "counterin- 
surgency." Systematic knowledge obviously sets constraints on all 
these other ways of knowing, but it does not exhaust or replace , 
them. Systematic knowledge concerns us here. 
It is possible that the pursuit of systematic knowledge about 
' collective violence and revolution destines the pursuer to failure 
and irrelevance in all but the longest of long runs. A scheme 
which will predict elections with no more than 5 percent error 
embodies quite an intellectual achievement, but it does little 
good to anyone in a political system in which most elections 
hang on a margin of less than 5 percent. With every reason to 
believe that revolutions and collective violence are at least as 
complicated and contingent as elections, we have to beware of 
the "quick fix" and resign ourselves to the prospect of . repeated 
blunders.  Any c a r e f u l  examination of the  constant ly  accumulating 
w r i t i n g s  on revo lu t ion  and c o l l e c t i v e  violence w i l l  convince t he  
reader  t ha t  t he  blundering has been going on f o r  a long time, and 
shows no s i gns  of ceas ing.  Nor do I hope f o r  an i n s t a n t  t h a t  t h i s  
essay w i l l  end t he  t rend,  or  even avoid i t .  
Avai lable  Ideas: General 
Like t he  old-time doctors who gravely sn i f f ed  the  chamber 
po t s  of t h e i r  pa t i en t s ,  we could seek t o  diagnose the  i l ls  of po l i -  
t i c a l  sc ience  by c lo se  examination of the  l a rge  v a r i e t y  of ava i l ab l e  
t heo r i e s  of revo lu t ion  and c o l l e c t i v e  violence.  That unpleasant 
t a sk  w i l l  not occupy us much here ,  a s  i t  has been done thoroughly 
and we l l  elsewhere ( see  Bienen 1968, Converse 1968, Stone 1966, 
Gurr 1969, Alberoni 1968: ch.1, Eckstein 1965, Fink 1968). This 
review w i l l  only ca ta log  o r  c r i t i c i z e  es tabl ished theor ies  where 
they w i l l  c l a r i f y  t he  argument. It w i l l  fol low the  r i s k i e r  course 
of concentra t ing on a  s i n g l e  approach t o  p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t  which 
is  promising, which takes i n t o  account a  good dea l  of previous 
th inking and research,  but which is  a l s o  f a r  from accepted or proved. 
The t a sk  i t s e l f  needs def in ing.  Whether we a r e  t r y ing  t o  
a n t i c i p a t e  o r  t o  manipulate t he  p o l i t i c a l  weather,' i t  i s  q u i t e  easy 
t o  confuse two d i f f e r e n t  procedures. The f i r s t  is  the  explanation 
of a  p a r t i c u l a r  c o n f l i c t  o r  c l a s s  of c o n f l i c t s  by moving backward 
from t h e  e f f e c t  t o  t he  complex of causes which l i e s  behind i t :  
Why t h e  Whiskey Rebell ion? Why the  recurrent  m i l i t a ry  coups of 
La t i n  America? The quest ion is  re t rospec t ive ,  moving from outcome 
t o  'o r ig in .  The second procedure i s  the  assessment of the  probable 
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' cedure i s  t o  draw prospect ive  conclusions from r e t r o s p e c t i v e  analyses ,  
going from t h e  f a c t  of r evo lu t ion  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t o  t h e  condi t ions  
, .  
under which revo lu t ions  occur i n  genera l .  
Although c o l l e c t i v e  v io lence  occurs every day, r evo lu t ions  a r e  
> '  . . ' . r a r e  events! They don ' t  lend themselves t o  t h e  s o r t s  of s t a t i s t i c a l  
. . 
procedures which he lp  us make sense 'o f  b i r t h s ,  o r  t r a f f i c  p a t t e r n s  
o r  s h i f t s  i n  everyday speech. Thei r  occurrence almost c e r t a i n l y  
depends on.  t h e  convergence of d i f f e r e n t  condi t ions ,  r a t h e r  than one . 
s u r e - f i r e  cause.  It is even poss ib le  t h a t  t h e  phenomenon we l a b e l  
I 1  revolut ion"  is  simply the  most v i s i b l e  r e s u l t a n t  of s e v e r a l  r e l a -  
t i v e l y  independent processes ,  i n  t h e  same sense  t h a t  t h e  change i n  
a c i t y ' s  popula t ion  i s  a sum of the  e f f e c t s  of in-migration, out-  
migra t ion ,  b i r t h s  and dea ths .  The movement from growth t o  d e c l i n e  
may w e l l  have devas ta t ing  e f f e c t s  on t h e  l i f e  of t h e  c i t y ;  y e t  i t  
i s  q u i t e  l i k e l y  t h a t  nothing whatsoever happened a t  t h e  point  of 
t r a n s i t i o n  from growth t o  dec l ine  but  t h e  c o n t i n u t a t i o n  of long- 
e s t a b l i s h e d  t r ends  i n  migrat ion,  f e r t i l i t y  and mor ta l i ty .  
T r a d i t i o n  and common sense  argue a g a i n s t  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  
t h a t  s o r t  of model t o  r evo lu t ion  . . . but then t r a d i t i o n  and com- 
mon s e n s e  a l s o  t r e a t  urban growth and urban d e c l i n e  a s  products  o f  
d r a s t i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n s .  The p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  r evo lu t ion  
i s  a much more complex process,  o r  bundle of processes ,  than  urban 
growth should encourage us t o  break i t  up i n t o  i t s  p a r t s  before  
r econs t ruc t ing  a s i n g l e  model of the  r evo lu t ionary  process .  
Deeply-ingrained pre judices  s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  t h i s  s o r t  of 
a n a l y t i c a l  d i saggrega t ion  of  revolut ionary  processes .  Nineteenth- 
cen tu ry  sociology bequeathed t o  us a  view of la rge-sca le  s o c i a l  
s t r u c t u r e  and s o c i a l  change which remains marvelously compelling 
d e s p i t e  t h e  mounting evidence aga ins t  i t .  The correspondence of 
t h e  formula t ions  of a  ~ u r k h e i m  or  a  Tunnies t o  t h e  f o l k  sociology 
of our e r a  makes them persuas ive .  So we f i n d  ourse lves  dea l ing  w i t h  
v a r i a t i o n s  on the  theme of a  coherent s o c i e t y  (conveniently matched 
t o  a na t iona l  s t a t e ,  with the  problem of whether I t a l i a n  soc ie ty  
ex i s t ed  before 1860, o r  Canadian soc ie ty  e x i s t s  today, l e f t  con- 
ven ien t ly  vague) precar iously  in tegrated by commitment t o  common. 
values  (conveniently described as  those of t he  dominant e l i t e s )  
responding t o  every s t r u c t u r a l  change by a temporary dis-integra-  
t i o n  which l eads  t o  new e f f o r t s  a t  integr.at ion.  
The adoption of t h i s  world view leads  almost without e f f o r t  
t o  t h e  sharp separat ion of "orderly" and "disorderly" responses t o  
s t r u c t u r a l  change, and hence to the  argument t ha t  the l ikel ihood 
of o rder ly  responses t o  change is  a func t ion  of a )  the  s t reng th  of 
commitment of a l l  members of the soc ie ty  t o  i t s  common values,  
b) t h e  gradualness and evenness of the  change. Those who adopt t h i s  
v i s i o n  of t he  way the  world works w i l l  f i nd  i t  na tu r a l  t o  assume 
t h a t  mobi l i ty  i s  more d i s rup t ive  fo r  ind iv idua l  and soc ie ty  than 
immobility, t ha t  crime i s  performed by people who a r e  "poorly in te -  
grated" i n t o  rou t ine  s o c i a l  l i f e ,  t ha t  a  r i s i n g  su ic ide  r a t e ,  a  
r i s i n g  i l l eg i t imacy  r a t e  and a r i s i n g  divorce  r a t e  a r e  r e l i a b l e  
s i g n s  of soc i a l  d i s i n t eg ra t i on ,  and t ha t  movements of p ro t e s t  draw 
t h e i r  c l i e n t e l e  from marginal members of soc ie ty  but--fortunately!-- 
tend t o  become more moderate, reasonable and r e a l i s t i c ,  a s  we l l  a s  
t o  shed t h e i r  wi ldes t  members, i n  the  course of p o l i t i c a l  experience. 
A l l  of these  can, of course, .be made t r u e  by de f i n i t i on .  Leaving 
t h a t  t r a p  as ide ,  however, every one of them remains unproved and, 
a t  be s t ,  dubious (see Cornelius 1970, Nelson 1969 and 1970, Bienen 
1968, Gurr 1969: ch. 4, Kantor 1965). 
I 
Dozens of observers  of our i t imes ,  l u l l e d  by t h e  r e t r o a c t i v e  
p a c i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  p a s t  and then shaken by the  v io lence  of t h e  
p resen t ,  have supposed t h a t  a  f ixed ,  i n s t i n c t i v e  d r i v e  t o  aggress ion 
under l i e s  t h e  r ead iness  of men t o  a t t a c k  each o t h e r .  Remove the  re-  
s t r a i n t s  o r  f l a s h  the  s i g n a l s ,  goes t h e  argument, and t h e  f a t e f u l  
urge w i l l  r i s e .  One popular account r e l y i n g  heavi ly  on animal s tud-  
i e s  observes : 
We a l ready  know t h a t  i f  our populat ions go on i n c r e a s i n g  
a t  t h e i r  p resen t  t e r r i f y i n g  r a t e ,  uncon t ro l l ab le  aggres- 
s iveness  w i l l  become dramat ica l ly  increased.  This  has 
been proved conclus ively  wi th  l abora to ry  experiments. 
Gross overcrowding w i l l  produce s o c i a l  s t r e s s e s  and ten- 
s i o n s  t h a t  w i l l  s h a t t e r  our community o rgan iza t ions  long 
before  i t  s t a r v e s ' u s  t o  death .  It  w i l l  work d i r e c t l y  
a g a i n s t  improvements i n  t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  c o n t r o l  and 
w i l l  savagely heighten  the  l ike l ihood  of emotional ex- 
p los ion  (Morris 1967: 145). 
If we adopted t h i s  reasoning i n  d e t a i l ,  we would have t o  expect 
t h a t  American c i t i e s ,  expec ia l ly  automobile c i t i e s  l i k e  Dal las  and 
Los Angeles, would be among the  l e a s t  "aggressive" i n  t h e  world, f o r  
they a r e  s e t t l e d  a t  f a r  lower d e n s i t i e s  than t h e i r  European o r  Asian 
counterpar ts ,  and have been g e t t i n g  l e s s  dense f o r  decades. They 
are no t  s o  peace fu l  a s  a l l  t h a t .  I f  we take  the  argument a s  simply 
i d e n t i f y i n g  one of t h e  f a c t o r s  behind v io lence ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, 
i ts  capaci ty  t o  account f o r  the  l a r g e ,  genuine v a r i a t i o n s  i n  v io lence  
from t h e  t o  time, p l a c e  t o  p lace ,  group t o  group dwindles. We have a s  yet  
no good means of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  t h e  e f f e c t s  of crowding from t h a t  
of a  g rea t  many o t h e r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of c i t i e s .  For t h e  p resen t ,  
then, a t tempts  t o  apply t o  human aggregates t h e  a l l e g e d  l e s sons  of 
animal-aggression s t u d i e s  lead us i n t o  a  dead end. 
A more powerful version of the argument has ''aggression" re- 
sulting mainly from the amount of frustration endured by men, tem- 
pered by existing constraints on the release of that aggression. 
A wonderful variety of conditions win nomination as frustrations 
capable of producing aggression--not only high densities, but also 
sexual repression, sexual freedom, wealth, poverty. If these anal- 
yses of aggressive impulses were correct, aggression would rise and 
fall regularly with the alteration of the signals, the frustration 
and/or the restraints. So far as I can tell, they do not. But 
even if such theories of impulse were valid, the necessity of estab- 
lishing exactly which conditions were frustrating, or restraining, 
or stimulating, would involve us again in analyzing the social rela- 
tions which actually turn to violent encounters. 
Our nineteenth-century sociology also favors a particular inter- . 
pretation of political conflict, especially revolution. Revolutions 
and other major conflicts arise, in this view, because structural 
change builds up unresolved tensions which burst into disorder 
when and where restraints are weak. Those tensions build up in sev- 
eral ways: through expectations which rise faster than achievement 
and thus produce frustration; through the disorientation suffered 
by those who cut traditional social ties; through the inherent 
psychic costs of mobility, complexity, variety and impersonality; 
through the difficulty of performing contradictory roles. The ten- 
sions build up in individuals, but eventually achieve collective 
expression. 
Embedded in this foundation for the study of political con- * .  
flict are a whole series of related fallacies: \ 
1. that rebellion is an individual act intimately dependent 
on a certain attitude--a rebellious attitude--toward some 
or all authorities; 
2. that the likelihood of mass rebellion is a linear func- 
tion of the sum of individual hostilities to the regime, 
which is in turn a linear function of the sum of depriva- 
tions experienced by the individuals; 
3. that there is a close correspondence between the sum 
of individual intentions of participants in revolution- 
ary actions and the changes produced by those actions; 
4. that revolution is simply the extreme position on a 
scale running from fleeting individual protests to durable 
anger on the part of the entire population, which implies 
that the extent of discontent and the likelihood of a 
transfer of power are closely related to one another; 
5 .  that revolution and revolutionary propensity are con- 
ditions of a "society" or a "social system" rather than 
of a particular government or a particular population. 
This variety of reasoning permits theorists like Chalmers Johnson, 
James Davies, Ted Gurr and Neil Smelser to erect schemes in which 
some inefficiency in "the system" expands the fund of discontent, 
which in turn leads to assaults on those who hold power, These 
social scientists concentrate their theorizing 
and their research on individual attitudes or on the condition of 
/ I  
the social system as a whole. They neglect the struggles among 
classes and power blocs which constitute the bulk of political 
conflict . 
I n  the  s tandard  social-psychological  t reatment,  the  i m p l i c i t  
crude model of t h e  whole process the re fo re  looks something l i k e  
t h i s  : . . . . .  . . 
. . -  -.. , 
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Hence t h e  r e c i p e  f o r  avoiding major c o n f l i c t s  goes; slow do- the  
pace of  change; dampen u n r e a l i s t i c  expecta t ions ;  expand t h e  oppor- 
t u n i t i e s  f o r  gradual  r e l e a s e  of tens ion;  r e i n f o r c e  e x i s t i n g  s o c i a l  
t ies and speed the  a c q u i s i t i o n  of new ones; s t r eng then  e x t e r n a l  
r e s t r a i n t s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  by re in fo rc ing  commitments t o  common values. .  
This  is, t o  be s u r e ,  a  c a r i c a t u r e .  I hope i t  i s  recognizable 
i n  t h e  same way t h a t  ~ a u r n i e r ' s  nineteenth-century c a r i c a t u r e s  were; 
i t  represen t s  a  r e a l i t y .  I n  any case,  my p lan  i s  not  t o  summon the  
c a r i c a t u r e  t o  l i f e  and do b a t t l e  with him, b u t  t o  sketch  another  
c o n t r a s t i n g  f i g u r e ,  and s e e  how much v i t a l i t y  he has .  
We have t o  f a c e  some s e r i o u s  problems of d e f i n i t i o n .  Yield 
t o  t h e  temptaticn t o  s i n g l e  out  a  small s e t  of "true' '  r evo lu t ions  
i n  which a whole c l a s s  gained power, o r  an even smal ler  set i n  
which deep, long-run structural changes resulted from the transfer 
of power. The danger is then not only that the number of cases you 
are working with will be too tiny to permit effective comparison 
(A distinguished student of political change, commenting on a student's 
proposal to undertake the study of revolutions, asked, "Which of the 
four are you studying?") but also that you will be making the wrong 
comparisons. If, for example, attempts to make revolutions differed 
fundamentally from all other sorts of political conflicts, but suc- 
cessful and unsuccessful attempts differed only through the inter- 
vention of chance, then a lifelong study of successful revolutions 
alone would probably yield nothing but shaky hypotheses about the 
causes of revolution. That is not an argument for abandoning the 
analysis of the so-called Great Revolutions, but for trying to link 
their study with that of the larger set of events to which they 
belong. Then we can preserve the distinctness of the Great Revolu- 
tions by treating revolutionary character--the extent to which the 
particular series of events at hand produced class realignments, 
transformations of government, further structural change, etc.--as 
a variable. 
Social scientists have, I must admit, been giving--and even 
trying 'to follow--this brand of advice for some time, without re- 
sounding success. We have, for example passed through numerous 
twists and turns in simply trying to decide what phenomenon is 
under examination: "rebellion," "violence," "collective violence," 
'I i n t e r n a l  war," "conf l i c t , "  " i n s t a b i l i t y , "  "p ro tes t , "  "disorder." 
Each of these  i s  p laus ib le .  Each c a r r i e s  wi th  it a somewhat d i f -  
f e r e n t  agenda and i m p l i c i t  theory.  The f a i l u r e  of any of them t o  
s t i c k  and the  ease  wi th  which w r i t e r s  on revo lu t ion  and p o l i t i c a l  
c o n f l i c t  switch from one t o  another  bespeak both confusion and d is -  
cord about  t h e  na tu re  of t h e  problem a t  hand. 
There a r e  exceptibns t o  the  genera l  feebleness  of soc ia l -  
s c i e n t i f i c  work on t h e  s u b j e c t ;  only t h e  repeated a p p l i c a t i o n  of t h e  
weight of q u a n t i t a t i v e  evidence assembled by psychologis ts  and 
s o c i o l o g i s t s  is  g e t t i n g  a c r o s s  the  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  
t h e  American ghe t to  r e b e l l i o n s  of t h e  1960s tended t o  be  young men 
we l l - in teg ra ted  i n  t h e i r  l o c a l  communities, well-convinced t h a t  they 
were b a t t l i n g  i n j u s t i c e ,  and well-supported by many of t h e i r  kinsmen 
and neighbors.  Again, the  genera l  models developed by Lewis 
Richardson and Kenneth Boulding o f f e r  a good dea l  of a n a l y t i c  power 
t o  those  who w i l l  use  them. But they have had l i t t l e  inf luence  on 
t h e  way s t u d e n t s  of p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t  a c t u a l l y  do t h e i r  work. 
In s h o r t ,  t h e  promise is  t h e r e  i n  p r i n c i p l e .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  
i t  has  been l i t t l e  r e a l i z e d .  
Chalmers Johnson on Revolutionary Change 
A g lance  a t  Chalmers Johnson's Revolutionary Change and Ted 
Gurr ' s  Why Men Rebel w i l l  g ive  a c l e a r e r  idea  what t h e  rnodel-builders -- 
have--and don' t  have--to o f f e r .  The books by Johnson and Gurr 
resemble each o ther  i n  br inging t o  bea r  on a s i n g l e  model a  whole 
broad t r a d i t i o n  of thought. Johnson's Revolutionary Change b r a i d s  
toge the r  many f i b e r s  of social-system theor iz ing ,  which assumes a 
fuqctioning system and then follows a sequence of the sort : challenge/, 
dysfunction/inadequate control/revolution. Gurr's, on the other hand, 
follows a much more psychological reasoning which finds the cause 
of rebellion in a widening discrepancy between what men expect of 
I 
life and what they get from it. Between the two of them, they employ 
almost all the well-defined ideas concerning the origins of violent 
conflict which are in common use among American social scientists. 
Before writing his general analysis of the revolutionary pro- 
cess, Chalmers Johnson wrote a valuable and well-informed study of 
the Chinese Revolution, emphasizing the importance of anti-Japanese 
nationalism as a source of support for the Communists. Whatever 
weaknesses his theorizing may display, then, do not come from ig- 
norance of the world outside of North America. They come rather, 
/' 
it seems to me, from heavy reliance on the systemic metaphor and 
from confusion of state with social system. 
Johnson identifies three clusters of causes of revolution: 
First, there are the pressures created by a disequilibrated 
social system--a society which is changing and which is 
in need of further change if it is to continue to exist. 
Of all the characteristics of the disequilibrated system, 
the one that contributed most directly to a revolution 
is.power deflation--the fact that during a period of change 
the integration of a system depends increasingly upon the 
maintenance and deployment of force by the occupants of 
the formal authority statuses. 
The second cluster of necessary causes revolves around the 
quality of the purposeful change being undertaken while 
a system is disequilibrated. This quality depends upon 
the abilities of the legitimate leaders. If they are 
unable to develop policies which will maintain the confi- 
dence of non-deviant actors in the system and its capacity 
to move toward resynchronization, a loss of authority 
w i l l  ensue. Such a l o s s  means t h a t  the  use of fo rce  by 
t h e  e l i t e  is  no longer  considered l eg i t ima te ,  although 
i t  does not  n e c e s s a r i l y  mean t h a t  a  r evo lu t ion  w i l l  occur 
a t  once. So long a s  the  l e a d e r s  can s t i l l  use the  army 
success fu l ly  t o  coerce s o c i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n ,  the  system 
w i l l  continue t o  p e r s i s t .  However, t h e  power d e f l a t i o n  
w i l l  approach maximum propor t ions ,  producing a "police 
s t a t e "  (e.g. South Afr ica  today). 
The f i n a l ,  o r  s u f f i c i e n t ,  cause of a  r evo lu t ion  i s  some 
ingred ien t ,  u sua l ly  cont r ibuted  by fo r tune ,  which depr ives  
t h e  e l i t e  of i t s  chief  weapon f o r  enforc ing s o c i a l  be- 
havior  (e.g. an army mutiny), o r  which l eads  a group of 
r evo lu t ionar i e s  t o  be l i eve  t h a t  they have the  means t o  
depr ive  t h e  e l i t e  of i t s  weapons of coercion.  I n  t h i s  
s tudy,  such f i n a l ,  o r  immediate, causes  of r evo lu t ion  
a r e  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  "accelera tors ."  They a r e  the  p ressures ,  
o f t e n  e a s i l y  sus ta ined  i n  f u n c t i o n a l  s o c i e t i e s ,  which 
when they impinge on a s o c i e t y  experiencing power de f l a -  
t i o n  and a l o s s  of a u t h o r i t y  immediately ca ta lyze  i t  i n t o  
i n s u r r e c t i o n .  They a r e  a l s o  the  f a c t o r s  which determine, 
when an  i n s u r r e c t i o n  does occur,  whether o r  not  t h e  rev- 
o l u t i o n a r i e s  w i l l  succeed i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  and occupying 
new s t a t u s e s  of a u t h o r i t y  (Johnson 1966: 90-91). . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . ( .  . , . . 
. .;:. : - - .  . . . .. 
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. ' he proposes the  s u i c i d e  r a t e  a s  a  prime index of d isequi l ibr ium.  
Johnson peppers h i s  work wi th  b r i g h t  ideas  and good c r i t i q u e s  
of previous analyses  of revolut ion .  H i s  scheme, however, has l i t t l e  
. . 
va lue  f o r  t h e  sys temat ic  a n a l y s i s  of p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t .  One 
1 
. . major reason i s  t h a t  the  scheme is r e t r o s p e c t i v e ;  t h e r e  appears t o  . . 
'. . be no way t o  know whether "homeostatic" and "purposive" responses ' 
t o  change were adequate except by observing whether a  r evo lu t ion  
a c t u a l l y  occurred.  Whether the  ques t ions  we a r e  asking a r e  meteoro- 
l o g i c a l  o r  engineer ing  i n  s t y l e ,  t h a t  i s  a  d i sappo in t ing  outcome. 
Again, the  treatment of a  government a s  an emanation of a  " s o c i a l  
system," o r  -- v i c e  ve r sa ,  l eads  t o  proposals  f o r  t h e  d e t e c t i o n  of  
d i sequ i l ib r ium which a r e  both l o g i c a l l y  and p r a c t i c a l l y  hopeless .  1 
"Ideally,'.' a s  Johnson says ,  " t h i s  index would por t r ay  t h e  magni- 
tude of d issynchroniza t ion  between the  s t r u c t u r e  of va lues  and t h e  
s o c i a l  d i v i s i o n  of l a b o r ,  thereby i n d i c a t i n g  t h e  p o t e n t i a l i t y  f o r  
te rminat ion  of a  system due t o  i t s  f a i l u r e  t o  f u l f i l l  i ts  f u n c t i o n a l  
p re requ i s i t e s"  (p. 120).  
The concre te  proposals  f o r  p r e d i c t o r s  which fo l low from t h i s  
genera l  p r i n c i p l e ,  according t o  Johnson, a re :  r i s i n g  s u i c i d e  rates, 
heightened i d e o l o g i c a l  a c t i v i t y ,  r i s i n g  m i l i t a r y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
r a t i o  and i n c r e a s e s  i n  r a t e s  of crime, e s p e c i a l l y  p o l i t i c a l  crime. 
These i tems have t h e  advantage of being measurable, a t  l e a s t  c rude ly ;  
we  the re fo re  can i n v e s t i g a t e  whether they predict t o  r e v o l u t i o n  w i t h  
b e t t e r  than chance accuracy. Even i f  they do, however, no t e s t  of 
t h e  theory has occurred.  Acceptance of crime; s u i c i d e ,  i d e o l o g i c a l  
a c t i v i t y  and m i l i t a r y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a s  i n d i c a t o r s  of t h e  badness 
of f i t  between "values" and "d iv i s ion  of labor" r equ i res  acceptance 
of the  very theory which is  saupposedly up f o r  t e s t .  
F ina l ly ,  the  argument provides almost no means whatsoever of 
i n f e r r i n g  which people take  what p a r t s ,  when and why. The main 
implicit proposition is that those segments of the population most 
disoriented by structural change will take the most active part in 
revolutionary movements: 
As the disequilibrium of a social system becomes more 
acute, personal tensions are generated in all statuses. 
These tensions may be controlled by some people through 
internal psychological defense mechanisms, and the aliena- 
tive sentiments of others may be dissipated through 
deviant behavior (e.g. fantasies, crime, mental disease, 
and psychosomatic illnesses). However, with the passage 
of time, these mechanisms tend to lose their efficacy, 
and persons subject to highly diverse status protests 
will begin to combine with each other and with deviants 
generally to form a deviant subcultural group or move- 
ment (p. 81). 
Again, we are dealing with a proposition which runs a great risk of 
becoming true by definition; all it takes is to give a high weight 
as "deviant" to those sorts of behavior which happen to be associated 
with the adoption of a revolutionary position. Leaving aside that 
tendentious way of setting up the problem, however, we simply . have , 
no reliable evidence of a general tendency for revolutionaries, 
protestors, rioters or participants in mass movements to come 
disproportionately from the marginal, criminal and/or disorgan- 
ized parts of the population. In short, Johnson's scheme assumes 
that nineteenth-century folk sociology is correct. 
> .  
Even within the framework of classic sociology, Johnson takes ' 
a step which is open to serious challenge: he essentially equates 
state and society. The equation shows up most clearly in the 
identification of the societal elite with those who run the state, 
but it recurs in general statements throughout: 
The t r u e  nark of soc ie ty ,  the re fore ,  w i l l  be i n s t i t u t i o n s  
charged with t he  exerc ise  of physical  fo rce  both t o  in-  
su r e  t h e  perpetuat ion of the  d iv i s i on  of labor  and t o  
r egu l a t e  the  use of v iolence i n  c o n f l i c t s  o f . p o l i t i c a 1  
i n t e r e s t .  The most t yp i ca l  form of such i n s t i t u t i o n s  i s  
t he  s t a t e .  (p .  18) 
The most important funct ion of the  value  system i n  a  
s o c i e t y  i s  t o  author ize ,  or  l eg i t ima t i z e ,  the  use of 
force .  (p. 26) 
Despi te  numerous e f f o r t s  over t he  pas t  century t o  b r i ng  
about some form of world government, e i t he r  through 
purposive organizat ion along p o l i t i c a l  l i n e s  o r  through 
t he  i n d i r e c t  l ink ing  of na t iona l  r epresen ta t ives  i n  task- 
o r ien ted  assoc ia t ions  (pos ta l  unions, hea l th  organizat ions ,  
bodies f o r  e s t ab l i sh ing  common s tandards ,  and so  f o r t h ) ,  
t h e  na t i ona l  s t a t e  has remained the  l a r g e s t  form of s e l f -  
contained s o c i a l  system. (p. 169) 
The consequence of t h i s  pa r t i cu l a r  equation i s  t o  brush a s i d e  t h e  
problematic charac te r  of t he  s t a t e ' s  very exis tence  and of i t s  
p a r t i c u l a r  boundaries a t  many moments of rebe l l ion ,  war, r evo lu t ion  
and counter-revolution. S t a t e s  a r e  organizat ions  which r i s e ,  f a l l ,  
experience changes of management, and even cease t o  e x i s t .  Only an 
extreme view of t h a t  mysterious e n t i t y  ca l l ed  "a society" g ran t s  i t  
those same p rope r t i e s .  Only a  muddled view equates the  experience 
of the  one e n t i t y  wi th  the  experience of the  other .  
Ted Gurr on Why Men Rebel 
Ted Gurr shows more awareness t h a t  these  problems are problems. 
H i s  side-comments and sub-hypotheses amount t o  an  extensive attempt 
t o  take the  o rgan iza t iona l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of governments i n t o  account.  
Yet h i s  ba s i c  theory does not permit him t o  deal  with the  phenomena 
of p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t  much b e t t e r  than Johnson. 
I n  h i s  book Why Men Rebel, Gurr seeks t o  provide a  general  
explanation of " p o l i t i c a l  violence." P o l i t i c a l  violence includes  
a l l  c o l l e c t i v e  a t t a c k s  on major p o l i t i c a l  actors--especially agents  
of the  s ta te- -wi th in  a p a r t i c u l a r  po l i t i ca l~communi ty .  Ins tead  of 
e l abora t ing  a  theory of  how p o l i t i c a l  communities opera te ,  however, _. L. < 
h e  concentra tes  on experiences which happen t o  ind iv idua l s  and then 
><".'i 
t . cumulate i n t o  mass a c t i o n .  
: 
The key i d e a s  have been around a  long time. Ind iv idua l s  anger 
when they sense  a l a r g e  gap between what they g e t  and what they 
deserve.  That can happen through a d e c l i n e  i n  what they g e t ,  o r  a 
r i s e  i n  what they f e e l  they deserve. Given t h e  chance, angry people 
r ebe l .  When many people go through t h a t  same experience of increas-  
ing  R e l a t i v e  Depr ivat ion  p lus  widening oppor tuni ty  f o r  r e b e l l i o n  a t  
t h e  same time, p o l i t i c a l  v io lence  genera l i zes .  S imi lar  ideas  have 
o f t e n  emerged i n  the  a n a l y s i s  of American ghet to  r e b e l l i o n s ,  of 
La t in  American pa lace  coups, and of the  French Revolution. Gurr 
has exp l i ca ted  t h e  l o g i c  of such analyses ,  and developed means of  
measuring a number of t h e  v a r i a b l e s  involved. Compared wi th  t h e  
argument of ~ o h n s o n ' s  Revolutionary Change, the-Gurr  scheme has t h e  
advantage of avoiding both the  assumption of a  s e l f - r e g u l a t i n g  
s o c i e t y  and the  equat ion  of government wi th  s o c i a l  system. 
Seen a s  a  r e t r o s p e c t i v e  a n a l y s i s ,  Gurr 's  argument hangs to- 
gether  very we l l .  It is, i n d e e d , . v i r t u a l l y  t r u e  by d e f i n i t i o n .  
P o l i t i c a l  v io lence  requ i res  some shared d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  granted .  
Shared d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  requ i res  i n d i v i d u a l  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  t r u e .  
Ind iv idua l  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  r e s u l t s  from an  unfavorable comparison 
between th ings  a s  they a r e  and th ings  a s  they ought t o  be, no 
doubt. What, Fhen, have we excluded? The two extremes: 1 )  pure ly  
ins t rumenta l  accounts  of r e b e l l i o n ,  i n  which v io lence  is  simply the  
most e f f i c i e n t  means a v a i l a b l e  f o r  accomplishing some c o l l e c t i v e  end, 
2) t r ea tmen t s  of r e b e l l i o n s  a s  emanations of i n s t i n c t ,  madness, ran- 
dom impulse o r  o c c u l t  fo rce .  Gurr 's  theory s t ands  w e l l  w i t h i n  west- 
e r n  p o l i t i c a l  philosophy a s  i t  r e j e c t s  t h e  i d e a s  t h a t  t h e  most e f f i c i e n t  
means may b e  h u r t f u l  t o  many and t h a t  t h e  i r r a t i o n a l  p lays  a  s i g n i f i -  
can t  p a r t  i n  l a r g e  p o l i t i c a l  movements. But t h e  s e a l i n g  o f f  of those  
two extremes s t i l l  l eaves  a  g r e a t  dea l  of room between them. 
A p r o s p e c t i v e  v e r s i o n  of t h e  argument, on t h e  o t h e r  hand, be- 
comes more determinate  and more dubious. Now t h e  argument says  t h a t  
d e p r i v a t i o n  produces anger whi le  l a c k  of d e p r i v a t i o n  prevents  i t ;  
t h a t  under s p e c i f i e d  cond i t ions  ind iv idua l  anger coa lesces ,  w i t h  h igh  
r e g u l a r i t y ,  i n t o  c o l l e c t i v e  d i scon ten t ;  t h a t  under f u r t h e r  s p e c i f i e d  
cond i t ions  c o l l e c t i v e  d i scon ten t  has  a  high p r o b a b i l i t y  of producing 
f 
v i o l e n t  a c t i o n .  It is  not  enough t o  show t h a t  t h e s e  th ings  happen 
sometimes, A t  t he  very  l e a s t ,  they must happen more o f t e n  than chance . 
would p r e d i c t .  
Gurr himself goes a t  t h e  problem through t h e .  . a n a l y s i s  . of 1,100 . .. ,. 
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. . . . imacy and, e s p e c i a l l y ,  Soc ia l  and S t r u c t u r a l  F a c i l i t a t i o n .  . . . . .  
This  l a s t  v a r i a b l e ,  Socia l  and S t r u c t u r a l  Faci l i ta t ion ,  i l l u s -  
t r a t e s  some of the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  i n t e r p r e t i n g  Gurr ' s  r e s u l t s .  
Af ter  cons iderable  experimentation, Gurr combined t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  
indexes : 
1 )  a  measure of geographic i n a c c e s s i b i l i t y  which gave 
high scores  t o  coun t r i e s  wi th  rough t e r r a i n s  and 
poor t r a n s p o r t  n e t s ;  
2) a  measure of t h e  extent  t o  which t h e  Communist pa r ty  
was bo th  a c t i v e  and i l l e g a l ;  
3) a  measure of f o r e i g n  support f o r  domestic " i n i t i a t o r s  
of s t r i f e . "  
A l l  of t h e s e  a r e  p laus ib ly  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  l e v e l  of conf l ic t - - the  
Communist Pa r ty  and fo re ign  support i tems s o  much s o  t h a t  one must 
wonder whether ~ u r r  has  measured the  same t h i n g  twice.  (The same. 
worry about  contamination dogs the  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h e  f ind ing  t h a t  
" legi t imate"  regimes have lower l e v e l s  of s t r i f e . )  The considerable  
explanatory s t r e n g t h  of these  v a r i a b l e s ,  however, provides no evidence 
whatsoever f o r  t h e  c e n t r a l  r e l a t ive -depr iva t ion  argument. 
The two measures of depr iva t ion  a r e  more c r u c i a l  t o  t h e  theory 
and more c l e a r l y  independent of the  phenomena Gurr is seeking t o  ex- 
p l a i n ,  bu t  t h e i r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  a l s o  r a i s e s  s e r i o u s  problems. F i r s t ,  
t h e  q u a l i t y  of d a t a  is  low. Second, t h e  114 p o l i t i e s  form a  cross-  
s e c t i o n  a t  t h e  same point  of time; t h a t  means one must judge t h e  
e f f e c t s  of long-run changes i n  depr iva t ion ,  f o r  example, through t h e  
comparison of regimes which vary i n  "economic d iscr iminat ion ,"  "poli- 
t i c a l  d i sc r imina t ion , "  "po ten t i a l  separa t i sm,"  "dependence on p r i v a t e  
f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l , "  " re l ig ious  cleavage," and "educational  opportunity" 
( f o r  those a r e  the e s s e n t i a l  c r i t e r i a  of long-run depr ivat ion)  a t  a 
given moment. Third, the  bas ic  var iab les  went through so much selec-  
t i o n  and re-measurement i n  t he  course of Gurr 's  research ( the  two 
depr ivat ion measures, fo r  example, combining i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  way the  
1 3  s t u r d i e s t  survivors  of the  48 separate  measures of depr ivat ion with 
which Gurr began) t h a t  the  data  may well have become a glove shaped 
we l l  t o  one hand, and to  no other.* The c r u c i a l  t e s t s  w i l l  come when 
Gurr's model i s  checked aga ins t  good data  fo r  appropriately-lagged 
time s e r i e s ,  with independently-measured var iab les  covering new time 
per iods  and new s e t s  of p o l i t i c a l  un i t s .  
The fu r the r  research is  d e f i n i t e l y  worth undertaking. For one 
thing,  Gurr has  reduced to  a manageable model t h e  e s sen t i a l s  of a 
shapeless  bu t  pervasive s e t  of ideas  encountered i n  branch a f t e r  branch 
of p o l i t i c a l  ana lys i s .  For another, he has worked out  an ingenious 
. . 
s e r i e s  of procedures fo r  measuring the  major var iab les  wi thin  t h e  
model. For once we have a genuine opportunity t o  confront theory 
w i t h  da ta .  
I f  t he  arguments of t h i s  essay a r e  co r r ec t ,  t h a t  confronta t ion 
w i l l  f e t ch  a smashing blow t o  the  very social-psychological theory 
Gurr espouses. To make su re  t ha t  so c ruc i a l  a contes t  proceeds t o  a 
f a i r  and f u l l  conclusion w i l l  require  some reworking of t h e  theory. 
For example, Gurr 's  de f in i t i ons ' e l im ina t e  one major category of col-  
l e c t i v e  violence: c o l l e c t i v e  violence ca r r ied  out by agents of t he  
*with my own data  on co l l ec t i ve  violence and i n d u s t r i a l  c o n f l i c t  
i n  Western Europe, a judic ious  se lec t ion  of cases,  va r iab le  lags and 
models makes i t  easy t o  produce mul t ip le  cor re la t ions  above .80. 
s t a t e .  Actual ly ,  a  good d e a l  of a c t i o n  of t h i s  v a r i e t y  s l i p s  i n t o  
Gurr ' s  a n a l y s i s  d isguised  a s  the  work of "d iss idents ."  For (cont rary  
t o  t h e  image of Diss iden t s  lashing ou t  a t  Regimes) the  g rea t  bulk of 
the  k i l l i n g  and wounding i n  the  course of modern c o l l e c t i v e  v io lence  
is  done by t roops ,  p o l i c e  and o the r  s p e c i a l i z e d  rep ress ive  forces!  
More important ,  t he  regime normally has  t h e  g r e a t e r  d i s c r e t i o n  i n  t h i s  
regard.  Many demonstrat ions,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  pass  peaceful ly .  But a  
few br ing  death,  mainly when some r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of the  government 
decides  the  demonstrators  have gone too  f a r .  Nothing i n  Gurr 's  scheme 
permi ts  us  t o  i n f e r  when repress ive  v i o l e n c e  w i l l  occur, and t o  whom. 
Likewise, an important p o r t i o n  of  c o l l e c t i v e  v io lence  p i t s  con- 
tenders  f o r  power a g a i n s t  each o t h e r ,  r a t h e r  than r e b e l s  a g a i n s t  
regimes. Gurr 's  scheme e l imina tes  such c o n f l i c t s  i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  while 
h i s  d a t a  inc lude  them i n  p r a c t i c e .  No ca tegory  i n  t h e  scheme, f u r t h e r -  
more, d e a l s  w i t h  the  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  o r  t h e  e f f e c t ,  of a g i t a t i o n ,  organi-  
aa t ion ,  mobi l iza t ion ,  leadership ,  pool ing  of resources,  development 
of i n t e r n a l  communications among p o t e n t i a l  r ebe l s .  We have only  t h e  
g ross  d i f f e r e n c e s  combined i n  Soc ia l  and S t r u c t u r a l  F a c i l i t a t i o n .  
One might be a b l e  t o  meet these  ob jec t ions  by refocusing t h e  
f rus t ra t ion-aggress ion  a n a l y s i s  on groups w i t h i n  a  s t a t e ,  and r e l a -  
t i o n s  among them. Gurr makes some va luab le ,  i f  f l e e t i n g ,  sugges- 
t i o n s  a s  t o  how one might do t h a t :  s e p a r a t e  d iscontent  scores  f o r ,  
each major segment of t h e  populat ion,  and s o  on. To do t h a t  work 
s e r i o u s l y ,  however, would amount t o  t ak ing  up the  very s o r t s  of s t r u c -  
t u r a l  a n a l y s i s  the  c e n t r a l  argument d ismisses .  
Alte rna t ive  Sources of  Theory 
A t  t h i s  moment, b e t t e r  guidance f o r  those who wish t o  s o r t  ou t  
t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  experience of p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t  i s  coming from s o c i a l  
s c i e n t i s t s  who have e l ec t ed  to  work l e s s  ab s t r ac t l y ,  c lose  t o  h i s t o r i -  
c a l  f a c t ,  with g r ea t e r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  d iv i s ions  and va r i a t i ons  wi th in  
t h e  countr ies  under s tudy ,  and i n  a comparative framework. (This might 
seem inev i tab le ;  i t  is, i n  f a c t ,  exceptional;  the s t ronges t  inf luences  
of s o c i a l  s c i e n t i f i c  procedures on h i s t o r i c a l  p rac t i ce ,  a s  i n  the  
cases of demography, l i n g u i s t i c s  and economic theory, normally in- 
volve complex, a b s t r a c t  theor ies . )  
Barrington Moore's Socia l  Origins of Dicta torship  - and Democracy, 
f o r  example, commands t h e  i n t e r e s t  and respect  of a wide range of 
h i s t o r i an s .  Its concentra t ion on t he  c l a s s  d iv i s ions  and a l l i a n c e s  
which c r e a t e  revolut ionary s i t u a t i o n s ,  and the  coa l i t i ons  which make 
t h e  revolut ions  themselves, s t rongly  counters the  soc io log ica l  tend- 
ency t o  consider revo lu t ion  a s  the  expression of a c r i t i c a l  l e v e l  of 
tension,  aggression o r  malfunction i n  the  system a s  a whole. 
The complex web of the  book's argument.hangs on two pegs: 1 )  t he  
idea  t h a t  the  c l a s s  c o a l i t i o n s  involved i n  the  g rea t  modernizing revo- 
l u t i ons ,  and hence t he  character  of those revolut ions ,  have depended 
espec ia l ly  on the  f a t e s  of the  ag r a r i an  c l a s s e s  i n  the  course of t he  
commercialization of a g r i c u l t u r e  and the  growth of the  ( s t a t e ,  wi th  t h e  
l i qu ida t i on  of the  peasantry and the  co-optation of the  a r i s t oc r acy  
and gentry,  f o r  example, being c r u c i a l  i n  England; 2)  the  f u r t he r  
idea  t h a t  the  c l a s s  c o a l i t i o n  making the  revolut ion has s t rong ly  
influenced the  subsequent p o l i t i c a l  organizat ion of tha t  country, with 
a c o a l i t i o n  of bureaucrats  and landlords,  f o r  ins tance,  tending t o  
produce fascism. Thus parliamentary democracy .becomes the  h i s t o r i ca l -  
ly-specif ic  consequence of the  ea r ly  emergence of agra r ian  capi ta l ism 
i n  c e r t a i n  count r ies ,  a circumstance perhaps never t o  be repeated 
again. Moore provides evidence f o r . h i s  twin theses v i a  extended compar- 
i sons  of t h e  h i s t o r i e s  of England, France, the  United s t a t e s ,  China, 
Japan and India ,  p lus  numerous excursions t o  Germany and Russia. 
Revolution takes on an i n t e r e s t i n g  r o l e  i n  ~ o o r e ' s  scheme. The 
major revolution--the English C iv i l  War, t he  French Revolution, and s o  
on--acts a s  a c ruc i a l  switch i n  the  t rack  along which a pa r t i cu l a r  
, . country' moves. Yet revolut ion dissolves  a s  a phenomenon gener i s ,  
. .. 
f o r  i t  becomes simply the  maximum moment of c o n f l i c t s  which endure . 
long before  and long a f t e r  the  t r ans f e r  of power i t s e l f ;  indeed, the  
. . 
. . case of Germany shows tha t  t h e  fundamental t r ans f e r s  of power which 
. . ' , occupy the  ceriter. of Moore's ana lys i s  can occur without any revolution 
a t  a l l  i n  t he  conventional sense of t he  word: 
. .. The not ion t h a t  a v io len t  popular revolut ion is  somehow 
. . . . necessary i n  order t o  sweep away "feudal" obs tac les  t o  
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  is  pure nonsense, a s  the  course of 
German and Japanese his tory .demonstra tes .  On the o ther  
. hand, the  p o l i t i c a l  consequences from dismounting t he  
old. order  from above a r e  decidely d i f f e r e n t .  A s  they , 
proceeded with  conservative modernizatton, these  semi- 
parliamentary governments t r i e d  t o  preserve a s  much of 
the  o r i g i n a l  s o c i a l  s t r uc tu r e  a s  they could, f i t t i n g  
l a rge  sec t ions  i n t o  the  new bui lding wherever poss ible .  
The r e s u l t s  had some resemblance to  present-day Victor- 
i a n  houses with modern e l e c t r i c a l  ki tchens but in- 
s u f f i c i e n t  bathrooms and leaky pipes hidden decorously 
behind newly p las te red  wal ls .  Ultimately the  m k e s h i f t s  
' collapsed.  (Moore 1966: 438). 
We f ind ourselves a t  the  opposite pos i t ion  from Chalmers Johnson's 
"d i sequ i l ib ra t ion"  and "dysfunction." I n  Moore's a n a l y s i s ,  t h e  
major c o n f l i c t s  which occur--including t h e  r evo lu t ions  themselves-- 
a r e  p a r t  of t h e  very l o g i c  of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  systems they shake a p a r t .  
. . To take  one more case  i n  po in t ,  E r i c  Wolf's Peasant --- Wars of  t h e  
~ w e n t i e t h  Century b e a r s  a  number of resemblances t o  Moore's d a r i n g  
s y n t h e s i s .  Wolf, t h e  an th ropo log i s t ,  t akes  on t h e  r evo lu t ions  of . 
Mexico, Russia,  China, Vie t  Nam, Alger ia  and Cuba. He e x t r a c t s  from 
them important l e s sons  about t h e  response o f  peasants  t h e  world over  
t o  being drawn i n t o  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  world economy. Even l e s s  concerned 
t o  l a y  out  a n  e x p l i c i t  t h e o r e t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  than Moore, Wolf never- 
t h e l e s s  b u i l d s  a n  e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  powerful a n a l y s i s  of t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  
. , foundat ions  of peasant l i f e ,  t h e  p r e c i s e  ways i n  which t h e  expansion 
. . . .  . . . . .  
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i ncep t ion)  se rves  r evo lu t ionary  ends. 
; . I  . . .  . . . . . ,  . . . . .  , . . , . . . . . .  ; . . . . 
. . . . . . .  . . The most 'genera l  argument i s  simple and t e l l i n g :  :. 
, .' ' . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . . ~. . . .  . - . . . .  ; , : . .  .. . - . '  . , . . . The major aim of the.  peasant  is  subs i s t ence  and' s o c i a l  
: '.. .. , 
' 3  .; . . . . . ' .  ' s t a t u s  gained w i t h i n  a  narrow range of s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n -  . ' .>, ' : .  ' . . ,  . .  4 .  .). . . .  . . . . , . , %.  > . , s h i p s .  Peasants  a r e  thus un l ike  c u l t i v a t o r s ,  who par- .. . . 
' ? , ' , ,  '.. ,, , .  . ' 3 " , , .: . . .  ....... . < : , :  : - . . .  '; . -  ' t i c i p a t e  f u l l y '  i n  t h e  market and who commit themselves . ~ . . . . . .  , , , s ! ' ' . "  , 
5 - . .:. . 4  , , . ,. . . .  . . t o  a  s t a t u s  game s e t  w i t h i n  a  wide s o c i a l  network. T o . .  , 
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. I .  . . . .  . . : -. . , I, ensure con t inu i ty  upon t h e  land and sustenance f o r  h i s  . :  . . . . . . .  . . .? . 
.._.. 1 . . '  - .  I .  , , , : . .  ,. 7 .  I . ( I  . I .  . , ,  . 4 . . household, the  peasant  most o f t e n  keeps the,market  a t  , 
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; ,  , t h r e a t e n s  h i s  hold o n h i s  source of l ive l ihood.  He . . .  . :. . . . . . . . . . .  . .  . , , . thus  c l eaves  t o  t r a d i t i o n a l  arrangements which guarantee 
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h i s  access  t o  land and t o  t h e  l abor  of  k in  and neighbors.  
. . . . .  . .  , - . . . : Moreover, he f avors  production f o r  s a l e  only w i t h i n  t h e  
. i! .- ' . . . . .  . .  . . . . . . .   context  of an assured  production f o r  subs is tence .  Put . . .  * 
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of production--land, l abor ,  equipment--are rendered 
r e l a t i v e l y  immobile by p r i o r  l i e n s  and expecta t ions ;  
products  a r e  so ld  i n  t h e  market t o  produce t h e  e x t r a  
margin of r e t u r n s  wi th  which t o  buy goods one does not 
produce on t h e  homestead. I n  c o n t r a s t , . t h e  farmer e n t e r s  
t h e  market f u l l y ,  s u b j e c t s  h i s  land and labor  t o  open 
competi t ion,  explores a l t e r n a t i v e  uses f o r  t h e  f a c t o r s  
of production i n  t h e  search  f o r  maximum r e t u r n s ,  and 
f a v o r s  t h e  more p r o f i t a b l e  product  over t h e  one en- 
t a i l i n g  t h e  smal ler  r i s k .  The change-over from peasant 
t o  farmer, however, i s  not  merely a  change i n  psycholog- 
i c a l  o r i e n t a t i o n ;  i t  involves  a  major s h i f t  i n  t h e  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  context  w i t h i n  which men make t h e i r  
choices .  Perhaps i t  i s  p r e c i s e l y  when t h e  peasant can 
no longer r e l y  on h i s  accustomed i n s t i t u t i o n a l  con- 
t e x t  t o  reduce h i s  r i s k s ,  bu t  when a l t e r n a t i v e  i n s t i -  
t u t i o n s  a r e  e i t h e r  too c h a o t i c  o r  too r e s t r i c t i v e  t o  
guarantee  a v i a b l e  commitment t o  new ways, t h a t  t h e  
psychological ,  economic, s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  tens ions  
a l l  mount toward peasant r e b e l l i o n  and involvement i n  
r e v o l u t i o n  (Wolf 1969: XIV-XV). 
From t h a t  springboard,  Wolf l eaps  t o  a  c l o s e  examination of t h e  
experience of t h e  peasantry i n  each of h i s  coun t r i e s ,  t o  s c r u t i n y  
of  t h e  cond i t ions  under which each of t h e  r evo lu t ions  i n  . ques t ion  . 
broke o u t ,  and t o  comparative a n a l y s i s  of the  determinants  of t h e  
cons iderably  d i f f e r e n t  forms of involvement of these  var ious  peasant 
popula t ions  i n  t h e i r  natconal  movements. 
Some common f e a t u r e s  emerge: t h e  c r u c i a l  r o l e  of t h e  middle 
peasants ,  r a t h e r  than the  r u r a l  p r o l e t a r i a n s  o r  the  kulaki ;  the  
i n f l u e n c e  of a l l i a n c e s  wi th  d i s a f f e c t e d  i n t e l l e c t u a l s :  the  i n i t i a l -  
l y  de fens ive  and inward-looking charac te r  of a l l  t h e  present  
r e b e l l i o n s ;  the  frequent  occurrence of a  deadlock of weak contenders 
f o r  power, u l t ima te ly  favorable  t o  wel l -organized.cent ra1  groups 
a l l i e d  wi th  m i l i t a r y  power; the  f i n a l  i n a b i l i t y  of peasants  t o  
accomplish t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  ends, however success fu l  t h e i r  r e b e l l i o n s  
i n  t h e  s h o r t  run,  i n  the  absence of s t r o n g  a l l i a n c e s  with de ter -  
mined and organized non-peasants. 
I n  the  long run, Wolf's sense  of t h e  v a r i a b l e s  involved w i l l  
probably c o n t r i b u t e  more t o  our understanding of p o l i t i c a l  con- 
f l i c t  than h i s  enumeration of t h e  cons tan t s .  He shows very ef-  
f e c t i v e l y  ( i n  a  l i n e  of argument s i m i l a r  t o  Moore's) t h a t  t h e  coa l i -  
t i o n s  formed by r e b e l l i o u s  peasants  s t r o n g l y  a f f e c t  whether t h e i r  
a c t i o n s  go beyond t h e  immediate r e d r e s s  of grievances,  t h a t  where 
commercial izat ion has proceeded so  f a r  a s  t o  d i s s o l v e  t h e  t r a d i -  
t i o n a l  o rgan iza t ion  of t h e  peasant community r e b e l l i o n  does not  
occur (cont rary  ' to  the  mass-society no t ion  t h a t  atomized and anguished 
men make i d e a l  r e b e l s ) ,  t h a t  a  center-outward p a t t e r n  of r e b e l l i o n ,  
as i n  Russia, China and Viet  Nam, favors  t h e  expanded power of a  
s i n g l e  p a r t y  a s  opposed t o  an  army and/or  a  n a t i o n a l  bourgeois ie .  
A t  p resen t ,  ex tens ions  of simple but  powerful analyses  l i k e  
Wolf's a r e  l i k e l y  t o  a i d  the  sys temat ic  s tudy of p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t  
more than t h e  borrowing of more e l abora te , and  a b s t r a c t  schemes l i k e  
those  of Johnson and Gurr. It would he lp  t o  e x p l i c a t e  and formal ize  
Wolf's argument, t o  f ind  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  of the  argu- 
ment and q u a n t i t a t i v e  evidence t o  t e s t  i t  out  where poss ib le ,  and 
t o  computerize p o r t i o n s  of the  a n a l y s i s  where the  d a t a  a r e  r i c h  
enough. The choice  is  not  between handwork and appara tus  but  be- 
tween s t rong  theory  and weak. The junc t ion  of t h e  powerful i d e a s  
of a  Wolf o r  a  Moore wi th  the  new methods emerging i n  h i s t o r i c a l  
r e sea rch  w i l l  produce exc i t ing  r e s u l t s .  
C o l l e c t i v e  History 
< 
I have i n  mind e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  inc reas ing  r ichness  of the  work 
now being done i n  c o l l e c t i v e  h i s t o r y :  h i s t o r y  from the  bottom up. 
C o l l e c t i v e  h i s t o r y  i s  the  sys temat ic  accumulation of comparable in- 
formation on numerous s o c i a l  u n i t s  (most o f t e n  ind iv idua l s ,  but  some- 
t imes f a m i l i e s ,  f i rms,  communities o r  o t h e r  u n i t s )  i n  order  t o  d e t e c t  
some s t r u c t u r e  o r  some change which i s  not r e a d i l y  v i s i b l e  t o  the  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  o r  the  observers .  The sha rpes t  examples come from 
demography, where changes i n  the  average age a t  marriage o r  i n  t h e  
d e a t h  r a t e  have none of t h e  dramatic v i s i b i l i t y  of t h e  death  of a  
k ing o r  t h e  outbreak of a  war, bu t  o f t e n  have more profound e f f , ec t s  
on t h e  l i v i n g  condi t ions  of l a r g e  popula t ions  than t h e  dramatic 
even t s  do. H i s t o r i c a l  demographers l i k e  E. A. Wrigley and Louis 
Henry have been transforming our knowledge of European soc ie ty  wi th  
. . , . .  
their ingenious e x p l o i t a t i o n  of everyday sources  l i k e  p a r i s h  reg i s -  
t e r s  and genealogies.  The l o g i c  of many s t u d i e s  of e l i t e s  and of 
s o c i a l  mobi l i ty  resembles t h a t  of h i s t o r i c a l  demography: assemble 
small, uniform and os tens ib ly  t r i v i a l  fragments of information 
about  ind iv idua l s  i n t o  evidence of major changes i n  s t r u c t u r e .  
E s s e n t i a l l y  s i m i l a r  procedures should .make i t  p o s s i b l e  t o  renew 
psychologica l  h i s t o r y ,  the  h i s t o r y  of consumption and production,  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  h i s t o r y  and the  ' h i s to ry  of p o l i t i c a l  power; so  f a r  
they have been l i t t l e  t r i e d .  
I n  s t u d i e s  of p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t ,  they have been t r i e d ,  with 
resounding success .  The French and the  f rancophi les  have l ed .  
Georges Lefebvre, t he  g r ea t ,  long-lived h i s t o r i a n  of t he  Revolution, 
provided much of t he  i n s p i r a t i o n ,  i f  not much of t h e  technique. He 
forwarded the  idea  of mul t ip le ,  semi-autrmommrevolutions converg- 
ing i n t o  a s i n g l e  Revolution. More important methodologically,  he  
demonstrated t h a t  the  semi-autonomous revolutions--especial ly t h e  
peasant revolution--were access ib le  t o  study from the  bottom up. 
But he d id  not  sys temat ize  the  study of the  populat ions involved. 
Albert  Soboul d id .  Soboul has no doubt been ~ e f e b v r e ' s  most in- 
f l u e n t i a l  h e i r  i n  both regards. H i s  1958 t h e s i s ,  & sans-culot tes  
p a r i s i e n s  --- en l ' a n  11, shone a spo t l i gh t  on faces  previously deep 
i n  shadow--the f ace s  of the  day-to-day a c t i v i s t s  of t h e  P a r i s i a n  
sec t ions .  (The "sections" were essen t i ' a l ly  neighhorhood governments 
and p o l i t i c a l  a ssoc ia t ions . )  I.t d id  s o  mainly through t h e  s t r a i g h t -  
forward but  extremely demanding ana ly s i s  of the  papers of t h e  
sec t ions  themselves, and t he  painstaking r econs t i t u t i on  of t h e i r  
membership. 
A t  about t h e  same time, Richard Cobb was ca r ry ing  out  a c l o s e  
study of t he  composition and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  volunteer  Revo- 
lu t ionary  Armies which played such a c r u c i a l  r o l e  i n  t he  ea r l y  
years  of  the  Revolution, I&re Tjdnnesson was following t he  P a r i s i a n  
sans-culot tes  through the  Year 111, George Rude was analyzing t h e  
a c t u a l  composition of t he  revolut ionary crowds of t h e  g r e a t  ~ou rn ' e e s ,  
Adeline Daumard, Louis Chevalier and F r a n ~ o i s  Furet  were c lo se ly  
s c r u t i n i z i n g  the  changing compqsition and' wealth of t he  P a r i s i a n  
popula t ion  from t h e  l a t e  e igh teen th  century t o  1848, and R6mi 
Gossez was applying many of the  same microscopic procedures t o  
the  Revolution of 1848. These h i s t o r i a n s  vary g r e a t l y  i n  preconcep- 
-- t i o n s , - t e c h n i q u e s  and s u b j e c t  ma t t e r .  What b r ings  them together ,  
wi th  dozens of t h e i r  compatriots ,  a s  exponents of a  new brand of 
. . h i s t o r y  i s  t h e  d e l i b e r a t e  accumulation of uniform d o s s i e r s  on numer- 
ous o rd ina ry  ind iv idua l s  i n  o rde r  t o  produce s o l i d  information on 
- 
c o l l e c t i v e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  not  r e a d i l y  v i s i b l e  i n  the  experiences of 
.. - 
any one of them. The s o l i d  informat ion  was o f t e n  q u a n t i t a t i v e ,  a l -  
though t h e  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  involved was o r d i n a r i l y  elementary. 
The adoption of c o l l e c t i v e  h i s t o r y  did not ,  of course,  guarantee 
success.  It could have been a  t e r r i b l e  waste of  time. Indeed, i t  
should have been, i f  old t h e o r i e s  about t h e  b l ind  spontanei ty  of 
t h e  masses were c o r r e c t .  A s  i t  turned ou t ,  however, c o l l e c t i v e  
h i s t o r y  y ie lded g r e a t  r e t u r n s  when app l i ed  t o  French p o l i t i c a l  con- 
f l i c t s .  H i s to r i ans  now understand how wide and deep was the  p o l i t i -  
c a l  mobi l i za t ion  of ordinary  Frenchmen i n  1789 and 1848, how coher- 
en t  t h e  a c t i o n  of the  so-cal led mob, how sharp  the  r i f t s  w i t h i n  t h e  
c o a l i t i o n  which made the  Revolution had become by 1793. The Marxist ' 
approach t o  the  s tudy  of French p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t s  gained new 
s t r e n g t h ,  both because Marxists  were more inc l ined than o t h e r s  t o  take  
up the  d lose  s tudy of the  " l f t t l e  peoplet t  which t h i s  s o r t  of c o l l e c t -  
i v e  h i s t o r y  involved, and because the  Marxist t r a d i t i o n  provided 
more powerful means of analyzing major d iv i s ions  wi th in  the  popu- 
l a t i o n  than i ts  r i v a l s  d id .  
Although much more has  been accomplished a long  t h e s e  l i n e s  i n  
French h i s t o r y  than  elsewhere,  t h e  cosmopoli tan George ~ u d 6  brought  
t h e  procedures  h e  p e r f e c t e d  i n  d e a l i n g  wi th  French crowds back a c r o s s  
t h e  channel  t o  B r i t a i n ,  wh i l e  s t u d e n t s  of t h e  P u r i t a n  Revolu t ion ,  o f  
t h e  American Revolu t ion  and of modern Germany have been d e v i s i n g  ve r -  
s i o n s  of c o l l e c t i v e  h i s t o r y  which a l s o  promise t o  renew t h e i r  a r e a s  
of s tudy .  I n  some of t h e s e  e n t e r p r i s e s  t h e  u n i t  under examinat ion 
is  n o t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  b u t  t h e  event ,  t h e  d e c l a r a t i o n ,  t h e  movement, 
o r  something e l s e .  But t h e  l o g i c  i s  s t i l l  t h e  same: comparable in-  
format ion  about  numerous unitssummed i n t o  p a t t e r n s  and changes which 
are o the rwi se  d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e t e c t .  
These developments i n  h i s t o r i c a l  r e s e a r c h  make i t  p o s s i b l e ,  
as never  b e f o r e ,  t o  j o i n  toge the r  t h e  r i c h n e s s  of t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  
record ,  t h e  s t r e n g t h  of t h e  k inds  of h i s t o r i c a l l y - b a s e d  theory  e lab-  
o r a t e d  by Moore and Wolf, and t h e  s e a r c h i n g  a n a l y t i c  procedures  of 
contemporary s o c i a l  s c i e n c e .  Not t h a t  we should abandon t h e  s t u d y  
of t h e  p r e s e n t .  The p o i n t ,  on t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  i s  t o  i n t e g r a t e  t h e  
examinat ion o f  today w i t h  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of yes t e rday .  
That  i n t e g r a t i o n  w i l l  be e a s i e r  i f  we s t a p  t r e a t i n g  t h e  p a s t  
as a r e p o s i t o r y  of  Grea t  Revolut ions and t h e  p r e s e n t  a s  a  c o n t a i n e r  
of o t h e r  k inds  of  c o n f l i c t s .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  a t t empt  t o  p l a c e  t h e  
g r e a t  s t r u g g l e s  f o r  power i n ' t h e  con tex t  of t h e  whole range  of  pol-  
i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t  w i l l  i t s e l f  b r i n g  ou t  many of t h e  c o n t i n u i t i e s  
between p a s t  and p r e s e n t .  
-- 
An Approach and Some Concepts 
Of course,  such a n  expansion of t h e  f i e l d  of v i s i o n  p resen t s  
i t s  own problems. I f  r e v o l u t i o n  i s  indeed a multi-dimensional phen- 
omenon, a long which dimensions should we expand? For example, one 
easy but  inadequate  formulat ion t r e a t s  r e v o l u t i o n  a s  a n  extreme case  
of a  more genera l  phenomenon c a l l e d  "violence." I f  we were t o  manu- 
f a c t u r e  a  Violence Detector  which would c lang  louder  and louder a s  i t  
passed g r e a t e r  and g r e a t e r  degrees of  damage t o  persons o r  proper ty ,  
however, i t  would r a i s e  a  hul labaloo around wars,hockey games, 
barrom brawls o r  everyday l i f e  i n  p r i sons ,  mental  h o s p i t a l s  and hous- 
i n g  p r o j e c t s ,  whi le  only chiming g e n t l y  i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  of a  g r e a t  
many coups d ' e t a t ,  demonstrat ions,  genera l  s t r i k e s  and so-cal led 
r e b e l l i o n s .  I f  v io lence  and r e v o l u t i o n  go together  t o  some e x t e n t ,  
. i t  is  n o t  because v io lence  i s  t h e  essence of r evo lu t ion ,  bu t  because 
men t u r n  t o  unl imi ted  means of coerc ion i n  t h e  f l u i d i t y  o f  a revolu- 
t i o n a r y  s i tua t i ' on ,  as i n  a number of  o t h e r  f l u i d  s i t u a t i o n s .  
. . Let  us r e t u r n  t o  t h e  exact  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between v io lence  and 
p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t  l a t e r  on. For now, t h e  important  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  
v io lence  by i t s e l f  does not  d e f i n e  a continuum of "revolut ionness" 
a t  one end of which we f i n d  the  fu l l - f ledged Great  Revolution. The 
same a p p l i e s  t o  a l l  t he  o t h e r  obvious p o s s i b i l i t i e s :  a )  t r a n s f e r  o f  
power a s  a  continuum, wi th  the  l a r g e s t  t r a n s f e r  (however "large" 
is  def ined)  t h e  most revolut ionary;  b) " s o c i a l  change" a s  a 
continuum, wi th  t h e  most rapid  and/or most far-reaching t h e  
most r evo lu t ionary ;  c )  i l l e g i t i m a c y  of p o l i t i c a l  
action, with the most illegitimate the most revolutionary; d) scale 
of collective'action, with large-scale more revolutionary; e) locus 
of action, with action by underdogs more revolutionary. Each of 
. ,  
these identifies some significant link between revolutions and other 
events. None of them singly defines the range of phenomena in- 
, 
eluding revolution. 
For the moment, then, let us assume that we are exploring the 
area of convergence of all these roads. We can call the entire region 
"political conflict," and leave its outer limits indefinite. The 
more violent, power-transferring, illegitimate etc. etc. the event, 
the closer we are coming to home. As we work, we can decide which 
roads are actually dead ends, and which ones main highways. 
A preliminary map of the region should include several impor- 
tant landmarks: a government, a polity, contenders for power. For 
any specified population, let us identify the organizations which 
control the principal concentrated means of coercion; such organi- 
zations are governments. In any particular population there may be 
several governments operating, or none at all. To the extent that 
such an organization is formally coordinated, centralized, differ- 
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equa l ly  success fu l .  To t h e  ex ten t  t h a t  a  contender exe rc i ses  a  
r o u t i n e l c l a i m  t o  response on the  p a r t  of agen t s  of the  government, 
t h e  contender i s  a member of the  p o l i t y ;  t h e  p o l i t y  c o n s i s t s  of a l l  
contenders r o u t i n e l y  and s u c c e s s f u l l y  l ay ing  claims on t h e  government. 
The nonmembers which a r e  contending f o r  power we may c a l l  chal lengers .  
Most groups wi th in  any p a r t i c u l a r  popula t ion  a r e  not contenders,  
many contenders a r e  not  members, .and some members a r e  a b l e  t o  exer- 
c i s e  f a r  l a r g e r  c o n t r o l  over t h e  a c t i v i t y  of the  government than o t h e r  
members. Obviously, a  group may contend f o r  power i n  more than one 
p o l i t y  (and even be a member of more than one) i f  more than one gov- 
ernment i s  opera t ing  wi th in  a populat ion.  These a r e  simply mat t e r s  
of d e f i n i t i o n .  
I l a y  ou t  t h e s e  ungainly d e f i n i t i o n s  (and o the r s ,  a l a s ,  s t i l l  
t o  come) wi th  trembling hands. Alber t  Hirschman (1970)--no mean 
wie lder  of paradigms himself--has warned e loquent ly  aga ins t  " the 
s e a r c h  f o r  paradigms a s  a  hindrance t o  understanding" revo lu t ions  and , 
p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t .  S o c i o l o g i s t s  and p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t s  a r e  ex- 
ceedingly vulnerable  t o  t h e  o ld  magical misconception t h a t  naming a 
phenomenon has the  e f f e c t  of taming i t .  Most conceptual schemes a r e ,  
a s  Hirschman claims,  more t r o u b l e  than they a r e  worth: b l i n d e r s ,  
not  te lescopes .  The t e s t s  of a  schemet.s va lue  come from t h e  under- 
s tanding,  the  f u r t h e r  exp lo ra t ions ,  t h e  new hypotheses, the  ve r i -  
f i a b l ' e  proposi t ions  which sp r ing  from i t s  use .  The scheme a t  hand i s  
l i t t l e  t e s t ed  i n  any of these  regards .  
Yet t h e  d e f i n i t i o n s  make it poss ib le  t o  map . . out a  s e t  of r e l a -  
t i o n s  among contenders,  p o l i t i e s  and governments. (The mapping is ,  
of course,  hypo the t i ca l ,  i n  the  same way t h a t  one might envis ion  a 
s t r a i g h t  road between London and P a r i s ,  only  t o  d iscover  t h e  incon- 
venient  f a c t  of t h e  English Channel.) Every p o l i t y ,  l e t  u s  say,  
e s t a b l i s h e s  t e s t s  of membership. The t e s t s  may inc lude  proof of 
s a n c t i t y ,  o r  wealth,  o r  any number of  o the r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  bu t  they 
always inc lude  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  mobil ize o r  coerce  s i g n i f i c a n t  numbers 
of  people. Plembers of a  p o l i t y  repeatedly  t e s t  each o t h e r ' s  qua l i -  
f i c a t i o n s .  When a  member f a i l s  a  p a r t i a l  t e s t ,  more s e r i o u s  chal -  
lenges  t o  t h e i r  membership follow{ repeated  f a i l u r e  l e a d s  t o  ex- 
c l u s i o n  from t h e  p o l i t y .  New members en te r  by passing t h e  t e s t s  of 
membership; o ld  members e x i t  by f a i l i n g  them. Each e n t r y  and each 
e x i t  changes t h e  c r i t e r i a  of membership i n  a  d i r e c t i o n  favorab le  t o  
t h e  r e s u l t i n g  s e t  of members, and t h e  members of t h e  p o l i t y  come 
t o  t r e a t  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  c r i t e r i a  a s  mat ters  of r i g h t ,  j u s t i c e  and 
p r i n c i p l e .  
Within t h e  p o l i t y ,  according t o  t h i s  hypo the t i ca l  construc-  
t i o n ,  s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  kinds of i n t e r a c t i o n s  a r e  cons tan t ly  going 
on: 
1. members of t h e  p o l i t y  a r e  rou t ine ly  applying resources  
t o  t h e  in f luence  of the  government; 
2. non-members a r e  a l s o  at tempting t o  in f luence  t h e  gov- 
ernment and t o  acqu i re  membership i n  t h e  p o l i t y ,  and mem- 
b e r s  ( a c t i n g  mostly through agencies. of the  government) 
a r e  r e s i s t i n g  those a t tempts ;  
3.  members a r e  t e s t i n g  each o the r  through a wide range 
of i n t e r ac t i ons  which could include contested e lec t ions ,  
parliamentary debates,  ceremonial d isplays ,  gang wars or 
advantageous marriages. 
The t e s t i ng  process by which contenders acquire  or lose  membership 
tends t o  increase  the  extent  of c o l l e c t i v e  violedce when t he  member- 
sh ip  of the  po l i t y  is  changing f a s t .  Prospective members o rd ina r i l y  
t r e a t  admission t o  the  p o l i t y  a s  due them on general  grounds, and , 
the re fore  f i g h t  i n  the  name of l a rge  p r inc ip l e s .  Exist ing members 
on t he  way out o rd ina r i l y  t r e a t  t h e i r  pr ivi leged pos i t i on  a s  guar- 
anteed by pa r t i cu l a r  agreements and customs, and therefore  f i g h t  
i n  t he  name of the  defense of hollowed r i g h t s .  Ei ther  of these  
o r i en t a t i ons  increases  t he  wi l l ingness  of the  individuals  i n  t he  
.- group t o  r i s k  damage o r  in ju ry ,  thus t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  violence.  
(Note, however, t h a t  over the  long run contenders enter ing and leav- 
ing t h e  p o l i t y  tend t o  receive  more damage and in ju ry  than they in- 
f l i c t ,  s ince  the  concentrated and e f f e c t i v e  means of coercion a r e  
- 
under the  con t ro l  of the  members v i a  t h e i r  influence over the  gov- 
ernment. We s h a l l  r e tu rn  t o  t h i s  problem l a t e r  on.) I f  t h i s  general  ' . . 
l i n e  of reasoning is  c o r r e c t ,  most c o l l e c t i v e  violence w i l l  oppose 
members of t he  p o l i t y  t o  non-members, members t o  members, and agents ' ,  
of the  government t o  non-members. Violent  c o n f l i c t s  of agents 
of government aga ins t  each o ther ,  agents  aga ins t  members and 
non-members aga ins t  non-members w i l l  be correspondingly r a r e .  
Mobilization and Contention fo r  Power 
How do contenders fo r  power come and go? Here t he  idea  of 
mobil ization is he lpfu l  (see Deutsch 1953, Etz ioni  1968, Net t1  1967). 
Men ge t  t h e i r  work done by accumulating and employing a grea t  
va r i e ty  of resources t o  inf luence each other and t o  transform the  
world around them. The resources include l o y a l t i e s ,  knowledge, 
- - 
wealth, machines, communication l i n e s  and any number of o ther  th ings .  
We can conveniently group them i n t o  th ree  categor ies :  normative, 
coercive,  and u t i l i t a r i a n  ( the  terminology comes from Etz ion i  1968, 
but the  general  idea  i s  commonplace). Normative resources include 
the  commitments of men t o  i dea l s ,  groups and o ther  men; coerc ive  
resources include means of punishing other  men and l im i t i ng  t he  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  open t o  them; u t i l i t a r i a n  resources include a l l  t h e  
--- 
r e s t ,  e spec ia l ly  those things men f i nd  i t  rewarding t o  acquire .  
When a group increases  i t s  c o l l e c t i v e  con t ro l  over any 
of these  three  v a r i e t i e s  of resources,  we say the  group is  mobili- 
zing; when i t s  c o l l e c t i v e  control  over such resources decreases,  
we say i t  i s  demobilizing. The group i n  question may range from a 
family t o  a t r i b e  t o  a s t a t e  to  an i n t e rna t i ona l  f edera t ion  of 
s t a t e s ;  the important th ing is  t h a t  the  group a s  a whole acqu i res  o r  
loses  co l l e c t i ve  con t ro l  of resources.  No group can take  any s o r t  
of co l l e c t i ve  a c t i o n  without some degree of mobil izat ion;  demobili- 
za t ion  u l t imate ly  des t roys  a group's capaci ty  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t i on .  
. . -. 
Although t h e  terminology may be ponderous, the core  meaning 
comes c lo se  to  a s tandard notion of a c t i ve  revo lu t ionar ies .  I n  one 
of h i s  most i n f l u e n t i a l  s tatements of s t ra tegy  during the  r e s i s t a n c e  
t o  Japan, Mao Tse-Tung wrote a s  follows: 
. Idhat does p o l i t i c a l  mobil izat ion mean? F i r s t ,  i t  means ' 
t e l l i n g  the  army and the  people about the p o l i t i c a l  aim 
of the war. It i s  necessary f o r  every s o l d i e r  and c i v i l i a n  
t o  see  why the  war must be fought and how i t  concerns him. 
. . . Secondly, i t  is  not  enough merely t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  
a i m  t o  them; t h e  s t e p s  and p o l i c i e s  f o r  i t s  a t t a inmen t  
must a l s o  be  g iven ,  t h a t  is,  t h e r e  must be  a  p o l i t i c a l  
programme . . . Thi rd ly ,  how should we mob i l i ze  them? 
By word of  mouth, by l e a f l e t s  and b u l l e t i n s ,  hy news- 
papers ,  books and pamphlets,  through p l a y s  and f i l m s ,  
through schoo l s ,  through t h e  mass organizat ions and 
through o u r  cad res .  What has  been done s o  f a r  i n  t h e  
Kuomintang a r e a s  i s  only  a  drop i n  t h e  ocean, and more- 
over  i t  h a s  been done i n  a  manner i l l - s u i t e d  t o  t h e  
peop le ' s  t a s t e s  and i n  a  s p i r i t  uncongenial  t o  them; 
t h i s  must be  d r a s t i c a l l y  changed. Four th ly ,  t o  mob i l i ze  
once is  n o t  enough; p o l i t i c a l  m o b i l i z a t i o n  f o r  t h e  War 
o f  Res i s t ance  must be cont inuous.  Ourjob i s  n o t  t o  
r e c i t e  o u r  p o l i t i c a l  programme t o  t h e  people,  f o r  no- 
body w i l l  l i s t e n  t o  such r e c i t a t i o n s ;  we must l i n k  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  m o b i l i z a t i o n  f o r  t h e  war w i t h  developments 
i n  t h e  war and w i t h  t h e  l i f e  of t h e  s o l d i e r s  and t h e  
people ,  and make i t  a  cont inuous movement (Mao 1965b: 
155). 
A l l  t h e  c u r r e n t  i d e a  of m o b i l i z a t i o n  does ,  then ,  i s  t o  broaden Maofs 
c e n t r a l  n o t i o n  t o  e x p l i c i t l y  i n c l u d e  c o n t r o l  over  o b j e c t s  and organ- 
i z a t i o n s  as w e l l  as commitments of i n d i v i d u a l s .  
W e  a r e  now p i l i n g  d e f i n i t i o n s  on d e f i n i t i o n s .  Never the less  
t h e s e  i d e a s  of m o b i l i z a t i o n  make i t  e a s i e r  t o  s e e  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  t h a t  
a wide range  of  group a c t i v i t i e s  have i n  common: accumulat ing a 
s t r i k e  fund,  b u i l d i n g  a n  e t h n i c  i d e n t i t y ,  s t o r i n g  weapons, sending 
members o f f  t o  school ,  working o u t  a  s e c r e t  r i t u a l ,  l a y i n g  a  c l a im  t o  
a c e r t a i n  p a r t  o f  every member's t ime, b u i l d i n g  a  headqua r t e r s ,  and 
s o  on. Some of  t h e s e  do no t  i n c r e a s e  t h e  t o t a l  r e sou rces  members 
of t h e  group posses s ,  b u t  simply t r a n s f e r  r e sou rces  from i n d i v i d u a l  
t o  group. A l l  o f  them, on t h e  o t h e r  hand, i n c r e a s e  t h e  r e sou rces  of 
which t h e  group a s  a whole can  d ispose .  
The structure, the environment and the already-accumulated 
resources of a group greatly limit the avenues toward mobilization 
open to it at any point in its history. Resources spent properly 
bring in new resources of a different kind, as when an ethnic leader 
uses his group's funds to bribe a politician disposing of jobs for 
his people, or a revolutionary committee activates the loyalties it 
commands to bring in cash contributions from its following. Whether 
the net effect of such exchanges is additional mobilization depends 
on the terms of trade between jobs and bribes on the one hand and 
between depletion of reserve loyalties and augmentation of the treas- 
ury on the other. Again, the environment may be abundant, yielding 
resources readily with little effort, or harsfi, full of competitors 
, . and barren of resources. All other things being equal, an abundant . . 
environment obviously facilitates mobilization. 
Finally, the group's organizational structure limits the means 
of mobilization. Perhaps the most important dimension in this re- ' 
gard is the one which runs from communal to associational organiza- 
tion. (The basic idea is one of the oldest in sociology; it has 
frequently been abused through the assumption that it describes the 
basic path of human evolution, the disguising of the fact that it 
lumps together several variables which 'do not always change in the 
same direction and the implicit assertion that the,one end is good, 
the other bad; here I offer it only as a preliminary sorting device.) 
Communal structures are small, local and relatively undifferentiated 
in structure. They recruit largely through inheritance. Among 
f r e q u e n t  contenders  f o r  power a t  one l e v e l  o r  ano the r  i n  t h e  world 
of  t h e  l a s t  few c e n t u r i e s ,  c o r p o r a t e  k i n  groups,  peasant  v i l l a g e s ,  
c r a f t  b ro therhoods  and r e l i g i o u s  congrega t ions  tend toward t h i s  ex- 
treme cype. Assoc ia t iona l  s t r u c t u r e s  a r e  l a r g e ,  ex t ens ive  and com- 
p l ex .  They r e c r u i t  l a r g e l y  through open t e s t s o f  i n t e n t i o n  and per- 
formance. In t h e  m o d e ~ n  world, p a r t i e s ,  f i r m s ,  t r a d e  unions and 
v o l u n t a r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a r e  f r equen t  contenders  of t h i s  type. 
To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  a  contender  i s  communal i n  s t r u c t u r e ,  i t  is 
u n l i k e l y  t o  b e  a b l e  t o  expand i t s  manpower r e p i d l y ,  b u t  i t  i s  q u i t e  
l i k e l y  t o  b e  a b l e  t o  gene ra t e  s t r o n g  l o y a l t i e s  on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  
members i t  does possess .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  a contender  i s  a s soc i a -  
t i o n a l  i n  s t r u c t u r e ,  t h e  accumulat ion of i n t e n s e  commitments i s  
l i k e l y  t o  be  very  c o s t l y ,  wh i l e  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of a  range of spec i a l -  
i z e d  s k i l l s  w i l l  b e  r e l a t i v e l y  easy .  Whether t h e  posses s ion  of in-  
t e n s e  commitments w i l l  be  more o r  l e s s  advantageous than  t h e  posses- 
. . 
s i o n  of s p e c i a l i z e d  s k i l l s ,  of cou r se ,  depends e n t i r e l y  on t h e  n a t u r e  ' 
of  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  t a s k s  a t  hand and t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of t h e  sur rounding  
world . 
. .. - . . . . 
The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  of  t h e  contenders  f o r  power . < '., .. ., . , - .  
! '  
w i t h i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  p o l i t y  a l s o  has  a  s t r o n g  impact on t h e  t y p i c a l  
forms of c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  w i t h i n  the'  p o l i t y .  To be more exac t ,  i t  . . 2. 
. . . .  _:. .
a f f e c t s  t h e  k inds  of  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  which o r d i n a r i l y  produce 
v io l ence .  With communal contenders ,  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  tends  t o  be un- . 
. . 
coordina ted ,  loca l ized ," raggedly  bounded i n  t ime and space ,  respon- 
. , 
s i v e  t o  r o u t i n e s  of congrega t ion  such  a s  t hose  of r e l i g i o u s  observance, .  
a 
festivals, planting, marketing and so on. Violence engaging communal 
contenders therefore tends to spring from such settings. The free- 
for-all between gilds and the rural tax rebellion illustrate what 
I have in mind. 
With associational contenders, the collective action (and hence 
the setting of collective violence) tends to be planned, scheduled, 
bounded, disciplined and large in scale. The violent strike and the 
turbulent demonstration are typical cases. This does not necessarily 
mean that they are more serious or more destructive than the violence 
involving communal contenders. In fact, peasant revolts are legen- 
dary for their bloodletting; associational participants in violence 
often have the advantage of being able to call off their forces as 
soon as they have won, or lost. Nevertheless, collective violence 
on a large scale rarely occurs without the significant involvement 
of associations. 
In the western experience on which this analysis is based, 
there is a tight connection between a contender's organizational 
structure and the locus of its power. The tightness of the connection 
may have led me to misstate the relationship between organizational 
structure and collective action. For the most part, communal groups 
wield power at a small scale, in local polities. To an important 
degree, associational groups wield power at a large scale, especially in 
national polities. If the correspondence were perfect, we would have 
no problem: localism and communal organization would simply be two 
features of the same phenomenon. But organizations such as gilds 
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and sworn brotherhoods have complex formal s t r u c t u r e s ,  y e t  o f t e n  
o p e r a t e  a t  a purely l o c a l  s c a l e ;  l ikewise ,  e t h n i c  and r e l i g i o u s  
groups sometimes band together ,  without  any s i n g l e  a s soc ia t ion  t o  
u n i f y  them, a t  a  n a t i o n a l  s c a l e .  One could make a  p laus ib le  case  
t h a t  l o c a l  g i l d s  and sworn brotherhoods behave the  same a s  o the r  
l o c a l  groups which l a c k  t h e i r  complex formal s t r u c t u r e s ,  t h a t  
n a t i o n a l  e t h n i c  and r e l i g i o u s  groups behave t h e  same a s  na t iona l  
a s s o c i a t i o n s .  O r  s c a l e  and formal i ty  of s t r u c t u r e  could have 
d i s t i n c t  e f f e c t s .  A s  I use i t  here ,  then,  t h e  communal-associa- 
t i o n a l  scheme con ta ins  two hypotheses which should be  t r e a t e d  a s  
hypo the t i ca l :  1 )  i n  genera l ,  t h e  l a r g e r ,  t h e  more extensive,  the  
more complex the  organiza t ion ,  t h e  l a r g e r  t h e  s c a l e  a t  which i t  
- 
wie lds  power; 2) t he  s c a l e  a t  which a  group wields power, a s  such, 
does  not  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t  i ts  predominant forms of c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n .  A t  l e a s t  t h e  hypotheses a r e  p l a u s i b l e ,  and open t o  
empi r i ca l  examination. 
Types of Co l l ec t ive  Action 
These s ta tements  dea l  with c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  not  with 
v i o l e n c e  i t s e l f .  Violence i s  a n  i n t e r a c t i o n  among people o r  
between people and o b j e c t s .  L e t ' s  save the  d i scuss ion  of d e f i n i -  
t i o n s  and shades of meaning f o r  l a t e r .  For now, a  simple obser- 
v a t i o n .  I n  the  western experience, t h r e e  fundamental forms of 
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  (each with many v a r i a n t s )  have led  t o  violence.  
.Form 1, competi t ive a c t i o n :  members of a  group which de f ines  another  
p a r t i c u l a r  group a s  a  r i v a l  o r  a s  an  enemy a t t a c k s  the  resources 
of t h a t  r i v a l  o r  enemy, Thus two armies f i g h t  i t  out ;  members of 
a  cabinet-makers' g i l d  vanda l i ze  the  headquarters  of a  r i v a l  g i l d ;  
armed peasants  l a y  waste t h e  c a s t l e s  of t h e  l o c a l  n o b i l i t y .  Groups 
which a r e  members of  some p a r t i c u l a r  p o l i t y  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  employ 
competi t ive a c t i o n s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  o the r  members of t h e  same 
p o l i t y .  I f  w e  mainta in  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between communal and 
a s s o c i a t i o n a l  groups, then  i t  w i l l  be convenient t o  c a l l  t h e  
communal group's  v e r s i o n  of competi t ive c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  p r i m i t i v e ,  
and t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n a l  group 's  ve r s ion  in teres t -group.  
Form 2, r e a c t i v e  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion :  some group, o r  i t s  agent ,  
l a y s  claim t o  a r e source  c u r r e n t l y  under the  c o n t r o l  of another  
p a r t i c u l a r  group, and t h e  members of the  second r e s i s t  t h e  e x e r c i s e  
of t h a t  claim, The a c t i o n  of  the  second group i s  r e a c t i v e .  Thus 
t h e  government's t a x  c o l l e c t o r  a r r i v e s  t o  enforce a new levy,  and 
t h e  v i l l a g e r s  d r i v e  him o u t  of town; a  group of band i t s  abduct a  
young woman, and h e r  kinsmen arm t o  hunt down t h e  band i t s ;  S o c i a l i s t s  
b u r s t  i n t o  a Communist meeting and s e i z e  t h e  podium, on ly  t o  be  
beaten  up by t h e  Communists. I suggest  t h a t  contenders which a r e  
l o s i n g  membership i n  a  p o l i t y  a r e  e s p e c i a l l y  prone t o  r e a c t i o n  
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  For communal contenders, the  s u b t i t l e  r eac t ionary  
seems appropr ia t e ;  f o r  a s s o c i a t i o n a l  contenders,  defens ive .  
Form 3, p r o a c t i v e  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion :  some group c a r r i e s  out  an  
a c t i o n  which, under the  p r e v a i l i n g  r u l e s ,  l a y s  c la im t o  a resource  
not  previous ly  accorded t o  t h a t  group; a t  l e a s t  one o t h e r  group , 
intervenes in the action and resists the claim. The action.of. 
the first group is proactive; obviously proactive motions by one 
group often lead to reactive motions by ,another. Thus an 
unauthorized association holds a public meeting, and police break 
it up; organized squatters move onto vacant land, and the landlords 
try to drive them away; demonstrators seize the city hall, and 
counter-demonstrators attack them. I suggest that contenders which 
are gaining membership in polities have an especial propensity to 
proactive collective action. Here, I suggest the name "revitali- 
.-. . 
zation" for the communal version, on the basis of work by Anthony F.C. 
Wallace. Revitalization movements, in Wallace's analysis, form 
around a whole new way of understanding the world. My speculation i s  
- .  twofold: a) that a communal group is not likely to mobilize 
extensively, bid for membership in a polity and therefore become 
- 
newly involved in collective violence unless its members are 
. . 
undergoing a major collective transformation of their perception of 
the world; a millennarian movement would be a type case; b) that no 
rapid change in the membership of a polity composed mainly of 
communal contenders is likely to occur except through the creation 
- 
of an entirely new group identity via a drastic revitalization 
process. The associational form of proactive collective action 
we may simply call "offensive','. 
In all three basic forms, the "resources" involved cover quite 
a range; they include people, land, private spaces, rights to act in 
certain ways. Reactive and proactive forms resemble each other in 
9 .  , * 
centering on the sequence assertion of claim/challenge to claim/ 
I " 
\ 
damage to one party by another. Although they have a gray area 
, 
- . between them, they differ: in the reactive form the resources in 
!. 
, . , question are already under the control of some particular group. 
* P  . * 
In the competitive form, the disagreement between groups may very 
- - well center on claim and counter-claim, but the immediate action 
does not consist of the exercising of claims. 
P < 
The three forms are so broad that they might seem to exhaust 
the logical possibilities. Not so. All three forms relate 
T 
specific groups to each other, and-thereby exclude action by'chance 
I ?  crowds, by the general population and by the disorganized dregs of 
social life. By the same token, they exclude random, expressive, 
-- purely destructive actions. The typology rests on the argument 
that the excluded forms of collective action -- spontaneous, 
-- 
disorganized, random, etc. -- are rare or nonexistent. 
The observations made so far on mobilization, contention and 
collective action crystallize into a useful classification of the 
forms of collective action leading to violence in which different 
kinds of contenders are likely to be involved. We distinguish first 
among groups which are not contending/challenging/maintaining 
membership/losing membership. Then we array the organizational 
structures of contenders from communal to associational: 
Communa 1 Associa tional 
I 






-. member ship : 
competitive 
losing 
member ship : 
reactive 
The diagram incorporates several hypotheses, some of them quite 
,- 1 
No collective action = 
No violence ........................................................ 
Revitalization Offensive 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Primitive Interes t-group 
........................................................ 
Reactionary Defensive 
speculative. The first hypothesis represents one of the chief 
i 
arguments of this essay: segments of the population which are 
unmobilized and not contending for power are rarely involved in 
collective violence. Remaining on the communal side of the 
continuum, the diagram indicates that communal contenders maintaining 
membership in a polity will ordinarily test each other via "primitive" 
actions of the type of ceremonials, games, drinking bouts or contacts 
in routine assemblies, and that these occasions will constitute their 
opportunities for collective violence. Those losing membership, on 
the other hand, will find themselves banding together to defend 
prerogatives or to resist encroachments, and will therefore form 
the nucleus of classic older forms of collective violence like the 
food riot, machine-breaking, the tax rebellion or true guerrilla. 
- 
b h  
On the other side, the diagram tells us that the collective 
action likely to involve an associational challenger in violence-- 
. .. 
"offensive" action--will center on displays of' the facts that the 
contender meets the tests of membership in the polity, attempts to 
coerce existing members and agents of the government, concerted 
efforts .to acquire some lasting control over the actions of the gov- 
ernment. Interes t-group actions (especially orderly shows of strength 
like parades) will be the main occasions on which associational m e w  
bers of the polity are involved.in collective violence. And the 
word "defensive," applied to associationally-organized contenders 
losing their membership, calls to mind the extensively-organized 
movement to resist change, secure old privileges, reactivate old 
symbols, bolster faltering strength. 
The propositions embedded in the scheme are imprecise where they 
are not speculative 'or tautologial; the main use of the scheme is as 
a classification. Nevertheless, the taxonomy as a whole emphasizes 
two ideas: 1) unmobilized segments of the population are little in- 
volved in collective violence, while certain kinds of mobilized groups 
are heavily involved in it; 2) the form of collective violence depends 
closely on the relationship of the participants to the existing struc- 
ture of power. 
Another assertion likewise lurks in the typology: governments 
and their agents are not simply on lookers, arbiters or cleaners-up 
in collective violence, but are often major participants in the 
action. Governments often lay new claims which other parties chal- 
lenge. Governments often resist the exercise of new claims. In war 
? -- 
and elsewhere, governments often play a major part in violence among 
rivals and enemies--at the extreme, arrogating to themselves the 
-- sole right to employ force in such encounters. To what extent gov- 
ernments act autonomously in such circumstances, and to what extent 
they act on behalf of particular members of the polity, undoubted- 
-- 
lyvaryconsiderably from one kind of government to another. What 
those variations are, and how much autonomy the average government 
has in this'regard,-make up two of the most important political 
questions of our time, 
Applying the Model to Western Political Experience 
The scheme provides a convenient means of summing up the larg- 
- .  
est trends in the evolution of collective violence in western countries 
- over the last four or five centuries. Two main processes have dom- 
inated all the rest: 1) the rise of national states to preeminent 
positions in a wide variety of political activities; 2) the increas- 
ingly associational character of the principal contenders for power 
at the local as well as the national level. In 1500, no full-fledged 
national state with unquestioned priori'ty over the other governments 
within its territory existed anywhere in the West. England was 
probably the closest approximation. Most statelike organizations 
faced serious challenges to their hegemony from both inside and out- 
' side the territory; in fact, only a small minority of the hundreds 
of more or less autonomous governments survived the next two cen- 
turies or statemaking. Most power was concentrated in polities of 
smaller than national scale: communities, city-states, principali- 
ties, semi-autonomous provinces. Most contenders for power in 
those polities were essentially communal in structure: craft brother- 
hoods, families, peasant communities. The predominant forms of 
~ollective violence registered these circumstances: wars between 
rival governments, brawls between groups of artisans, battles among 
the youth of neighboring communes, attacks by one religious group on 
another . 
The rise of the state, however, threatened the power (and often 
the very survival) of all these small-scale polities. They resisted; 
the statemakers only.won their struggle for predominance over the 
furious resistance of princes, communes, provinces and peasant com- 
munities. For several centcries the principal forms of collective 
violence followed what I have call.ed. the "reactionary" pattern: 
communally-basedacontenders fighting against loss of membership in 
polities, in fact against the very destruction of the polities in 
which their power was invested. Collective resistance to conscrip- 
tion, to taxation, to billeting, to a whole variety of other exactions 
of the state exemplify this reactionary variety of collective action 
characteristically producing violence. 
Two things eventually put an end to the predominance of the 
reactionary forms, although at times and tempos which varied mark- 
edly from one part of the West to another. First, the state won 
almost everywhere. One may ask how complete the victory of the state 
was i n  the,remote sec t ions .~of  vas t  t e r r i t o r i e s  l i k e  Canada, Aus t ra l i a ,  
o r  Braz i l ,  and specula te  whether recent  surges of sectionalism i n  
Belgium, Great Br i t a in ,  and even France presage the  end of s t a t e  .a>. 
cont ro l .  But on the  whole the  two cen tur ies  a f t e r  1700 produced 
an  enormous concentrat ion of resources and means of coercion under 
t h e  con t ro l  of nat ional  s t a t e s ,  t o  t h e  v i r t u a l  exclusion of o ther  
l eve l s  of government. Second, a  whole s e r i e s  of organizat ional  
changes c lose ly  l inked t o  urbanization and i ndus t r i a l i z a t i on  g r ea t l y  
reduced t h e  r o l e  of the  communal group a s  a  s e t t i n g  fo r  mobil ization 
and reposi tory  fo r  power, while t he  assoc ia t ion  of one kind or anoth- 
e r  came t o  be the  cha rac t e r i s t i c  veh ic le  fo r  co l l ec t i ve  ac t ion .  The 
r i s e  of t he  joint-stock company, the  p o l i t i c a l  par ty ,  t he  labor union, 
the  club a l l  belong t o  the  same general  trend.  
Working together,  the  v ic to ry  o f '  t he  s t a t e  and the  . r i s e  . .  of the  
assoc ia t ion  transformed the  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ions  which most commonly 
produced violence. I n  country a f t e r  country, p o l i t i c s  nat ional ized;  
t h e p d i t y  which mattered was the  one which controlled the  na t iona l  
s t a t e ;  t he  c ruc i a l  s t rugg les  f o r  power went on a t  a  na t iona l  s ca l e .  
And the  pa r t i c ipan t s  i n  those s t ruggles  were most o f ten  associa- 
t i ona l  i n  organization.  Revi ta l i za t ion ,  primitive and reaction- 
a ry  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ions  declined i n  prevalence and importance, while 
offensive ,  interest-group and' defensive co l l ec t i ve  ac t ions  took over. 
The s t r i k e ,  the  demonstration, the  par ty  conspiracy, the  organized 
march on the  cap i t a l ,  the  parliamentary sess ion,  the  mass meeting 
became the  usual  s e t t i n g s  f o r  co l l e c t i ve  violence.  And t he  s t a t e  
became an  i n t e r e s t e d  pa r t i c i pan t  i n  almost a l l  c o l l e c t i v e  violence-- 
as policeman, a s  pa r ty  t o  the  c o n f l i c t ,  and a s  t e r t i u s  gaudens. 
That b r ings  us back t o  contention f o r  power. Contenders f o r  
power with respec t  t o  any p a r t i c u l a r  government a r e  groups which 
c o l l e c t i v e l y  apply resources  t o  the  inf luence of t h a t  government. 
I n  theory, a  group can mobil ize without contending f o r  power, i f  i t  
app l i e s  i t s  c o l l e c t i v e  resources e n t i r e l y  t o  rec rea t ion ,  the  search 
f o r  enlightenment o r  some o ther  non-pol i t ica l  end. A commune o r  
r e l i g ious  community r e t i r i n g  from the  world moves i n  t ha t  d i r ec t i on .  
Within the  modern warld,  however, governments a r e  so  l i k e l y  t o  claim 
t h e  power t o  r egu l a t e  and t o  ex t r ac t  resources from any mobil izing 
group t ha t  (above some low minimum) mobil izat ion usual ly  propels  
a group i n t o  content ion f o r  power over one government o r  another .  
E r i c  Wolf's a n a l y s i s  of t he  involvement of peasant communities i n  
revolut ions ,  f o r  example, shows how regu la r ly  they mobil ize and then , 
contend f o r  power i n  se l f -defense .  
Wolf's ana ly s i s  a l s o  t e l l s  us how c r u c i a l  t o  the  success of 
t h a t  contention f o r  power a r e  the  coa l i t i ons  peasant communities 
make with other  groups ou t s ide .  No c o a l i t i o n  = l o s t  revolut ion.  
I n  a  g rea t  many s i t u a t i o n s ,  a  s i ng l e  contender does not  have enough 
resources--enough committed men, enough guns, enough t ra ined  lawyers, 
enough cash--to in f luence  t he  government by i t s e l f .  A c o a l i t i o n  
with another contender which has overlapping o r  complementary de- 
s igns  on the  government w i l l  then increase  the  j o i n t  power of t he  
contenders t o  accomplish those designs.  
- . While c o a l i t i o n s  most commonly occur between members of the  
p o l i t y  ( t h a t  is ,  between groups which can a l r eady  r o u t i n e l y  lay  
. - 
claims t o  response and t o  de l ive ry  of resources  by agen t s  of t h e  
government) o r  between nonmembers of t h e  p o l i t y  (between groups 
which have no r o u t i n e  claims t o  response and de l ive ry  of r e sources ) ,  
c o a l i t i o n s  between members and nonmembers f r equen t ly  occur when t h e  
members a r e  seeking ends f o r  which t h e r e  a r e  not  enough c o a l i t i o n  
p a r t n e r s  w i t h i n  t h e  p o l i t y ,  and f o r  which t h e  resources being mobil- 
' 
ized  by t h e  nonmembers would be  use fu l .  This  happens when a  pa r ty  
wins a n  e l e c t i o n  by buying o f f  t h e  support  of a  t r i b e  through prom- 
-- ises of jobs  and in f luence ,  o r  when a  d i s s i d e n t  bu t  e s t ab l i shed  
group of i n t e l l e c t u a l s  forms an  a l l i a n c e  with a  new workers'  move- 
ment. These c o a l i t i o n s  take  on s p e c i a l  importance because they 
o f t e n  open the  way t o  t h e  new contender 's  a c q u i s i t i o n  of membership 
i n  t h e  p o l i t y ,  o r  t h e  way t o  a  revolut ionary  a l l i a n c e .  
Member-nonmember c o a l i t i o n s  a l s o  matter  because they appear 
t o  s t rong ly  a f f e c t  t h e  amount of v io lence  which grows out  of conten- 
- . t i o n  f o r  power. Under most cond i t ions  a  c o a l i t i o n  with a  member 
reduces the  v io lence  which a t t e n d s  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of power by a  
nonmember. The c o a l i t i o n s  of t h e  woman's su f f rage  and temperance 
' . movements i n  England and the  United S t a t e s  with o t h e r  e s t ab l i shed  
segments of the  middle c l a s s e s ,  f o r  example, almost c e r t a i n l y  re-  
. s t r a i n e d  the  use of f o r c e  aga ins t  them. Where the  e f f e c t  of t h e  
c o a l i t i o n  is t o  s p l i t  the  p o l i t y  i n t o  f a c t i o n s  making exclus ive  and 
incompatible claims on the  government, however, a  high degree of 
c o l l e c t i v e  v io lence  i s  l i k e l y  t o  follow. 
Violence 
In order to understand why this should be so, we ought to 
look more closely at the nature of "violence." The term often serves 
as a catchall containing all the varieties of pro.test, militancy, 
coercion, destruction or muscle-flexing which a given observer hap- 
( 
pens to fear or condemn. Violence, as Henry Bienen (1968: 4) com- 
I I ments, carries overtones of 'violating,' and we often use violence 
to refer to illegitimate force." (cf. Converse 1968: 481-485). With 
that usage, we shall never be able to make systematic statements 
about the conditions of violence. If we restrict our attention to 
human actions which.damage persons or property, however, we have at 
least a chance to sort out the regularities in their appearance. 
Even that restriction calls immediately for further distinctions; 





--normal wear of automobiles or the roads they drive on 
--disposal of noxious wastes 
--cigarette smoking 
The obvious temptation is to add some qualifications concerning the 
intentions of the actors: they want to destroy, they are angry, they 
seek power, or something else. The trouble with letting a lot 
depend on intentions is intentions are mixed and hard to discern, 
The judgements outsiders make concerning the intentions of partici- 
pants in conflicts usually include implicit theories of causation 
and responsibility. Even with full knowledge, intentions often 
turn out to be mixed and divergent, often change or misfire in the 
course of the action. We must ask whose intentions when. Violence 
is rarely a solo performance; it usually grows out of an interaction 
of opponents. Whose intentions should count: the small group of 
demonstrators who gather on the steps of the capital, the larger 
group of spectators who eventually get drawn into the action, the 
police who first stand guard and then struggle to disperse the crowd? 
Both in theory and in practice, then, intentions provide very shaky 
criteria for the distinction of violence from nonviolence. 
In her brilliant essay on violence, Hannah Arendt (1970) urges 
a fundamental distinction between power and violence. Power, in 
her view, is "the human ability not just to act but to act in concert." 
But the difficulties with which we are now wrestling come out in one 
fact: Arendt never quite defines violence. This is the closest 
approach: 
Violence, finally, as I have said, is distinguished by 
its instrumental character. Phenomenologically, it is 
close to strength, since the implements of violence, 
like all other tools, are designed and used for the 
purpose of multiplying natural strength until, in the 
last stage of their development, they can substitute 
for it (Arendt 1970: 46). 
As a distinction in political philosophy--that is, in the principles 
upon which we can reasonably found a system of government and by 
which we can justify or condemn public. actions--I find Arendt's 
. treatment of power and violence illuminating. As a guide to obser- 
vation of acting men, however, it has the fatal flaw of resting 
exactly on the features of collective action which observers and 
participants dispute most passionately, precisely because they are 
the features of action which will bring on it justification from 
some and condemnation from others. The justification and condemna- 
tion are important business, but they are not our business here. 
Nor do any easy alternatives lie close at hand. We may try 
li 
to define "normal" or "expected" or "legitimate" uses of force in 
social life, and define deviations from them as violent; that ap- 
proach not only requires the (rather difficult) assessment of the 
normal expected state of affairs but also tends to define away 
violence exerted by professional specialists in coercion. If, on 
the other hand, we turn to the amount of damage sustained by the 
individuals involved, we face the difficulty of determining how 
direct and material the damage must be: Does a firm's dumping of . 
garbage which promotes disease count? Does the psychic burden of 
enslavement count? 
I recite these tedious complications in order to emphasize 
that in the present'state of knowledge and theory concerning violence 
any definition will be arbitrary in some regards and debatable in 
many others. Men do not agree on what they will call violent; what 
is more, their disagreement springs to an important extent from 
differences in political perspective; My own inclination is toward 
what Terry Nardin calls a "brute harm" conception of violence: any 
- 
observable interaction in the course of which persons or objects are 
seized or physically.damaged over resistance. (Direct or indirect - 
< 
resistance, in the form of attacks on persons, erection of barriers, 
standing in the way, holding on to the persons or objects at issue, 
and so on, enters the definition in order to exclude self-destruction, 
potlatches, ceremonial mutilation, urban renewal and other collective 
damage in which all parties are more or less agreed to theaction.) 
Further distinctions start from there: collective vs. indivi- 
dual, depending on the number of parties to the inter-action; games 
vs. nongames, depending on the extent to which all participants begin 
-- 
with an agreement to work toward a determinate set of alternative 
i 
outcomes by following some standard rules; continuous vs. discontinous, 
i depending on how great a time span we observe and how large an inter- 
- val we permit to elapse before we call the action at an end; and so 
forth. 
A Way of Defining and Studying Collective Violence 
Within this broad field, let us concentrate on collective 
violence within a population under the control of a single govern- 
ment. Let us agree to pay little attention to war, to full fledged 
games, to individual violence or to highly discontinuous interac- 
tions. We are then still free to examine events i.n which agents of 
the government do all the damaging, and other events in which the 
damage was only incidental to the aims of most of those involved. 
In a series of investigations of collective violence in modern 
Europe, my own research group has discovered that we can, without 
enormous u n c e r t a i n t y ,  s i n g l e  ou t  even t s  occu r r ing  w i t h i n  a  p a r t i -  
c u l a r  n a t i o n a l  s t a t e  i n  which a t  l e a s t  one group of f i f t y  o r  more 
persons  s e i z e s  o r  damages someone o r  something from ano the r  group. 
Below t h a t  s c a l e ,  c o l l e c t i v e  v i o l e n c e  begins  t o  f a d e  i n t o  b a n d i t r y ,  
brawling,  vandal ism,  t e r r o r i s m  and a  wide v a r i e t y  of t h r e a t e n i n g  
nonvio len t  e v e n t s ,  s o  f a r  a s  o u r  a b i l i t y  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  them on  t h e  
b a s i s  of t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  record i s  concerned. 
We use  t h e  community-population-day a s  a n  e l e m e n t a r y ' u n i t .  
On a p a r t i c u l a r  day, d i d  t h i s  segment of t h e  popu la t ion  of  t h i s  
* 
community engage i n  c o l l e c t i v e  v i o l e n c e ,  a s  j u s t  de f ined?  I f  s o ,  
we have t h e  elementary u n i t  of a v i o l e n t  i n c i d e n t .  'D id  a n  over- 
l app ing  s e t  of people  c a r r y  on t h e  a c t i o n  i n  a n  a d j a c e n t  community? 
I f  so ,  bo th  communities were involved i n  t h e  same i n c i d e n t .  Did 
a n  over lapping  s e t  o f  'people con t inue  t h e  a c t i o n  t h e  fo l lowing  day? 
I f  so ,  t h e  i n c i d e n t  l a s t e d  a t  l e a s t  two days. In t roduce  a b r e a k  
i n  t ime, s p a c e . o r  personnel ,  and we a r e  d e a l i n g  w i t h  two o r  more 
d i s t i n c t  i n c i d e n t s .  The r e s u l t  of t h i s  modular reasoning  i s  b o t h  
t o  g r e a t l y  s i m p l i f y  t h e  problem of bounding t h e  "same" i n c i d e n t  
and t o  fragment i n t o  many s e p a r a t e  i n c i d e n t s  s e r i e s  of i n t e r a c t i o n s  
( l i k e  t h e  Spanish  C i v i l  War a s  a  whole) which many a n a l y s t s  have 
been w i l l i n g  t o  t r e a t  as a  s i n g l e  u n i t .  
For some purposes,  l i k e  t h e  comparative s tudy of  r e v o l u t i o n s ,  
a broader  c r i t e r i o n  may s e r v e  b e t t e r .  S t i l l  o t h e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  
w i l l  r e q u i r e  more s t r i n g e n t  s t anda rds :  more p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  a  c e r t a i n  
d u t a t i o n ,  someone k i l l e d ,  a  p a r t i c u l a r  minimum of p r o p e r t y  damage. 
. But the general reasoning of such choices would be the same: identify 
all the events above a certain magnitude, or at least a representa- -
tive sample of them, before trying to sort them out in terms of legit- 
imacy or in terms of the aims of the participants. 
Once collective violence is defined in these terms, interesting 
conclusions begin to emerge from the close examination of the actual 
record of violent incidents. Our study of thousands of violent in- 
cidents occurring in western Europe since 1800 reveals several strong 
tendencies which affect our understanding of the roots of violence. 
First, most collective violence--in the sense of interactions 
which actually produce direct damage to persons and property--grows 
out of actions which are not intrinsically violent, and which are 
basically similar to a much larger number of collective actions 
occurring without violence in the same periods and settings. The 
clearest example is the demonstration, in which some group displays 
' ,  its strength and determination in the presence of the public, of 
the agents of the state, and perhaps of its enemies as well. The 
overwhelming majority of demonstrations pass without direct damage 
to persons or property. But a small proportion do turn to violent 
encounters between police and demonstrators, or attacks on property 
.--. . . by the demonstrators. The demonstration is such a common way of 
doing political business.in modern Europe that even that small pro- 
.- - 
portion of violent outcomes is enough to make the demonstration the 
most common setting for collective violence. The strike, the parlia- 
mentary session, the public meeting, the fiesta follow something 
like the same pattern: the great majority of them going off without 
violence, the violent ones not differing in any fundamental way from 
the nonviolent ones. 
A second important feature of collective violence which stands 
out in the modern European record is the heavy involvement of agents 
of the state, especially repressive agents like police and soldiers. 
 his is, unsurprisingly, a matter of scale: the fewer the people in- 
volved, the less likely that repressive agents will be there. But 
it does not mean simply that the larger the scale of violence, the 
more likely the police are to step in. For in the modern European 
experience repressive forces are themselves the most consistent 
Initiators and performers of collective violence. There is a sort 
of division of labor: repressive forces do the largest part of the 
killing and wounding, while the groups they are seeking to,control 
do most of the &amage to property. The division of labor follows 
from the usual advantage repressive forces have with respect to 
arms and military discipline; from the common.tactics of demonstra- 
' tors, strikers and other frequent participants in collective vio- 
lence, which are to violate symbolically-charged rules and prohibi- 
tions whose enforcement is the business of agents of government; 
from the typical sequence of events, in which demonstrators are 
' carrying on an action which is illegal yet nonviolent, and repre;- 
sive forces receive the order to stop them. 
Since no one has done the necessary detailed studies of con- 
temporary Latin America, North America, Africa or Asia, it i s  hard 
to say how generally these generalizations apply. The fragments of 
evidence now available indicate that they apply very widel?': in con- 
temporary countries with strong.governments. Jerome Skolnick (1969: 
258) says in summary of one part of his analysis of contemporary 
American protests, "It is misleading to ignore the part played by 
social control agencies in aggravating and sometimes creating a riot. 
It is not unusual, as the Kerner Commission observed, for a riot to 
begin end with police violence." A chronological review of 
violence in American labor-management disputes makes it clear both 
that over the long run police, troops, and plant guards have done 
the bulk of the killing and wounding, and that the typical starting 
point has been some sort of illegal but nonviolent collective action 
by the workers--a walkout, a sitdown, a demonstration, picketing, 
sending of delegations. In their sketch of the usual circumstances 
in which the total of at least 700 persons died in American "labor 
violence" during the nineteenth .and twentieth'centuries, the authors 
report: 
Facing inflexible opposition, union leaders and their 
members frequently found that nothing, neither peace- 
ful persuasion nor the intervention of heads of govern- 
ment, could move the employer towards recognition. 
Frustration and desperation impelled pickets to react 
to strikebreakers with anger. Piany violent outbreaks 
followed efforts of strikers to restrain the entry of 
strikebreakers and raw materials into the struck plant. 
Such conduct, obviously illegal, opened the opportunity 
for forceful police measures. In the long run, the 
employer's side was better equipped for success. The 
use of force by pickets was illegal on its face, but the 
action of the police and company guards were in vindi- 
cation of the employers' rights (Taft and Ross 1969: 289-290). 
The same general pattern recurs in the bulk of contemporary American . .  
<$, ' 
cbllrF tive violence: a group undertakes an illegal and/or politically. 
unacceptable action, forces of order seek to check the group, a violent 
encounter ensues, the '!rioters"--for that is the label the group 
acquires at the moment of violent contact with police or troops-- 
sustain most of the casualties. 
Reflecting on the long succession of violent encounters be- 
tween contenders for power and power-holders in America, Richard 
/ 
Rubenstein (1970: 15-16) makes an important observation: 
At the outset, one thing seems clear: those groups which 
achieved success without participating in sustained 
rioting, guerrilla terrorism or outright insurrection 
were not necessarily more talented, hardworking or "Ameri- 
can" than those that resorted to higher levels of violence. 
The resistance of more 'powerful groups to change is one 
key struggle; another is the match between out-group 
characteristics and the needs of a changing political- 
economic system. . . .  
Then he goes on to contrast the fluidity of the economic and politi- 
cal arrangements,open to the immigrants of 1880-1920 with the forma- 
tion, in the 1930s and 1940s, of a new ruling coalition quite resis- 
tant to displacement: "Ironically, since these are the groups most 
wedded to the myth of peaceful progress and the culpability of the 
violent--it is the existence of this coalition, exercising power 
through a highly centralized federal bureaucracy, which helps keep 
emerging groups powerless and' dependent" (p. 17). The consequence, 
in Rubenstein's view, is that recent bids for power have met deter- 
mined resistance and brought forth the pious recommendation that 
the members of the groups involved attempt to enter the system as 
- - 
individuals, on their own merits, rather than destroying the system 
through collective efforts to wrest benefits from it. 
~ubenstein's analysis includes both an idea of how the American 
I- 
system usually works and a notion of the changes it has undergone 
since the 1930s. The general picture corresponds to William Gamson'a 
-- 
portrayal of "stable ~?representation" in American politics: 
1 1 , , . the American political system normally operates to prevent 
. -. 
, incipient competitors from achieving full entry into the political 
-- arena" (Gamson 1968b: 18). That description applies to all political 
I 
I systems; the real questions are: How great are the obstacles? How 
. -- 
do they vary from system to system and time to time? 
That brings up the second part. Has the American system 
closed down since the 1930s? To try that question out seriously, 
r-- we shall need much more precise infornation than we now have concerning 
the fates of successive challengers. Gamson's investigation, indeed, 
- 
I ! is one of several current efforts to attack that very problem. In 
the meantime, it is not obvious that recent challengers -- antiwar 
students, organized blacks, gay activists and aircraft manufacturers 
are likely candidates for the post-1940 list -- met more resistance 
than craft unions, Prohibitionists or Abolitionists had in the 
nineteenth century. There is probably variation over tine, and there 
may well be a long-run trend. But both are no doubt too subtle to 
show up in a few offhand comparisons. 
P.M.G. Harris has taken a close look at the elite figures of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries described in the Dictionary 
of American Biography. He finds both that there was some decline -
over the nineteenth century in the proportion of elite men coming 
from working-class and lower-middle-class origins, and that there 
were cyclical variations in the recruitment of elites; he suggests 
a connection with Kuznets cycles of economic activity. IF a) ~arris' 
conclusions are correct and IF b) fluctuations in individual 
mobility into the national elite correspond to group movements into 
the national polity, THEN it is plausible that American entries and 
exits change over time in response to the rhythms of economic life. 
/ 
If that were the case, I would be surprised to see Rubenstein's 
treatment of the period since the New Deal onward as a single 
block hold up to close scrutiny. The discovery that he was wrong 
in that regard would not challenge, however, his basic analysis of 
the difficulties of acquiring power. 
Political Action and ~nvolvement' in Violence 
In the.terms we were using earlier, Rubenstein is saying that 
members of the polity, acting mainly through agents of the state, 
have banded together to resist the claims of newly-mobilized 
contenders for membership. His most prominent case is organized 
blacks, but the analysis applies more generally to the past and 
present contention of wheat farmers, women, believers in Temperance, 
students and organized labor. In these cases and many others, the 
acceptance of the group's collective claims would significantly 
reallocate the resources under the control of the polity, redefine 
the rules of membership for further contenders, change the likely 
coalitions inside and outside the polity. In such cases,' the main 
link between violence and contention for power consists of the 
repeated sequence in which members of the challenging group 
publicly lay claim to some space, object, privilege, protection or 
other resource which they consider due them on general grounds, 
and the agents of the government (backed by the members of the polity) 
forcibly resist their claims.. Proactive collective action on the 
one side, reactive collective action on the other..' 
A complete picture of the process linking contention and 
violence, however, requires a distinction between nonmembers bidding 
for power and members on their way out of the polity. Members losing 
their position are more likely to find themselves trying to maintain 
exclusive claims to some particular resource -- a school, a distinctive 
9 
. . 
costume, a source of income, a tax exemption--and unable to enlist 
the support of other members or of agents of the government in main- 
taining those claims. Under those circumstances, they commonly at- 
tempt to exert those claims on their own, and to keep others from 
claiming the same resources. We have reactive collectfie acti~n. 
Then two different sequences are likely to produce collective 
violence involving declining members of a polity. The first is like 
the one involving new claimants for membership in the polity, in that 
agents of the government directly resist the claims of the parting 
member to keep exerting their former rights to certain resources. 
The second pits the parting member directly against others seeking 
to acquire the disputed resources; vigilante movements,.private 
armies, and gangs of thugs are especially likely to enter the action 
at this point, as the old member seeks to substitute its,.own force 
for that of the now-unreliable government. The regional movement 
o f  resistance against a centralizing state commonly takes this form. 
So does the classic European food riot, in which the members of a 
community collectively dispute the right of anyone to store grain 
in times of hunger or ship grain out of the community when local 
people still need food, and reinforce their dispute by acting in 
thetraditional role of the authorities: inventorying the grain on 
hand, accumulating it in a public place, and selling it off at a 
price locally determined to be just and reasonable. So finally, do 
a variety of fascist movements formed in opposition to the threaten- 
ing claims of a mobilized working class. 
. . 
The sequence involving new contenders and declining members 
mean that.collective violence tends to cluster around entries into 
the polity and exits from it. When membership is stable, collec- 
tive violence is less prevalent. And the most important single reason 
for that clustering is the propensity of the government's repressive 
forces to act against new contenders and declining members. 
I do not mean that the sequences I have described are the only 
ones which produce collective violence, just that they are the most 
regular and reliable. Routine testing among established members of 
a polity produces a certain amount ofviolent conflict, but it tends 
to be limited, and treated as a regrettable error. Conventional 
combats among teams, communities, youth groups or schools sometimes . . .   . 
fit the pattern of "testing violence," but more often escape it; 
they, too, operate on a small scale, within large restrictions. 
. . 
Drunken brawls, private vengeance, festival madness, impulsive 
vandalism, all reach a dangerou~ magnitude now and then. What is 
more, the frequency of conventional combats, brawls, vendetta and 
so on undoubtedly varies with the basic conceptions of honor, ob- 
ligation and solidarity which prevail within a population. Never- 
theless, I would say that in populations under the control of states 
all these forms account for only a small proportion of the collec- 
tive violence which occurs, and change far too gradually to account 
for the abrupt surges and recessions of collective violence which 
appear in such populations. The chief source of variation in col- 
lective violence is the operation of the polity. 
Nor do I mean that most collective violence goes on in cal- 
culating calm. Far from it. Both those who are arguing for the 
acquisition of rights on the basis of general principals and those 
who are fighting for the defense of privilege on the basis of cus- 
tom and precedent are usually indignant, and often enraged. Moments 
of dangerous confrontation (as Louis Girard says of the French 
revolutions of 1830 and 1848, and almost everyone says of the French 
Events of May, 1968) frequently bring an air of festival, of exhili- 
ration, of release from ordinary restrictions. Plenty of indiddual 
venting of resentments and settling of old scores takes place under 
the cover of collective action in the name of high principle. The 
argument up to this point simply denies the conclusion that the rage, 
the exhiliration or the resentment cause the collective violence. 
Revolution 
A fortiori, the argument denies that accumulated rage, exhilira- - 
tion or resentment causes revolutions. It leads instead to a concep- . 
tion of revolution as an extreme condition of the normal political 
process. The distinguishing characteristic of a revolutionary 
situation, as Leon Trotsky said long ago, is the presence of more than 
one bloc effectively exercising control over a significant part of 
the state apparatus. Trotsky built into this idea of "dual sover- 
eignty" two restrictions which appear unnecessary: 1) that each of 
the blocs consist of a single social class; 2) that there be only 
two such blocs at any point in time. Either of these restrictions 
would eliminate most of the standard cases of revolution, Including 
the French, Chinese and Mexican classics. 
Trotsky's idea retains its analytic strength if expanded to 
Include blocs consisting of coalitions of classes and/or other groups 
and to allow for the possibility.of three or more simultaneous blocs. 
Multiple sovereignty is then the identifying feature of revolutions. 
A revolution begins when a government previously under the control 
of a single, sovereign polity becomes the object of effective, com- 
peting, mutually exclusive claims on the part of two or more distinct 
polities; it ends when a single sovereign polity regains control 
over the government. 
Such a multiplication of polities can occur under four dif- 
ferent conditions: 
1. The members of one polity attempt to subordinate another 
previously distinct polity. Where the two polities are 
clearly sovereign and independent at the outset we are 
more likely to consider this conflict a special variety 
of war. Circumstances like the annexation of Texas. to 
the United States or the transfers of power to various 
cormnunist regimes in Eastern Europe at the end of the 
second world war fall, in fact, into an uncertain area 
between war and revolution.. 
2. The members of a previously subordinate polity, such 
as the group of contenders holding power over a regional 
government, assert sovereignty. Here the words "rebellion" 
and "revoit" spring readily to mind. Yet in recent years 
it has become quite usual.to call one version of such , 
events a colonial or national revolution. 
3. Contenders not holding membership in the existing polity 
mobilize into a bloc successfully exerting control over 
some portion of the'governmental apparatus. Despite the 
attractiveness of this version to leaders of the dispos- 
sessed, it rarely, if ever, occurs in a pure form. 
4. The more usual circumstance is the fragmentation of an 
existing polity into two or more blocs each exercising 
control over some part of the government. That fragmenta- 
tion frequently involves the emergence of coalitions be- 
tween established members of the polity and mobilizing non- 
members. 
How would we recognize the onset of multiple sovereignty? The question 
is stickier than it seems at first glance. Neither the presence or 
expansion of areas of autonomy or of resistance on the part of the 
'subject population is a reliable sign; all governments excite some 
sorts of resistance, and all governments exert incomplete control over 
their subjects. Most states face continuing marginal challenges to 
their sovereignty: from within, bandits, vigilantes, religious com- 
munities, national minorities or uncompromising separatists hold them 
off; from without, powerful states infiltrate them and encroach on their 
perogatives. All of these circumstances have some distant kinship to 
revolution, but they do not constitute revolution. Even rival claims 
to those of the existing polity by the adherents of displaced regimes, 
revolutionary movements or outside states are quite common. The claims 
themselves do not amount to revolution. 
The question is whether some significant part of the subject 
population honors the claim. The revolutionary moment arrives when 
previously acquiescent members of that population find themselves con- 
fronted with strictly incompatible demands from the government and from 
an alternative body claiming control over the governnent. . .and obey 
the alternative body. They pay taxes, provide men to its armies, feed 
its functionaries, honor its symbols, give time to its service, or yield 
other resources despite the prohibitions of a still-existing government 
they formerly obeyed. Multiple sovereignty has begun. When only one 
polity exerting exclusive control over the government remains, and no 
rivals are successfully pressing their claims--however that happens-- 
the revolution has ended. 
Proximate Conditions of Revolution 
If this is the case, a revolutionary meteorologist would keep 
his eyes peeled for the followinp conditions, and a revolutionary engineer 
would try to create them: 
1. the appearance of contenders, or coalitions of contenders, 
advancing exclusive alternative claims to the control over 
the government currently exerted by the members of the polity; 
2. commitment to those claims by a significant segment of 
the subject population (especially when those commitments are 
not simply acknowledged in principle, but activated in the 
face of prohibitions or contrary directives from the govern- 
ment) ; 
3. fo'rmation of coalitions between members of the polity and 
the contenders advancing the alternative claims; 
4. incapacity or unwillingness of the agents of the government 
to suppress the alternative coalition or the commitment to its 
claims. . . 
1, 2, and 4 are necessary conditions for revolution. The third con- 
ditfon, the formation of coalitions, is not logically necessary. It 
may not even be practically necessary, but it greatly facilitates 
condition.4. Coalitions between members and challengers, that is, 
make it less likely that suppression of the challengers will work. 
That is one reason for the importance of a "symptom" to which Crane 
Brinton and many other analysts of revolution have devoted considerable 
attention: the transfer of intellectuals and elites to the revolutionary 
opposition. Historically, the incapacity or neutralization of the 
anned forces has often followed this sort of division of the polity 
and has usually been essential to the success of the revolutionary 
coalition. 
The explanation, prediction or production of revolution there- 
fore comes down to the specification, detection or creation of the 
circumstances under which condition 1 to 4 occur. The five proximate 
conditions leave out a number of things which have often been con- 
sidered defining features of revolution: permanent transfer of power, 
displacement of one ruling class by another, extensive structural 
change, high levels of violence, widespread participation, action by 
the oppressed, activation in the name of a vision of a transformed 
world. 
Of course, anyone has the right to restrict his category of 
True Revolutions to those displaying any or all of these additional 
features. All of them are related as likely cause or probable effect 
to the particular form of multiple sovereignty which characterizes 
the revolution. Yet each of them has occurred historically in the 
absence of multiple sovereignty. Multiple sovereignty has, more- 
over, occurred in the absence of each of them; none is a necessary 
condition. (I am not sure whether multiple sovereignty has ever 
occured in the absence of - all of the conditions.) Hence, the desir- 
ability of distinguishing the conditions for transfers of power, 
extensive structural change, high levels of violence, etc.from the 
conditions for revolution. 
Most analysts of revolution have taken a different tack. 
  hey have restricted the meaning of revolution in two ways: 1) by 
insisting that the actors and the action meet some demanding 
standards--that they based on an oppressed class, that they have a 
comprehensive program of social transformation in view, or some 
other gauge of seriousness--2) by dealing only with cases in which 
power actually changed hands. Peter Calvert, to take a recent 
example, builds the foltowing elenents into his conception of revolu- 
tion: 
(a) A process in which the political direction of a state 
becomes increasingly discredited in the eyes 'of either the 
population as a whole or certain key sections of it. . . 
(b) A change of government (transition) at a clearly defined 
point in time by the use of arned force, or the credible 
threat of it$ use; nanely, an event. 
( c )  , A  more-or-less coherent programme of change in either 
the political or the social institutions of a state, or both, 
induced by the political le,adership after a revolutionary 
event, the transition of power, has occured. 
(d) A political myth that gives to the political leadership 
resulting from a revolutionary transition short-term status 
as the legitimate government of the. state (Calvert 1970: 4). 
Thus, he goes on, "in order to investigate fully the concept of revolu- 
tion it would be necessary to study in detail process, event, programme, 
and myth as distinct phenomena" (Calvert 1970: 4). He confines his 
own study to revolutionary events: changes of government accomplished 
by force. That greatly increases the number of cases he has to examine. 
Yet the insistence on armed force and on an actual transfer of power 
eliminatesa number of cases in which multiple sovereignty appeared with- 
out the use of armed force or, especially, a change of government. 
His general definition is quite narrow, and even his working definition 
of revolutionary events is somewhat narrower than the definition 
, of revolution I have proposed. 
My reasons for preferring a broad definition are at once the- 
oretical and practical. Theoretically, I am not convinced that 
revolutions in the narrow sense of violent, extensive transfers of 
power are phenomena - sui generis. On the contrary, I am impressed 
with the carryover of routine forms of political action into 
revolutionary situations, the apparently small initial differenc'es 
separating "success£ ul" from  unsuccessful'^ revolutions, and the 
apparent contingency of the degree of violence itself. Yet multiple 
sovereignty does seem to mark out a domain of situations which have 
a good deal of homogeneity by comparison with all cases of single 
sovereignty. Practically, the usual criteria of revolution--the extent 
and durability of the transfer of power, the amount of social change 
called for by the revolutionary program, the prominence of the power- 
less in the revolutionary action, for instance--single out as defining 
conditions features of the event which are likely to be mixed, con- 
troversial and ambiguous. That is, to say the least, inconvenient. 
Multiple sovereignty has its own difficulties. But it is rather 
easier to identify than is, say, "fundamental social change.'' 
We might hold onto the classic questions by adopting a taxo- 
nomic strategy. We could classify revolutions initially identified 
by the presence of multiple sovereignty as 
violent/nonviolent 
no transfer/little trasfer /much transfer 
,and so on. The taxonomies of revolution which follow most directly 
t s  ' 
from the argument unfolding here, however, differentiate among a) pro- 
cesses leading to multiple sovereignty, b) processes leading to the 
termination of multiple sovereignty, c) patterns of mobilization, 
coalition and opposition among the contenders involved. A coup d16tat, 
then, would turn out to be a revolution in which one member of a 
polity attempted to displace another via a temporary seizure of a major 
instrument of government, with only a brief interval of multiple 
sovereignty. A civil war would be a revolution in which the blocs of -- 
contenders had distinct territorial bases. And so on. 
Proceeding in this way, it would not be hard to work out a 
comprehensive classification scheme. There is no point in doing 
that here. In such a scheme, whether the revolution was "successful" 
or "unsuccessful," whether one group of participants hoped to trans- 
form the entire structure of power, whether fundamental social change 
went on before the revolution, whether important transformations 
occurred as a result of it, whether many people died during the con- 
flict would remain important questions, but that would not enter into 
the classification of revolutions. 
The critical signs of revolution, in this perspective, are signs 
of the emergence of an alternative polity. These signs may possibly 
be related to rising discontent, value conflict, frustration or 
relative deprivation. The relationship must, however, be proved and 
not assumed. Even if it is proved that discontent, value conflict, 
frustration and relative deprivation do fluctuate in close correspondence 
to the emergence and disappearance of alternative polities--a result 
which would surprise me--the thing to watch for would still be the com- 
mitment of a significant part of.the population, regardless of their 
motives, to exclusive alternative claims to the control over the govern- 
ment currently exerted by the members of the polity. 
We have narrowed the focus of explanation and prediction con- 
siderably. It now comes down to spkcifying and detecting the conditions 
under which five related outcomes occur: 1) the appearance of contenders 
making exclusive alternative claims, 2) significant commitment to those 
claims, 3) formation of coalitions with the contenders, 4) repressive 
incapacity of the government, 5) activation of the commitments. The 
short-run conditions for these outcomes pay, of course, be quite dif- 
ferent from the long-run changes which make them possible. Let us con- 
centrate for the moment on the short-run conditions. 
Alternatives to the Existing Polity 
What I mean by "exclusive alternative claims to control of 
the government" comes out dramatically in an article written about 
a year after the October Revolution, as the other parties which had 
joined the revolutionary coalition were being squeezed out of power: 
Now, however, the course of world events and the bltter 
lessons derived from the alliance of all the Russian mon- 
archists with Anglo-French and American imperialism are 
proving practice that a democratic republic is a 
bourgeois-democratic republic, which is already out of 
date from the point of view of the problems which im- 
perialism has placed before history. They show that there 
is no other alternative: either Soviet government triumphs 
in every advanced country in the world, or the most 
reactionary imperialism triumphs, the most savage im- 
perialism, which is throttling the small and weak 
nations and reinstating reaction all over the world-- 
Anglo-American imperialism, which has perfectly masterd 
the art of using the form of a democratic republic. 
One or the other. 
There is no middle course; until quite recently this view was 
regarded as the blind fanaticism of the Bolsheviks. 
But it turned out to be true (Lenin 1967a: 35). 
These claims came, of course,' from a party already in power, but 
they were addressed to revolutionary strategists in other countries 
who wished to continue a collaborative approach within Russia itself. 
When can we expect the appearance of contenders (or coali- 
tions of contenders) advancing exclusive alternative claims to the 
control of the government currently exerted by the members of the 
polity? The question is a trifle misleading, for such contenders 
are almost always with us in the form of millennia1 cults, radical 
cells or rejects from positions of power. The real question is when 
such contenders proliferate and/or mobilize. 
Two paths lead to that proliferation and/or mobilization. 
The first is the flourishing of groups which from their inception 
hold to transforming aims which are incompatible with the continued 
power of the members of the polity. Truly other-worldly and re- 
treatist groups seeking total withdrawal from contemporary life do 
not fully qualify, since in principle they can prosper so long as 
the rest of the world lets them alone. True radicals, true reaction- 
aries, anarchists, preachers of theocracy, monists of almost every 
persuasion come closer to the mark. The second path is the turning 
of contenders from objectives which are compatible with the survival 
of the polity to objectives which spell its doom: a claim 
to all power, a demand for criteria of membership which would ex- 
haust all the available resources, or exclude all its present members. 
Why and how the first sort of group--the group committed 
from the start to fundamental transformation of the structure of power-- 
forms remains one of the mysteries or our time. Of course, Max Weber 
taught that such groups formed around charismatic individuals who 
offered alternative visions of the world, visions that made sense 
of the contemporary chaos. Marx suggested that from time to time a 
few individuals would swing so free of their assigned places in 
the existing class structure that they could view the structure as 
a whole and the historical process producing it; they could then 
teach their view to others who were still caught in the structure. 
Since Marx and Weber we have had some heroic conceptualizing and 
cataloging of the varieties of intrinsically revolutionary groups 
(see Smelser 1963, Lipset and Raab 1970, Gamson 1968). But the 
rise and fall of diverse movements of protest since World War 11 
'has shown us that we still have almost no power to anticipate where 
and when such committed groups will appear. 
The turning of contenders from compatible objectives is rather 
less of a mystery, because we can witness its occurence as old members 
lose their position in the p~iity and as challengers are refused 
access to power. The former is the recurrent history of right-wing 
activism, the latter the standard condition for left-wing activism. 
Marx himself gave the classic analysis of the process of radicalization 
away from some sort of accomodation with the existing system 
toward an exclusive, revolutionary position. His argument was pre- 
cisely that through repeated victimization under bourgeois democracy 
(a victimization, to be sure, dictated by the logic of capitalism) 
workers would gradually turn away from its illusions toward class- 
conscious militancy. That he should have overestimated the polarizing 
effects of industrial capitalism and underestimated the absorptive 
capacity of the polities it supported does not reduce the accuracy of 
his perception of the relationships. So far as Marx was concerned 
a newly-forming and growing class was the only candidate for such a 
transformation. In £act, the general principle appears to apply as 
well to national minorities, age-sex groups, regional populations or 
any other mobilizing group which makes repeated unsuccessful bids for 
power. 
The elaboration of new ideologies, new theories of how the 
world works, new creeds is part and parcel of both paths to a revolu- 
tionary position: the emergence of brand-new challengers and the 
turning of existing contenders. Most likely the articulation of 
ideologies which capture and formulate the problems of such con- 
tenders in itself accelerates their mobilization and change of 
direction; how great an independent weight to attribute to ideological 
innovation is another recurrent puzzle in the analysis of revolution. 
The need for elaboration of ideologies is one of the chief reasons 
for the exceptional importance of intellectuals in revolutionary move- 
ments. The reflections of a leading French Marxist intellectual on 
c u r r e n t  p o l i t i c a l  s t r a t e g y  a r e  r e v e a l i n g :  
The r e v o l u t i o n a r y  p a r t y ' s  c a p a c i t y  f o r  hegemony is  
d i r e c t l y  l i n k e d  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  of i t s  i n f l u e n c e  i n  t h e  
p r o f e s s i o n s  and i n  i n t e l l e c t u a l  c i r c l e s .  It can coun te r  
bourgeois  ideo logy  t o  t h e  degree  t h a t  i t  i n s p i r e s  t h e i r  
i n q u i r i e s  and draws t h e i r  vanguard i n t o  r e f l e c t i o n  on 
an " a l t e r n a t i v e  model," wh i l e  r e s p e c t i n g  t h e  indepen- 
dence of  t h e s e  i n q u i r i e s .  The mediat ion of  t h e  i n t e l -  
l e c t u a l  vanguard i s  ind i spensab le  i n  combatt ing and 
d e s t r o y i n g  t h e  g r i p  of t h e  dominant ideo logy .  It i s  
a l s o  neces sa ry  i n  o r d e r  t o  g ive  t h e  dominated c l a s s e s  , , 
a  language and a  means of exp re s s ion  which w i l l  make 
them consc ious  of t h e  r e a l i t y  of t h e i r  subo rd ina t ion  
and e x p l o i t a t i o n  (Gorz 1969: 241-242). 
Th i s  i s ,  of  cou r se ,  a  congenia l  d o c t r i n e  f o r  an i n t e l l e c t u a l  t o  ho ld .  
Y e t ,  i t  cor responds  t o  a  v igorous  r e a l i t y :  an  ou tpour ing  of new 
thought  a r t i c u l a t i n g  o b j e c t i v e s  incompat ib le  w i t h  t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  
of  t h e  e x i s t i n g  p o l i t y  i s  probably  ou r  s i n g l e  most r e l i a b l e  s i g n  
t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  c o n d i t i o n  of a  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  s i t u a t i o n  is  be ing  f u l -  
f i l l e d .  
Acceptance of A l t e r n a t i v e  Claims 
The second c o n d i t i o n  i s  corn-itment t o  t h e  c la ims  by a  s i g -  
n i f i c a n t  segment of  t h e  s u b j e c t  popu la t i on .  The f i r s t  and secon'd 
c o n d i t i o n s  o v e r l a p ,  s i n c e  t h e  v e e r i n g  of an already-mobil ized con- 
t ende r  toward e x c l u s i v e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c la ims  t o  c o n t r o l  of t h e  govern- 
ment s imul taneous ly  e s t a b l i s h e s  t h e  c la ims  and produces commitment 
t o  them. Y e t  expans ion  of commitment can occur  without  t h e  e s t a b l i s h -  
ment of any new e x c l u s i v e  c la ims  through a )  t h e  f u r t h e r  m o b i l i z a t i o n  
of  t h e  contenders  i nvo lved ,  and b) t h e  acceptance  of t h o s e  c l a ims  
by o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s  and groups.  It i s  i n  account ing  f o r  t h e  expan- 
s i o n  and c o n t r a c t i o n  f o  t h i s  s o r t  of  commitment t h a t  a t t i t u d i n a l  
a n a l y s e s  of t h e  t ype  conducted by Ted Gurr ,  James Davies and Ne i l  
Smelser  should have t h e i r  g r e a t e s t  power. 
Two c l a s s e s  of  a c t i o n  by governments have a s t r o n g  tendency 
to  expand commitment t o  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  c la ims .  The f i r s t  i s  t h e  sudden 
f a i l u r e  of  t h e  government t o  meet s p e c i f i c  o b l i g a t i o n s  which members 
of t h e  s u b j e c t  popu la t i on  regard  a s  w e l l  e s t a b l i s h e d  and c r u c i a l  t o  
t h e i r  own w e l f a r e .  I have i n  mind b b l i g a t i o n s  t o  provide  employment, 
w e l f a r e  s e r v i c e s ,  p r o t e c t i o n ,  acces s  t o  j u s t i c e ,  and t h e  o t h e r  major 
s e r v i c e s  of government. 
I t a l y ,  f o r  example,  exper ienced  a series of  c r i s e s  of t h i s  
s o r t  a t  t h e  end of lJorld War I ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  s h e  had ended 
up on t h e  "winning" s i d e .  The demob i l i za t i on  of t h e  army threw over  
two m i l l i o n  men on a  s o f t  l a b o r  marke t ,  t h e  f l u c t u a t i o n  and r e l axa -  
t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l s  over  food s u p p l i e s  and p r i c e s  aggr ieved  m i l l i o n s  of 
consumers, and p e a s a n t s  ( i nc lud ing  demobil ized s o l d i e r s )  began t o  
t a k e  i n t o  t h e i r  own hands t h e  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  of l and  they  argued 
t h e  government had promised du r ing  t h e  war. The consequent with-  
drawal  of  commitment f r o n  t h e  government opened t h e  way t o  fasc i sm.  
Both Right  and L e f t  mobil ized i n  response  t o  t h e  government 's  i n -  
a b i l i t y  t o  d e l i v e r  on i t s  promises .  I n  t h e  e v e n t ,  t h e  regime chose 
t o  t o l e r a t e  o r  suppor t  t h e  F a s c i s t  strong-arm s q u a d r i  i n  t h e i r  e f f o r t  
t o  d e s t r o y  t h e  most e f f e c t i v e  working c l a s s  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  For t h a t  
reason  ( r a t h e r  t han  any fundamental s i m i l a r i t y  i n  t h e i r  s o c i a l  bases )  
t h e  i n i t i a l  geographic  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of I t a l i a n  Fascism resembled t h e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  s o c i a l i s t  s t r e n g t h :  t h e  Po Va l l ey ,  t h e  no r the rn  
industrial cities, and so forth. The Right: Far Right coalition 
worked, more or less, in crushing the organized segments of the Left. 
But it left the Fascists in nearly autonomous control of large parts 
of Italy: multiple sovereignty. 
The case of postwar Italy has a three fold importance, for 
it illustrates a process which was widespread (although generally 
less acute) elsewhere in Europe at the same time, falls into a very 
general pattern in which the end of war (victorious or not) produces 
a crisis of governmental incapacity and demonstrates the way in which 
movements of protest themselves not clearly "right" or "left" in 
orientation sometime open the way to a right-wing (or, for that 
matter, left-wing) seizure of power. 
The second class of governmental action which commonly expands 
the commitment of important segments of the population to revolu- 
tionary claims is a rapid or unexpected increase in the government's 
demand for surrender of resources by its subject population. An 
increase in taxes is the clearest example, but military conscrip- 
tion, the commandeering of land, crops or farm animals and the im- 
position of corvees have all played an historical role in the in- 
citement of opposition. Gabriel Ardant (1965) argues, with wide- 
spread evidence, that increased taxation has been the single most 
important stimulus to popular 'rebellion throughout western history. 
Furthermore, he points out that the characteristic circumstances of 
tax rebellions in Europe since 1500 are not what most historians 
have thought. Instead of being either the last resort of those who 
are in such misery that any more taxation will destroy them or the 
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first resort of privileged parties who refuse to let anything slip 
away from thm,the rebellion against new taxes most commonly arises 
where communities find themselves incapable of marketing enough of 
their goods to acquire the funds demanded by'the government. 
Ardant considers "incapable of marketing" to mean either that 
the local economy is insufficiently commercialized or that the market 
for the particular products of the community in question has con- 
tracted. Eric Wolf's analysis of the relationship between peasants 
and the market, however, suggests that "incapability" refers more 
generally to any demands which would make it impossible for people to 
fulfill the obligations which bind them to the local community, 
and whose fulfillment nakes then honorable men. It follows directly 
from Wolf's argument that increased taxation in the face of little 
commercialization or the contraction of demand for the products 
already being marketed by a peasant community tends to have devasting . 
effects on the structure of the community. 
Other types of communities face different versions of the 
same problems. The consequence is that rapidly increased extraction 
of resources by the government--which in western countries has most 
frequently occurred in preparations for i~ar--regularly persuades 
some segment of the population that the government is no longer 
legitimate, while those who oppose it are. 
Such a shift in position sometimesoccurs rapidly, with 
little advance warning. This appears to be especially likely when 
a contender or set of contenders mobilizes quickly in response to a 
general threat to its position--an invasion, an economic crisis, a 
major attempt by landlords, the state or someone else to deprive 
them of crucial resources. We find the villagers of northern England 
rising in a Pilgrimage of Grace to oppose Henry VIII's dispossession 
of the monasteries, Mexican peasants banding together to resist the 
threat of takeover of their common lands, Japanese countrymen re- 
currently joining bloodly uprisings against the imposition of new 
taxes. 
This defensive mobilization is not simply a cumulation of 
individual dissatisfactions with hardship or a mechanical group 
response to deprivation. Whether it occurs at all depends very much, 
as Eric Wolf and others have shown, on the pre-existing structure of 
power and solidarity within the population experiencing the threat. 
Furthermore, its character is not intrinsically either "revolu- 
tionary" or "counter-revolutionary"; that depends mainly on the 
coalitions the potential rebels make. This defensive mobilization 
is the most volatile feature of a revolutionary situation, both 
because it often occurs fast and because new coalitions between a 
rapidly-mobilized group and established contenders for power can 
suddenly create a significant commitment to an alternative polity. 
If that is the case, there may be something to the common 
notion that revolutions are most likely to occur when a sharp con- 
traction in well-being follows a long period of improvement. James 
Davies has recently propounded the idea under the label of "J-curve 
hypothesis" and Ted Gurr has treated it as one of the chief variants 
of his general condition for rebellion: a widening of the ex- 
pectation-achievement gap. All the attempts to test these attitu- 
dinal versions of the theory have been dogged by the difficulty 
of measuring changes in expectations and achievements for large 
populations over substantial blocks of time and by the tendency 
of most analysts to work from the fact of revolution back to the 
search for evidence of short-run deprivation and then further back 
to the search for evidence of long-run improvement, not necessarily 
with respect to the same presumed wants, needs or expectations. The 
latter procedure has the advantage of almost always producing a fit 
between the data and the theory, and the disadvantage of not being 
a reliable test of the theory. The question remains open. 
Assuming that sharp contractions following long expansions 
do produce revolutions with exceptional frequency, however, the -
line of argument pursued here leads to an interesting alternative 
explanation of the J-curve phenomenon. It is that during a long 
run of expanding resources, the government tends to take on com- 
mitments to redistribute resources to new contenders and the polity 
tends to admit challengers more easily because the relative cost 
to existing members is lower when resources are expanding. In the 
event of quick contraction, the government has greater commitments, 
new matters of right, to members of the polity, and has acquited 
partial commitments to new contenders, perhaps not members of the 
polity, but very likely forming coalitions with members. The governaent 
faces a choice between 1) greatly increasing the coercion applied 
to the more vulnerabl2 segments of the population in order to bring 
up the yield of resources for reallocation or 2) breaking commitments 
where that will incite the least dangerous,opposition. Either 
step is likely to lead to a defensive mobilization, and thence 
to a threat of revolution. Such a situation does, to be sure, 
promote the disappointment of rising expectations. But the 
principal link between the J-curve and the revolution, in this 
hypothesis lies in the changing relations between contenders and 
government likely to occur in a period of expanding resources. 
This is speculation bolstered by hypothesis. In the present 
state of the evidence both the existence of the J-curve phenomenon 
and any proposed explanation of it remain little more than informed 
guesswork. A proper verification that the phenomenon exists will 
require comparisons of periods of J-curve, U-curve, M-curve and no 
curve as well as between revolutions and non-revolutions, in order 
to see whether there is in fact an affinity of one for the other. 
In a longer historical view, the changes which have most often 
produced the rapid shifts in commitment away from existing govern- 
ments and established polities are processes which directly affect 
the autonomy of smaller units within the span of the government: the 
rise and fall of centralized states, the expansion and contraction of 
national markets, the concentration and dispersion of control over 
property. Prosperity and depression, urbanization and ruralization, 
industrialization and deindustrialization, sanctification and secularization 
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occur  i n  a  d i spe r sed  and incrementa l  f a sh ion .  Although s t a t e -  
'making, t h e  expansion and c o n t r a c t i o n  of markets and proper ty  
s h i f t s  a l s o  develop inc remen ta l ly  most of t h e  t ime, they  a r e  
e s p e c i a l l y  s u s c e p t i b l e  of  producing dramat ic  con f ron ta t ions  of 
r i g h t s ,  p r i v i l e g e s  and p r i n c i p l e s ;  t h i s  t a x  c o l l e c t o r  wants t h e  
f ami ly  cow, t h i s  merchant proposes t o  buy t h e  v i l l a g e  commons, 
t h i s  p r i n c e  f a i l s  t o  p r o t e c t  h i s  s u b j e c t s  from b a n d i t s .  S.N. 
E i s e n s t a d t  (1963) has  brought ou t  t h e  extreme v u l n e r a b i l i t y  of 
v a s t  b u r e a u c r a t i c  empires t o  overexpansion and t o  damage a t  t h e  
c e n t e r ;  bo th ,  i n  h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  tend t o  produce r e b e l l i o n s  i n  which 
p e r i p h e r a l  agen t s  of t h e  empire s e e k  t o  e s t a b l i s h  autonomous 
c o n t r o l  over  t he  l ands ,  men, o r g a n i z a t i o n s  and weal th  f i r s t  mobil ized 
by t h e  empire. Fernand Braudel (1966) has  s t r e s s e d  t h e  frequency 
w i t h  which band i t ry  and r e l a t e d  s t r u g g l e s  f o r  l o c a l  power p r o l i f e r -  
a t e d  as t h e  ephemeral s t a t e s  of seventeenth-century Europe con- 
t r a c t e d .  I n  a l l  t h e s e  cases ,  spokesmen f o r  l a rge - sca l e  organiza-  
t i o n  and c e n t r i p e t a l  p roces ses  f i n d  themselves locked i n  s t r u g g l e  
w i t h  advoca tes  of sma l l - s ca l e  autonomy. 
I n  o rde r  t o  produce m u l t i p l e  sove re ign ty ,  and thus  become 
revo lu t iona ry ,  commitments tomme a l t e r n a t i v e  claimant  must be 
a c t i v a t e d  i n  t h e  f a c e  of p r o h i b i t i o n s  o r  con t r a ry  d i r e c t i v e s  from 
t h e  government. The moment a t  which some men belonging t o  members 
of  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o a l i t i o n  s e i z e  c o n t r o l  over some p o r t i o n  of  
t h e  government, and o t h e r  men n o t  p rev ious ly  a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  c o a l i -  
t i o n  honor t h e i r  d i r e c t i v e s  marks t h e  beginning o f  a  r evo lu t ion .  
That  acceptance  of d i r e c t i v e s  may, t o  be  s u r e ,  occur  a s  a  r e s u l t  of 
d u r e s s  o r  d e c e p t i o n  a s  w e l l  of conversion t o  t h e  cause .  A mix- 
t u r e  of duress ,  d e c e p t i o n  and convers ion  w i l l  o f t e n  do t h e  job .  
The presence  of a  coherent  r evo lu t iona ry  o r g a n i z a t i o n  makes 
a g r e a t  d i f f e r e n c e  a t  e x a c t l y  t h i s  p o i n t .  An o r g a n i z a t i o n  f a c i l i t a t e s  
t h e  i n i t i a l  s e i z u r e  of c o n t r o l ,  sp reads  the  news, a c t i v a t e s  t h e  
commitments a l r e a d y  made by s p e c i f i c  men. I f  s o ,  Lenin p rov ides  a  
more r e l i a b l e  gu ide  t o  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  s t r a t e g y  than  S o r e l ;  h i s  c l o s e l y -  
d i r e c t e d  conspi ra tor ia l  p a r t y  c o n t r a s t s  s h a r p l y  wi th  t h e  spontaneous 
and pu r i fy ing  r e b e l l i o n  i n  which S o r e l  plac,ed h i s  hopes. But t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  of such a n  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a l s o  makes t h e  s t a r t  of r e v o l u t i o n  
more c l o s e l y  dependent on t h e  d e c i s i o n s  of a  smal l  number of men-- 
and thus ,  pa radox ica l ly ,  s u b j e c t  t o  chance and id iosync rasy .  
I n  t h e  l a s t  a n a l y s i s ,  a c t i v a t i o n  of r evo lu t iona ry  commitments 
happens through a n  ex tens ion  of t h e  same processes  which c r e a t e  t h e  
commitments. C o n s p i r a t o r i a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  simply happens t o  b e  t h e  
one which maximizes t h e  oppor tun i ty  of t h e  committed t o  c a l c u l a t e  
t h e  r i g h t  moment t o  s t r i k e  a g a i n s t  t h e  government. The government 's 
sudden i n a b i l i t y  t o  meet i t s  own r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  ( a s  i n  t h e  German 
i n s u r r e c t i o n s  du r ing  t h e  d i s i n t e g r a t i o n  of t h e  imper i a l  w a r  e f f o r t  
i n  1918) o r  i t s  v i o l a t i o n  of t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  r i g h t s  of i t s  s u b j e c t  
popula t ion  ( a s  i n  t h e  1640 r e b e l l i o n s  of Po r tuga l  and C a t a l o n i a  
a g a i n s t  C a s t i l e ,  which fol lowed O l i v a r e s '  a t tempt  t o  squeeze ex- 
c e p t i o n a l  r e s o u r c e s  from those  r e l u c t a n t  provinces  f o r  t h e  conduct  
of h i s  war w i th  France)  can s imul taneous ly  spread  and a c t i v a t e  t h e  
conimitment t o  i t s  r evo lu t iona ry  oppos i t i on .  
I n  a  c a s e  l i k e  t h a t  of t h e  Taip ing  r e b e l l i o n ,  t h e  r a p i d  
mob i l i za t ion  of a  contender  advancing e x c l u s i v e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c la ims  
t o  c o n t r o l  over  t h e  government i t s e l f  l e a d s  quick ly  and i n e v i t a b l y  
t o  a  break  and t o  a n  armed s t r u g g l e .  The dramatic  weakening of a  
government 's r e p r e s s i v e  c a p a c i t y  through war,  d e f e c t i o n  o r  ca t a s -  
t rophe  can s imultaneou?ly c r e a t e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of r e v o l u t i o n  and 
encourage t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  t o  make t h e i r  b i d ;  t h e  quick  succes s ion  
of t h e  French r e v o l u t i o n  of 1870 t o  t h e  d e f e a t  of t h e  Emperor by 
P r u s s i a  f a l l s  i n t o  t h i s  ca t egory .  
C o a l i t i o n s  between Members and Chal lengers  
The t h i r d  r e v d l u t i o n a r y  c o n d i t i o n  i s  t h e  format ion  of c o a l i -  
t i o n s  between members of  t h e  p o l i t y  and t h e  contenders  advancing 
e x c l u s i v e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c l a i m s  t o  c o n t r o l  over t h e  government. Ob- 
v i o u s l y ,  t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  a n d - t h e  f i r s t  one ( t h e  appearance of al- 
t e r n a t i v e  c l a i m s . e t c . )  o v e r l a p ,  bo th  because by d e f i n i t i o n  no such 
c o a l i t i o n  can  occur  u n t i l  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  e x i s t s  and because a 
c o a l i t i o n  sometimes turns,  i n t o  a  commitment t o  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c la ims .  
Yet t h i s  i s  a  s e p a r a t e  c o n d i t i o n ,  as some r e f l e c t i o n  on t h e  c o a l i -  
t i o n  between i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  and t h e  Nazis be fo re  1933 w i l l  s ugges t .  
The n a t u r e  of such a  c o a l i t i o n  i s  f o r  a  member of t h e  p o l i t y  t o  
t r a d e  r e sou rces  w i t h  a  c h a l l e n g e r ,  f o r  example, an' exchange of jobs 
f o r  e l e c t o r a l  suppor t .  Such a  c o a l i t i o n  i s  always r i s k y ,  s i n c e  t h e  
cha l l enge r  w i l l  always be on the  l o s i n g  end of t he  exchange a s  
compared w i t h  t h e  v a l u e  of t h e  r e sou rces  when t raded  among members 
of t h e  p o l i t y ,  and t h e r e f o r e  disposed t o  move i t s  ex tens ive  mobil ized 
r e sou rces  elsewhere.  Never the less  t i l t .  c . lr ;~llcnger i s  l i k e l y  t o  
accep t  a  c o a l i t i o n  where i t  o f f e r s  a i l c . l - t * r l s c  a g a i n s t  r e p r e s s i o n  
o r  d e v a l u a t i o n  of i t s  r e sources  and t l l c s  ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ i ~ h e r  i s  l i k e l y t o  a c c e p t  
i t  when t h e  p o l i t y  i s  c l o s e l y  d iv ided ,  01. whcn no c o a l i t i o n  p a r t n e r s  
are a v a i l a b l e  w i t h i n  t h e  p o l i t y ,  o r  w11t~11 i t s  own membership i s  i n  
jeopardy f o r  want of r e sou rces .  Stantl.1 rtl r :on l i t ion  theory  a p p l i e s -  
h e r e  ( s e e  esp.  Gamson 1968).  
A c l a s s i c  r evo lu t iona ry  t a c t i c  ;rl:;o f a l l s  under t h e  heading 
of  challenger-member c o a l i t i o n :  t h e  I ) c '~~c~Lr :~ t ion  of a n  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
which a l r e a d y  has  a n  e s t a b l i s h e d  p lac t*  111 t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of  power. 
A s  e a r l y  as 1901, Lenin w a s  c l e a r l y  c1lrtlnci:lting such a n  approach 
t o  t r a d e  unions: 
Every Social-Democratic worker :;llc,tr 111 a s  f a r  a s  p o s s i b l e  
assist and a c t i v e l y  work i n  thcrac* o r ~ n n i z a t i o n s .  Bqt, 
w h i l e  t h i s  i s  t r u e ,  i t  i s  c e r t n  111ly  not i n  our i n t e r e s t  
t o  demand t h a t  only Social-Democ* r:rl s slrould be e l i g i b l e  
f o r  membership i n  t h e  " t rade"  ~ r l l l o l ~ s ,  s i n c e  t h a t  would 
only  narrow t h e  scope of our  i n f  l t~ t*~i r .c  upon t h e  masses.  
Le t  every worker who understantl:; 1 1111 need t o  u n i t e  f o r  t h e  
s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  t h e  employers ill111 t lrc governments j o i n  
- t h e  t r a d e  unions.  The very  aim 0 1  L 111. t r a d e  unions would 
be  imposs ib le  of achievement,  i i t l ~ t ~ y  'lid not  u n i t e  a l l  who 
have a t t a i n e d  a t  l e a s t  t h i s  e l c n ~ t ~ ~ ~ l ; r r y  clcgrc?e of under- - 
s t and ing ,  i f  they were not  very 11 I.O;I t l  o rg i ln iza t ions .  The 
broader  t h e s e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  tlrts l,~~-cc;tlt$r w i l l  b e  our  
i n f l u e n c e  over  them--an influcnc-1. t l11 t1 ,  l l o ~  only  t o  t h e  
11 spontaneous" development of tlltu c~c3c~~io~ir 1 r s t r u g g l e ,  bu t  
t o  t h e  d i r e c t  and consc ious  ef f ~ l  1 0 1  tllcb s o c i a l i s t  t r a d e  
union members t o  i n f  l uence  t h e  1 1. I ' ~ ~ I I I I . , I ~ ~ L ~ H .  (Lenin 1967b : 
191). 
I n  t h e s e  cases ,  t h e  t r a d e  unions wcrt. 111) I . I I I : I  l l y 11s tab1  i shed  members 
of t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  p o l i t i e s ,  wh i l e  t I 1 4 ~  :;cbc*lr~l I)uaocr'ats i n  q u e s t i o n  
were c h a l l e n g e r s  s t i l l  o u t s i d e  the  p o l  1 I y . 111 tlris same message, 
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Lenin concludes by recommending the control of the large, open, 
legal union by the secret, closed, disciplined revolutionary party. 
Splinter groups of intellectuals appear to have a special 
propensity to form coalitions outside the polity. They trade off 
ideological work publicity for the demands of the challenger, lead- 
ership skills and acce5s to persons in high places for various forms 
of support: personnel for demonstrations, electoral strength, defense 
against other threatening challengers, and so on. Analysts of 
revolution as' diverse as Crane Brinton (1948) andBarrington Moore 
(1969) have considered the "desertion of the intellectuals" to be 
a crucial early omen of a revolutionary situation. The "desertion" 
may, of course, consist of individual acceptance of exclusive al- 
ternative claims to control of the government. It may also take 
the form of rejecting - all claims, in good anarchist fashion. But 
the shifts in commitment by intellectuals which contribute most 
to hasten a revolutionary situation, in my view, consist of coali- 
tions between revolutionary challengers and groups of intellectuals 
having membership in the polity. The propensity of French left- 
wing intellectuals to form such coalitions--without quite relinquish- 
ing their own claims to power and privilege--is legendary. 
Governmental Inaction 
Condition four is the incapacity or unwillingness of the agents 
of the government to suppress the alternative coalition or the com- 
mitment to its claims. Three paths are possible: a) sheer insuf- 
ficiency of the available means of coercion; b) inefficiency in 
app ly ing  t h e  means; c )  i n h i b i t i o n s  t o  t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n .  The 
s t a r k e s t  c a s e s  of i n s u f f i c i e n c y  occur  when t h e  ba l ance  of coe rc ive  
r e s o u r c e s  between t h e  government and t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o a l i t i o n  
swings suddenly toward . the  l a t t e r ,  because the  government has  suf -  
f e r e d  a  sudden d e p l e t i o n  of  i t s  r e sources  ( a s  i n  a l o s t  war) ,  be- 
cause  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o a l i t i o n  has  managed a  sudden m o b i l i z a t i o n  
of  r e sou rces  ( a s  i n  t h e  pool ing  of p r i v a t e  arms) o r  because a  new 
contender  w i th  abundant coe rc ive  r e s o u r c e s  has  jo ined  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  
( a s  i n  t h e  d e f e c t i o n  of t roops  o r  f o r e i g n  i n t e r v e n t i o n ) .  However, 
t h e  massing of r e b e l s  i n  l o c a t i o n s  remote from t h e  c e n t e r s  of coer-  
c i v e  s t r e n g t h ,  t h e  imp lan ta t ion  of t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o a l i t i o n  i f  a 
rough and unknown t e r r a i n  and t h e  adop t ion  of t a c t i c s  un fami l i a r  t o  
the p r o f e s s i o n a l  f o r c e s  of t h e  government a l l  r a i s e  t h e  c o s t s  of 
s u p p r e s s i o n  a s  w e l l .  
Ted Gurr (1969: 235-236) develops a n  i n t e r e s t i n g  argument about  
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t h e  ba l ance  o f ' c o e r c i v e  r e sou rces  between a government and i t s  op- 
ponents .  I n  h i s  phras ing ,  "The l i k e l i h o o d  of  i n t e r n a l  war i n c r e a s e s  
as t h e  r a t i o  of d i s s i d e n t  t o  regime coe rc ive  c o n t r o l  approaches 
e q u a l i t y . "  He i s  r e f e r r i n g  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  probably magnitude of 
c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence ;  where t h e  ba lance  s t r o n g l y  f avo r s  t h e  government, 
goes t h e  argument, on ly  d i spe r sed  a c t s  of r e b e l l i o n  occur ;  where 
t h e  ba l ance  s t r o n g l y  f a v o r s  i t s  opponents,  t h e  government tends  t o  
b e  a  pawn i n  t h e i r  hands. The a n a l y s i s  a p p l i e s  even more plaus ib ly  
t o  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  of r evo lu t ion ,  f o r  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o a l i t i o n  wi th  
l a r g e  c o e r c i v e  r e sou rces  i s  l i k e l y  t o  s e i z e  c o n t r o l  w i t h  a t  most an 
instant of multiple sovereignty, while an alternative coalition 
with small coercive resources will never get multiple sovereignty 
started. 
Inefficiency in applying means which are, in principle, suf- 
ficient is harder to pin down and explain; the inefficient almost 
always plead insufficient means. William Langer (1969 esp. 321-322) 
contends that had the authorities not bungled their repression of 
various popular movements the European revolutions of 1848 would 
never have occurred. To have confidence in his conclusion we have 
to assess the balance of coercive means between popular movements 
and governments as well as the political inhibitions to repression. 
In pre-revolutionary 1848 the governments clearly had the edge in 
men, weapons, supplies and coercive technique. The strong com- 
mitment of the new bourgeois who had been acquiring significant 
roles in European governments to certain kinds of civil liberties 
and various working-class movements, however, both stayed the gov- 
ernment's hand. From a strictly instrumental perspective, all 
such inhibitions are "inefficient." Yet not to distinguish them 
from the apparent incompetence of the Egyptian regime toppled in 
1952 or the Turkish sultanate displaced in 1919 blurs the essential 
explanation of these events. 
Inhibitions to the application of available coercive means are 
more interesting than shortages or inefficiency, because they are 
so likely to flow from the political process itself. The great im- 
portance of coalitions between established members of the polity and 
revolutionary challengers exemplifies the point very well. The 
United States of the 1960s witnessed the constant formation and 
reformation of coalitions between groups of intellectuals, opposi- 
tion politicians, black liberation movements, students and peace 
activists, some within the American polity and some outside it. 
The total effect of these coalitions fell considerably short of 
revolution, but while operating they shielded those whose principles 
offered the greatest challenge to the existing distribution of power 
from the treatment they received from police, troops and other re- 
pressors when acting on their own. 
Despite the implications of this example, however, the most 
crucial coalitions over the whole range of revolutions surely link 
challengers directly with military forces. The Egyptian and Turkish 
revolutions stand near the extreme at which the chief claims to al- 
ternative control of the government come from within the military 
itself; in both cases soldiers dominated a coalition linking dis- 
sident politicians and local movements of resistance. In the midst 
of the range we find events like the Russian revolution, in which 
the military were far from paramount, but important segments of the 
military defected, disintegrated or refused to repress their brethren. 
The more extensive the pre-revolutionary coalitions between chal- 
lengers and military units, the more likely this is to happen. 
In this respect and others, war bears a crucial relationship 
to revolution. Walter Laqueur (1968: 501) puts it this way: 
"War appears to have been the decisive factor in the 
emergence of revolutionary situations in modern times; 
most modern revolutions, both successful and abortive, 
have followed in the wake of war (thehris Commune of 
1871, the Russian revolution of 1905, the various revo- 
lutions after the two World Wars, including the Chinese 
revolutions). These have occurred not only in the 
countries that suffered defeat. The general dislocation 
caused by war, the material losses and human sacrifices, 
creat a climate conducive to radical change. A large 
section of the pqpulation has been armed; human life 
seems considerably less valua5le than in peacetime. In 
a defeated country authority tends to disintegrate, and 
acute social dissatisfaction receives additional impetus 
from a sense of wounded national prestige (the Young 
Turks in 1908, FTaguib and Nasser in 1952). The old 
leadership is discredited by defeat, and the appeal for 
radical social change and national reassertion thus 
falls on fertile ground." 
No doubt the statement suffers from a superabundance of explanations. 
Still it points out the essential relationship between war and the 
repressive capacity of the government. Although war temporarily 
places large coercive resources under the control of a government, 
it does not guarantee that they will be adequate to the demands 
placed upon them, that they will be used efficiently, or that they 
will even remain under the government's firm control. Defeat and/or 
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demobilization provide especially favorable circumstances for rev- 
olution because they combine the presence of substantial coercive 
resources with uncertain control over their use. 
War also matters in quite a different way. By and large, wars 
have always provided the principal occasions on which states have 
rapidly increased their levies of resources from their subject popu- 
lations. Conscription is only the self-evident case. Demands for 
taxes, forced loans, food, non-military labor, manufactured goods and 
raw m a t e r i a l s  fo l low the  same p a t t e r n .  The increased exac t ions  a l -  
most always meet widespread r e s i s t a n c e ,  which the  agents  of s t a t e s  
counter  wi th  persuas ion and fo rce .  Despite  the  advantage of having 
extens ive  e s t a t e s  t o  squeeze and a wealthy church t o  d i s p o s s e s s , t h e  
Tudors pressed t h e i r  England hard t o  support  the  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s  
they committed to  s ixteenth-century warfare.  They faced s e r i o u s  
r e b e l l i o n  i n  1489, 1497, 1536, 1547, 1549, 1553 and 1569. The l a s t  
three--Kettls, Wyatt 's and the  Northern Rebellion--centered on dynas- 
t i c  i s s u e s  and cons i s t ed  l a r g e l y  of r i s i n g s  engineered by reg iona l  
magnates. The f i r s t  f o u r ,  on the  o the r  hand, were popular rebel -  
l i o n s ;  every one of them began with t h e  crown's sudden l a y i n g  hand 
on resources  previous ly  o u t s i d e  i ts  c o n t r o l .  The genera l  p a t t e r n  
is t h e  same a s  I have a l r eady  described f o r  t a x  r e b e l l i o n s :  t h e  r ap id  
mobi l i za t ion  of an  e n t i r e  populs t ion  which then chal lenges  t h e  very  
j u s t i c e  of t h e  r o y a l  demand f o r  men, money o r  goods. - 
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, the  content ion  model makes i t  appear l i k e l y  
t h a t  once m u l t i p l e  sovereignty begins, c o l l e c t i v e  v io lence  .kill 
cont inue  a t  high l e v e l s  long a f t e r  t h e  bas ic  i s s u e  i s  decided, and 
w i l l  t ape r  of f  gradual ly .  Schematically, the  c o n t r a s t  is  t h i s :  
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There a r e  s e v e r a l  reasons f o r  t h i s  genera l  p r e d i c t i o n .  F i r s t ,  t h e  
appearance of m u l t i p l e  sovereignty p u t s  i n t o  ques t ion  the  achieved 
p o s i t i o n  of every s i n g l e  contender, whether a  member of t h e  p o l i t y  
o r  not ,  and the re fo re  tends t o  i n i t i a t e  a  genera l  round of mutual 
t e s t i n g  among contenders.  That t e s t i n g  i n  i t s e l f  produces co l l ec -  
t i v e  v io lence .  
Second, t h e  s t r u g g l e  of one p o l i t y  a g a i n s t  i ts  r i v a l  amounts 
t o  war: a b a t t l e  fought wi th  unlimited means. Since c o n t r o l  of 
t h e  e n t i r e  government is a t  s t a k e ,  high c o s t s  and high r i s k s  a r e  
j u s t i f i e d .  High c o s t s  and high r i s k s  inc lude  d e s t r u c t i o n  of persons 
and proper ty .  
Third ,  t h e  revolut ionary  c o a l i t i o n  i s  l i k e l y  t o  fragment once 
t h e  i n i t i a l  s e i z u r e  of c o n t r o l  over the  c e n t r a l  governmental appara- 
. t u s  occurs,  and t h a t  fragmentation i t s e l f  tends t o  produce f u r t h e r  
s t r u g g l e s  involving v io lence .  The revolut ionary  c o a l i t i o n  fragments 
f o r  s e v e r a l  reasons:  i t  takes  a l a r g e r  mobilized mass t o  s e i z e  power 
than  t o  main ta in  i t ;  t he  i n e v i t a b l e  d ivergence  of some major ob- 
j e c t i v e s  of t h e  contenders  w i t h i n  the  c o a l i t i o n  w i l l  come t o  t h e  
f o r e  once t h e  common o b j e c t i v e  of s e i z u r e  of power has  been accomp- 
l i s h e d ;  those  contenders  which have mobil ized r a p i d l y  up t o  t h e  
p o i n t  of r e v o l u t i o n  a r e  a l s o . l i k e l y  t o  demobi l ize  r a p i d l y  due t o  
t h e  underdevelopment o f s t h e i r  o r g a n i z a t i o n  f o r  t h e  management of  
t h e  mobi l ized  r e s o u r c e s ,  and thus  w i l l  tend t o  l o s e  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  
nex t  rounds of t e s t i n g .  
Fourth,  t h e  v i c t o r i o u s  p o l i t y  s t i l l  f a c e s  t h e  problem of re-  
imposing r o u t i n e  governmental c o n t r o l  over  t h e  s u b j e c t  popu la t ion  
even a f t e r  m u l t i p l e  sove re ign ty  has  ended. A s  t h e  government 
r e t u r n s  t o  i t s  work of e x t r a c t i n g  and r e d i s t r i b u t i n g  r e sou rces ,  
i t  f i n d s  people r e l u c t a n t  t o  pay t a x e s ,  g ive  up t h e i r  l and ,  send 
t h e i r  sons  t o  w a r ,  devote  t h e i r  t ime t o  l o c a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  And 
s o  a new round of v i o l e n t  impos i t ion  and v i o l e n t  r e s i s t a n c e  beg ins .  
Where t h e  i n i t i a l  locus  of t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  i s  c o n s t r i c t e d ,  t h i s  i s  
l i k e l y  t o  show up a s  a spread  of c o l l e c t i v e  v i o l e n c e  t o  o t h e r  p a r t s  
of t h e  popula t ion .  I n  a c e n t r a l i z e d  governmental system, t he  most 
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common sequence i s  t h e r e f o r e  l i k e l y  t o  be a l a r g e  and d e c i s i v e  
s t r u g g l e  a t  t h e  c e n t e r  followed by a more widespread b u t  l e s s  c r i t i -  
c a l  s e r i e s  of b a t t l e s  through t h e  r e s t  of t h e  t e r r i t o r y .  
To sum up, we might put  t oge the r  a n  i d e a l  sequence f o r  revolu-  
t i o n s  : 
1. gradua l  mob i l i za t ion  of contenders  making exc lus ive  c la ims  
t o  governmental c o n t r o l  a n d l o r  unacceptable  t o  t h e  members of 
t h e  p o l i t y .  
2. rapid increase in the number of people accepting those 
claims and/or rapid expansion of the coalition including the 
unacceptable or exclusive contenders; 
3. unsuccessful efforts by the government (at the behest of 
members of the polity) to suppress the alternative coalition 
and/or the acceptance of its claims; this may well include 
attempts at forceddemobilization--seizure, devaluation or 
dispersion of the resources at the disposal of contenders; 
4. establishment by the alternative coalition of effective 
control over some portion of the government--a territorial 
branch, a functional subdivision, a portion of its personnel; 
5 .  struggles of the alternative coalition to maintain or expand 
that control; 
6. reconstruction of a single polity through the victory of 
the alternative coalition, through its defeat, or through the 
establishment of a modus vivendi between the alternative coali- 
tion and some or all of the old members; gragmentation of the 
revolutionary coalition; 
7. reimposition of routine governmental control throughout 
the subject population. 
This series of stages suffers from the same defects as all "natural 
histories" of revolution. It consists mainly of an explication of 
a definition, and yet has an unjustified air of inevitability. I 
lay it out merely to summarize and clarify the previous argument. 
Some Related Generalizations 
Within this framework, several conditions appear likely to 
affect the overall level of violence produced by a revoluhion. In 
general, the larger the number of contenders involved in the struggle 
for power (holding constant the number of people involved), the 
higher the level of violence, because the number Af mutual tests of 
position between contenders likely rises exponentially with the 
number of contenders. The greater the fluctuation l a  control of 
various segments of the government by different coelltions of 
con tende r s ,  t h e  h ighe r  t h e  l e v e l  of v i o l e n c e ,  both because t h e  
s e i z u r e  of  c o n t r o l  i t s e l f  b r ings  v i o l e n t  r e s i s t a n c e  and because 
each change of  c o n t r o l  s e t s  o f f  f u r t h e r  t e s t i n g  of p o s i t i o n .  F i n a l l y ,  
t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of t h e  r e p r e s s i v e  means under government c o n t r o l  s t rong-  
l y  a f f e c t s  t h e  deg ree  of v io lence .  The connect ions  a r e  obvious y e t  
complicated:  t h e  u s e  of l e t h a l  weapons f o r  crowd c o n t r o l  i n c r e a s e s  
d e a t h s  through c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence ,  t h e  d i v i s i o n  of l a b o r  between 
s p e c i a l i s t s  i n  domest ic  o rde r  (po l i ce )  and war (armies)  probably 
d e c r e a s e s  i t ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  o v e r a l l  r e p r e s s i v e  c a p a c i t y  of  t h e  
government i s  probably c u r v i l i n e a r  ( l i t t l e  damage t o  persons  o r  
p rope r ty  where t h e  government has g r e a t  r e p r e s s i v e  c a p a c i t y ,  l i t t l e  
damage where i t s  r e p r e s s i v e  capac i ty  i s  s l i g h t ) ,  t h e  l e v e l  of v i o l e n c e  
probably r i s e s  a s  t h e  armament of t h e  government and of i ts  opponents 
approaches e q u a l i t y .  A l l  of t hese  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and more a r e  plaus-  
i b l e ,  b u t  no more than  s l i v e r s  of s y s t e m a t i c  evidence f o r  t h e i r  
a c t u a l  v a l i d i t y  e x i s t .  
I f  t h e s e  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  have something t o  them, t h e  e x t e n t  
of c o l l e c t i v e  v i o l e n c e  produced by a r e v o l u t i o n  should be  only  
weakly and i n d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  ex t en t ,  t o  which t h e  d i s t r i b u -  
t i o n  of  power changes. A zero  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  of power (which most 
of u s  would c a l l  a  f a i l u r e  of t he  r e v o l u t i o n )  can  occur  a s  a n  out -  
come of any of t h e  i d e a l  s t a g e s  presented  be fo re ,  a l though i t  becomes 
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l e s s  probably a s  t h e  s t a g e s  proceed. A glance back a t  t h a t  scheme 
w i l l  make c l e a r  how complicated any t r a c i n g  of  g e n e r a l  cond i t i ons  
f o r  l l ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ l l  o r  " f a i l u r e "  must be. 
A s i n g l e  bes t -es t ab l i shed  r e l a t i o n s h i p  is  a n  obvious and funda- 
mental one: t h e  p i v o t a l  in f luence  of, c o n t r o l  over t h e  major organ- 
i zed  means of  coerc ion w i t h i n  the  populat ion.  Within a l l  contempor- 
a r y  s t a t e s ,  t h a t  means c o n t r o l  of  t h e  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s .  No t r a n s f e r  
of power a t  a l l  is l i k e l y  i n  a r e v o l u t i o n  i f  t h e  government r e t a i n s  
c o n t r o l  of t h e  m i l i t a r ~ ~ p a s t  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n ' s  beginning, al though 
d e f e c t i o n  of  the  m i l i t a r y  i s  by no means a  s u f f i c i e n t  cond i t ion  f o r  
a  takeover by the  r e b e l s  (Chorley 1943, Andreski 1968, Russe l l  
It fo l lows more o r  l e s s  d i r e c t l y  t h a t  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  coerc ive  
r e s 0 u r c . e ~  --including p r i v a t e  armies,  weapons and segments of t h e  
n a t i o n a l  armed f o r c e s - - i n i t i a l l y  c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  revolut ionary  
c o a l i t i o n ,  t h e  more l i k e l y  a  t r a n s f e r  of power. Likewise, t h e  
e a r l i e r  t h e  t r a n s f e r  of coerc ive  re sources  t o  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  
c o a l i t i o n ,  t h e  more l i k e l y  a  t r q n s f e r .  The mobi l i za t ion  
o f  o t h e r  res&rces ,  normative and u t i l i t a r i a n ,  probably a f f e c t s  t h e  
chances of  a c q u i r i n g  power s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a s  w e l l ,  but  a t  a  much 
lower than  t h e  mobi l i za t ion  of coe rc ive  resources .  It a l s o  fo l lows 
t h a t  t h e  presence of e x i s t i n g  members of t h e  p o l i t y  i n  t h e  revolu- 
t i o n a r y  c o a l i t i o n  w i l l  i nc rease  t h e  chances f o r  some t r a n s f e r  of 
power (although i t  reduces t h e  chances f o r  a  complete wres t ing  of  
power from members of t h e  p o l i t y )  both  because of t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  . 
resources  i t  b r ings  t o  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  and because of t h e  g r e a t e r  
l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  t h e  armed f o r c e s  w i l l  d e f e c t ,  waver o r  remain 
n e u t r a l  when confronted wi th  e s t a b l i s h e d  members of t h e  p o l i t y .  
Beyond these  r a t h e r  banal  conclus ions ,  I f ind  myself rummag- 
i n g  around i n  v in tage  c l i c h g s  about t a c t i c s ,  t e r r a i n ,  l eader sh ip ,  
chance and i n i o n n a t i o n .  That is s u r p r i s i n g ,  cons ide r ing  t h e  huge 
amount t h a t  has  been w r i t t e n  about  success  and f a i l u r e  i n  r e v o l u t i o n .  
Perhaps t h e  pover ty  of s y s t e m a t i c c ~ n c l u s i o n s  comes from t h e  essen-  
t i a l  u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  of t r a n s f e r s  of power. I am more i n c l i n e d  t o  
t h i n k  i t  comes from our  f a i l u r e  t o*  b r ing  keen a n a l y t i c  i n t e l l i g e n c e  
t o  b e a r .  
I f e a r  t h e  same is t r u e  of t h e  next  q u e s t i o n  which s p r i n g s  t o  
mind: under what c o n d i t i o n s  does ex t ens ive  s t r u c t u r a l  change accom- 
pany o r  r e s u l t  from a  r e v o l u t i o n ?  To t h e  degree  t h a t  s t r u c t u r a l  
change means t r a n s f e r  of power £ram c l a s s  t o  c l a s s ,  p a r t y  t o  p a r t y ,  
contender  t o  contender ,  t o  b e  s u r e ,  we have j u s t  examined t h e  ques- 
t i o n .  But i f  i t  means f u r t h e r  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  of r e sou rces ,  changes 
i n  t h e  q u a l i t y  of  l i f e ,  u rban iza t ion ,  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,  moral  re-  
cons t ruc t ion ,  eve ry th ing  depends on t h e  time s c a l e  one adop t s .  
R e l a t i v e l y  few permanent changes of  t h i s  s o r t  a c t u a l l y  occur  
i n  t h e  cou r se  of r e v o l u t i o n s .  Engels,  Sore1 and Fanon a l l  h e l d  o u t  
t h e  hope of a v a s t  moral r egene ra t ion  w i t h i n  t h e  a c t  of r e v o l u t i o n  
i t s e l f ,  b u t  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  exper ience  i s  sad ly  l a c k i n g  i n  examples 
t h e r e o f .  The o t h e r  s t r u c t u r a l  rearrangements  which occur  i n  t h e  
course  of r e v o l u t i o n s  a r e  t y p i c a l l y  temporary: t h e  m o b i l i z a t i o n  of 
men, l o y a l t i e s ,  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  t a l e n t s  and weapons a t  a n a t i o n a l  
l e v e l  which r ecedes  a s  t h e  new s t r u c t u r e  of power c r y s t a l l i z e s ,  t h e  
d i s r u p t i o n  of d a i l y  r o u t i n e s  f o r  f e s t i v a l s ,  d e l i b e r a t i o n s ,  emergen- 
c i e s ,  t h e  p r o v i s i o n a l  appearance of  commissars, governing commit t e e s ,  
t a s k  f o r c e s .  Michael Walzer has  b r i l l i a n t l y  por t rayed  a  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  
out look f o r  seventeenth century England, Richard Cobb a  revolut ion- 
a r y  men ta l i ty  f o r  e ighteenth  century France; never the less ,  f o r  the  
out looks  and m e n t a l i t i e s  of most people, r evo lu t ions  a r e  but  passing 
moments. 
A few grea t  r evo lu t ions  provide exceptions t o  t h i s  absence of 
short-run transformation;  t h a t  i s  perhaps what permits us t o  c a l l  
them g r e a t  r evo lu t ions .  Although t h e  nobles and the  c lergy regained 
some of t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  i n  Frdnce wi th  and a f t e r  Napoleon, the  con- 
f i s c a t i o n  and s a l e  of a r i s t o c r a t i c  and e c c l e s i a s t i c a l  property from 
1790 t o  1793 permanently s h i f t e d  t h e  weight away from those two power- 
f u l  c l a s s e s .  The s o v i e t s  survived the  Bolshevik Revolution. The 
Chinese communists began reorganizing v i l l a g e  s t r u c t u r e  almost a s  
soon a s  they were on the  scene.  Contrary t o  t h e  world-weary view 
of Crane Brinton, who argued t h a t  a  r evo lu t ion  took a  country through 
tremendous turmoil  t o  a  p o s i t i o n  approximately the  same a s  i t  would 
have occupied anyway a f t e r  an equivalent  l apse  of time, i t  may be 
t h a t  the ex ten t  of s t r u c t u r a l  a l t e r a t i o n  occurring while m u l t i p l e  
sovere ignty  p e r s i s t s  is our b e s t  s i g n  of the  depth of t h e  permanent 
change t o  be produced by the  r evo lu t ion .  
Over t h e  long run,  r evo lu t ions  appear t o  change t h e  d i r e c t i o n  
of s t r u c t u r a l  t ransformation t o  t h e  ex ten t  t h a t  they produce a  t rans-  
f e r  of power. Where the re  i s ' a  l a r g e  t r a n s f e r  of power among c l a s s e s ,  
t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  c o a l i t i o n  which ga ins  profoundly shapes the  subsequent 
p o l i t i c a l  development of t h e  country.  Barrington Moore's comparison 
of Ind ia ,  Japan, China, the  U .  S. ,  France, England, Germany and 
Russia makes p r e c i s e l y  that: poi.nt.  M i l i t a r y  coups almost  never 
produce any s i g n i  f icnnt-  s t r u c t  u r n 1  cliangc--despite t he  d e c l a r a t i o n s  
of n a t i o n a l  rcnovat  ion  l ~ h i c 1 1  r i t u a l ]  y accompany thcm t h e s e  days-- 
because they i-nvolve mi.nor 1-earl-angcmcnt s among extremely l i m i t e d  
s e t s  of contenders .  The apparent  except ions  t o  t h i s  r u l e ,  r e v o l u t i o n s  
from above l i k e  those  of Japan and Turl:ey, o r d i n a r i l y  have a  reform- 
ing  segment of t h e  r u l i n g  e l i t e  e f f e c t i v e l y  c u t t i n g  o f f  t h e i r  f e l -  
b 
lows from f u r t h e r  a c c e s s  t o  power, and forming c o a l i t i o n s  w i t h  c l a s s e s  
p rev ious ly  excluded from power. 
However, t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  means a v a i l a b l e  t o  t hose  who emerge 
from t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  w i t h  power a f f e c t  t he  degree  of s t r u c t u r a l  t r a n s -  
format ion  d e l i b e r a t e l y  promoted by t h e  government i n  pos t - revolu t ion-  
a r y  y e a r s .  I n  a  d i s c u s s i o n  of t he  e f f e c t  of t h e  "conf in ing  cond i t i ons"  
under which a  r evo lu t iona ry  c o a l i t i o n  s e i z e d  power on i t s  subsequent  
c a p a c i t y  t o . t r a n s f o r m  s o c i a l  o rgan iza t ion ,  O t to  Kirchheimer comes 
t o  t h e  conclus ion  t h a t  t h e  emergency powers accru ing  t o  s t a t e s  dur- 
i n g  twent ie th-century  c r i s e s  l i k e  World War I d r a s t i c a l l y  reduced 
t h e  confinement of  power-holders: 
The r e v o l u t i o n  of t h e  20th Century o b l i t e r a t e s  t h e  d i s -  
t i n c t i o n  between emergency and normalcy. Movement p lus  
s t a t e  can o rgan ize  t h e  masses because: ( a )  t h e  tech- 
n i c a l  and i n t e l l e c t u a l  equipment i s  now a t  hand t o  d i r e c t  
them toward major s o c i e t a l  programs r a t h e r  than  simply 
l i b e r a t i n g  t h e i r  e n e r g i e s  from t h e  bonds of t r e d i t i o n ;  
(b)  they have t h e  means a t  hand t o  c o n t r o l  p e o p l e ' s  
l i v e l i h o o d  by means of job assignments  and graduated  r e -  
wards u n a v a i l a b l e  under t h e  l a r g e l y  a g r i c u l t u r a l  and 
a r t i s a n a l  s t r u c t u r e  of t he  1790s and s t i l l  u n a v a i l a b l e  
t o  t h e  sma l l  e n t e r p r i s e  and commission-merchant-type 
economy of t h e  1850s and 1860s; ( c )  they have f a l l e n  h e i r  
t o  e n d l e s s l y  and t e c h n i c a l l y  r e f i n e d  propaganda dev ices  
s u b s t i t u t i n g  f o r  t h e  u n c e r t a i n  leader-mass r e l a t i o n s  of 
t h e  previous  p e r i o d s ;  and (d)  they faced s t a t e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
shaken up by war d i s l o c a t i o n  and economic c r i s i s .  Under 
t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  S o v i e t  Russia  could c a r r y  through simul- 
t aneous ly  t h e  job of a n  economic and a  p o l i t i c a l ,  a  bour- 
g e o i s  and a  pos t -bourgeois  r e v o l u t i o n  i n  s p i t e  of t h e  ex- 
ceedingly  narrow b a s i s  of i t s  p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e .  On t h e  
o t h e r  hand, t h e  premature r evo lu t iona ry  combination of  
1793-94 not  on ly  d i s s o l v e d  quick ly ,  b u t  l e f t  i ts  most ad- 
vanced s e c t o r ,  t h e  s a n s - c u l o t t e s ,  wi th  only t h e  melancholy 
cho ice  between d e s p e r a t e  rioting--Germinal 1795--or f a l l i n g  
back i n t o  a  p r e - ~ r g a n i z e d  s t a g e  of u t t e r  h e l p l e s s n e s s  and 
agony (Kirchheimer 1965: 973).  
Th i s  a n a l y s i s  can be  g e n e r a l i z e d .  Despi te  t h e  "conf in ing  cond i t i ons"  
faced  by t h e  French r e v o l u t i o n a r y  c o a l i t i o n s  of 1789-94, they  s e i z e d  
a s t a t e  appa ra tus  which was a l r e a d y  e x c e p t i o n a l l y  c e n t r a l i z e d  and 
powerful  by comparison w i t h  those  which had grown up elsewhere i n  
t h e  world.  They were a b l e  t o  u s e  t h a t  g r e a t  power,in f a c t ,  t o  
d e s t r o y  t h e  j u r i d i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  of feudal i sm,  e f f e c t  l a r g e  t r ans -  
f e r s  of  weal th ,  s u b j u g a t e  t h e  Church, b u i l d  a  mass army. The nine-  
teen th-century  r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  whc r epea t ed ly  s e i z e d  c o n t r o l  of 
the Spanish s t a t e  grabkc2  a n  apparzicus ~ h z s s  escr3:tive a n t  r e p r e s -  
s i v e  c a p a c i t i e s  were i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  any t a s k  of n a t i o n a l  t r a n s -  
format ion .  It i s  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  m o b i l i z a t i o n  of contenders  which 
occu r s  b e f o r e  and du r ing  a r e v o l u t i o n  may i t s e l f  f a c i l i t a t e  a f u r t h e r  
n a t i o n a l  mob i l i za  t i o  n ,  p u t t i n g  r e sou rces  a t  t h e  d i s p o s a l  of t h e  
s t a t e  which were simply u n a v a i l a b l e  be fo re  t h e  r evo lu t ion :  p rope r ty ,  
energy,  in format ion ,  l o y a l t i e s .  That is ,  indeed,  a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
s t r a t e g y  of contemporary n a t i o n a l  r e v o l u t i o n s .  Yet I am i n c l i n e d  
t o  t h i n k  t h a t  i n  g e n e r a l  t h e  already-accrued power of t h e  s t a t e  a f -  
f e c t s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  fundamental s t r u c t u r a l  change w i l l  i s s u e  
from the revolution much more strongly than the extent of mobiliza- 
tion during the revolution itself does. 
These facile generalizations, I confess, do not do justice to 
a critical question. For on our estimate of the long-run effects 
of different kinds of revolution must rest our judgement as to 
whether any particular revolution, or revolutionary opportunity, is 
worth its cost. I estimate some revolutions as worth it, but at 
present no one has enough systematic knowledge about the probable 
structural consequences of one variety of revolution or another to 
make such estimates with confidence. 
Except, perhaps, in retrospect. Historians continue to debate 
what the English, French and Russian revolutions cost and what they 
accomplished, but in those cases (at least in principle) they are 
dealing with actualities rather than probabilities. That potential 
certainty, .however, has a self-destructive side; when it comes to 
an event as sweeping as the English Revolution, almost every prev- 
ious event which left some trace in seventeenth-century England is 
in some sense a "cause", and almost every subsequent event in the 
country and its ambit is in some sense an "effect." Making cause- 
and-effect analysis manageable in this context means reducing the 
revolution to certain essentials, identifying the sufficient condi- 
tions for those essentials, and then specifying subsequent events 
which would have been unlikely without the revolutionary essentials. 
So in fact the causal analysis of real, historic revolutione and 
of revolutions in general converge on statements of probability. 
l l i s t o r i c a l  Appl ica t ion  of the  Scheme 
a 
How, then,  could we s e t  concre te  h i s t o r i c a l  exper ience  i n t o  
t h e  frame developed i n  t h i s  essay? I f  t h e  point  were t o  account 
f o r  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n s  and the  va r ious  forms of c o l l e c t i v e  v io lence  
occur r ing  w i t h i n  t h a t  experience--and t h a t  would have t o  be t h e  
po in t  of  employing t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  scheme--the h i s t o r i c a l  work 
would c o n s i s t  of grouping p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n s  w i t h i n  t h a t  experience 
i n t o  governments, contenders,  p o l i t i e s ,  c o a l i t i o n s ,  processes  of 
mobi l i za t ion ,  and s o  on. Other fundamental phenomena l i k e  changes 
i n  b e l i e f s ,  demographic change o r  economic c r i s i s  would only  e n t e r  
t h e  account  i n  s o  f a r  a s  they a f f e c t e d  t h e  p a t t e r n  of con ten t ion  f o r  
power. 
I n  t h e  case  of France s i n c e  1500, f o r  example, t h e  l a r g e s t  
frame f o r  a n a l y s i s  would be  s e t  by t h e  i n t e r p l a y  of a g radua l ly  
i n d u s t r i a l i z i n g  and urbanizing popula t ion  wi th  a  n a t i o n a l  s t a t e  
which was f i r s t  emerging, then e s t a b l i s h i n g  p r i o r i t y ,  then  con- 
s o l i d a t i n g  i t s  hold on the  popula t ion .  The two s e t s  of processes  
d i d ,  o f  course ,  depend on each o t h e r  t o  some degree--for example, 
i n  t h e  way t h a t  expanding t a x a t i o n  drove peasants  t o  market goods 
they would o therwise  have kept a t  home, on t h e  one .hand, and t h e  way 
t h a t  t h e  degree of  commercialization of land,  labor  and a g r i c u l t u r -  ,:. 
a1 product ion  s e t  s t r i n g e n t  l i m i t s  on t h e  r e t u r n  from land t axes ,  
income t axes  o r  e x c i s e  taxes ,  on the  o t h e r .  But t h e i r  t iming d i f -  
f e red .  The e p i c  pe r iods  of French statemaking were t h e  t imes of 
Louis XI11 and Louis XIV. Those pe r iods  had t h e i r  ehare of economic 
turmoi l ;  furthermore,  they saw both a n  important increaee i n  the  
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importance of Paris and a few other major cities for the life of 
France as a whole and the spread of trade and small-scale manufact- 
uring through the towns and villages of the entire country. Yet in 
terms of productivity, organization, sheer numbers of persons in- 
volved, the urbanization and industrialization of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries produced incomparably greater changes. To 
oversimplify outrageously, the drama consists of two acts: first 
a fast-growing state acting on a slow-moving population and economy; 
then a fast-changing population and economy dealing with a consoli- 
dating state. 
In  analyzing this interplay, we need to ask over and over for 
different places and points in time what contenders for power (poten- 
tial and actual) the existing social structure made available, and 
what governments the existing stage of statemaking left them to 
contend over. The most strenuous current debates over the history 
of the turbulent French seventeenth century,for example, pivot, 
first, on the extent to which the national government squeezed out 
its provincial rivals and acquired firm control over French social 
life; second, and even more strenuously, on the extent to which 
the operative divisions of the population were social classes in 
something like a Marxian sense (see Mousnier 1970, Lebrun 1967, 
Porchnev 1963, Lublinskaya 1968). The analytic scheme I have laid 
out provides no pat answers to those serious questions; if it did, 
one would have to suspect that its principal assertions were true 
by definition. It does suggest that the tracing of the actual 
issues, locations and personnel of violent encounters in seventeenth- 
century France will provide.crucia1 evidence on the pace and extent 
of political centralization, as well as on the nature of the groups 
which were then engaged in struggles for power. The basic research 
remains to be done. Yet the recurrent importance of new taxation 
in seventeenth-century rebellions, the apparent subsidence of those 
rebellions toward the end of the century, and the frequent involve- 
ment of whole peasant communities in resistance to the demands of 
the crown all point toward a decisive seventeenth-century battle 
among local and national polities. 
Not that all struggle ended then. As Tocqueville declared 
long ago, the Revolution of 1789 pitted centralizers against guard- 
ians of provincial autonomies, The contest between crown and provin- 
cial parlements (which led quite directly to the calling forthe 
Estates General, which in turn became the locus of multiple sover- 
eignty in 1789) continued the struggle of the seventeenth century. 
Throughout the Revolution, in fact, the issue of predominance of 
Paris and the national government remained open, with tax rebellions, 
movements against conscription and resistance to the calls of the 
nation for food recurring when the center weakened and when its 
demands increased sharply. Nost of the events of the so-called 
peasant revolt of 1789 took the form of food riots and other classic 
eighteenth-century local conflicts. 
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Y e t  they  d i d  n o t  j u s t  r e p r e s e n t  "more of  t h e  same," because  
they  came i n  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  c l u s t e r s ,  because they occurred  i n  t h e  
presence  of m u l t i p l e  sove re ign ty ,  and because t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  be- 
gan t o  form c o a l i t i o n s  w i t h  o t h e r  contenders  f o r  power. Now, t h e  
exac t  con tou r s  o f  t h e  major contenders  and t h e  p r e c i s e  n a t u r e  of  
t h e i r  s h i f t i n g  a l l i a n c e s  a r e  t h e  c e n t r a l  i s s u e s  of t h e  b i g  d e b a t e s  
about  t h e  h i s t o r y  of t h e  Revolut ion ( s e e  e .g .  Cobban 1964, Mazauric 
1970).  But i t  i s  a t  l e a s t  roughly t r u e  t o  s ay  t h a t  a l o o s e  c o a l i -  
t i o n  among p e a s a n t s ,  o f f i c i a l s ,  urban commercial c l a s s e s  and small 
b u t  c r u c i a l  groups of urban craf t smen and shopkeepers  c a r r i e d  t h e  
r e v o l u t i o n  through i t s  f i r s t  few y e a r s ,  b u t  began t o  f a l l  a p a r t  
i r r e v o c a b l y  i n  1792 and 1793. Looked a t  from t h e  p o i n t  of view of 
coa l i t i on - fo rma t ion  and m u l t i p l e  sove re ign ty ,  t h e  Revolu t ion  b r e a k s  
i n t o  a whole s e r i e s  of r e v o l u t i o n s ,  from t h e  f i r s t  d e c l a r a c t i o n  of  
sove re ign ty  by t h e  Thi rd  E s t a t e  i n  1789 t o  t h e  f i n a l  d e f e a t  of 
Napoleon i n  1815. 
Again, i n  t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e  we begin  t o  g ra sp  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
of m a t e r i a l l y  t r i v i a l  events  l i k e  t h e  t ak ing  of  t h e  Bastille. For 
t h e  a t t a c k  by P a r i s i a n s  on t h e  o l d  f o r t r e s s  f i n a l l y  s e t  a  crowd 
unambiguously a g a i n s t  t h e  regime, r evea l ed  t h e  u n c e r t a i n  commit- 
ment of p a r t  o f  t h e  armed f o r c e s  t o  t h e  government, brought  t h e  
King t o  h i s  f i r s t  a c c e s s i o n s  t o  t h e  popular  movement ( h i s  t r i p  t o  
t h e  Na t iona l  Assembly on t h e  1 5 t h  of J u l y  and h i s  t r i p  t o  P a r i s  on 
t h e  1 7 t h )  and s t i m u l a t e d  a s e r i e s  of minor coups i n  t h e  provinces :  
Until July 14th the handful of revolutionary institutions 
set up in the provinces were disparate and isolated. 
Henceforward most of the towns and many of the villages 
. of France were to imitate Paris with extraordinary swift- 
ness. During the weeks that followed the fall of the 
Bastille there arose everywhere revolutionary Town Councils 
of permanent committees, and citizen militias which soon 
assumed the name of national guards (Godechot 1970: 273). 
So if we date the start of multiple sovereignty from the Third Estate's 
Tennis Court Oath to remain assembled despite the prohibitions of 
. . 
the King, we still have to treat July 14th and its immediate after- 
math as a great expansion of the revolutionary coalition. 
Obviously the four proximate conditions for revolution enumer- 
ated earlier--coalitions of contenders advancing exclusive alterna- 
tive claims, commitment to those claims, failure of the government 
to suppress them, coalitions between members of the polity and the 
revolutionary contenders--appeared in the France of 1789. What 
cannot be obvious from a mere chronicle of the events is how long 
each of the conditions existed, what caused them and whether they 
were sufficient to cause the collapse of the old regime. At least 
these are researchable questions, as contrasted with attempts to 
ask directly whether the rise of the bourgeoisie, the increase in 
relative deprivation or the decay of the old elite "caused" the 
Revolution. What is more, they call attention to the probable im- 
portince of shifting coalition's among lawyers, officials, provincial 
magnates, peasants and workers in the nationwide political maneuver- 
ing of 1787 to 1789, as well as to the effect of "defensive" moblli- 
zation of peasants and workers in response to the multiple pressures 
impinging on them in 1789. 
The Revolution produced a great transfer of power. It stamped 
out a new and distinctive political system. Despite the Restoration 
of 1815, the nobility and the clergy never recovered their pre-revolu- 
tionary position, some segments of the bourgeoisie greatly enhanced 
their power over the national government, and the priority of that 
national government over all others increased permanently. In Bar- 
rington Moor's analysis, whose main lines appear correct to me, the 
predominance of the coalition of officials, bourgeois and peasant 
in the decisive early phases of the Revolution promoted the emergence 
of the attenuated parliamentary democracy which characterizes post- 
revolutionary France (Moore 1966, ch. 11; for explication and critique 
see Rokkan 1969, Rothman 1970a, Stone 1967). At that scale and in 
the details of public administration, education, ideology and life 
style, the Revolution le'ft a durable heritage. 
None of the old conflicts, nevertheless, disappeared completely 
with the Revolution. The counter-revolutionary ~endge, despite 
having come close to destruction in 1793, again rose in rebellion 
in 1794, 1795, 1799, 1815 and 1832. Further revolutions overcame 
France as a whole in 1830, 1848, and 1870. Most of the characteris- 
tic forms of resistance to demands from the center--food riots, tax 
rebellions, movements against conscription, and so on--continued 
well into the nineteenth century. Indeed, these "reactionary" forms 
of collective action reached their climax around the Revolution of 
1848 before fading rapidly to insignificance. 
From that mid-century crisis we can date the definitive reduc- 
tion of the smaller polities in which Frenchmen had once done most 
of their political business, the virtual disappearance of communal 
contenders for power, the shift of all contenders toward associa- 
tional organization and action at a national level,. The massive 
urbanization and industrialization of France which gained momentum 
after 1830 transformed the available contenders for power, espe- 
cially by creating a large, new urban working class based in fac- 
tories and other large organizations. From that point on, the 
demonstration, the meeting, the strike were the usual matrices of 
collective violence as well as the settings in which an enormous 
proportion of all struggles for power went on. Collective violence 
evolved with the organization of public life and the structure of 
political action. 
Qualifications and Conclusions 
This all-too-quick sketch of the evolution of political con- 
flict in France lacks two elements which belong to the conventional 
wisdom: the explanation of popular protests before the Revolution 
as angry or impulsive responses to economic crisis and the explana- 
tion of popular protests after the Revolution as angry or impulsive 
responses to the strains of rapid industrialization and.urbaniza- 
, 
tion. Before the Revolution, the characteristic forms of "protest" 
were much more closely tied to the major political traneformations 
of the time than any such account makes plausible. After the 
Revolution, such detailed studies of conflicts and collective 
violence as we have reveal no particular tendency for 'broteet" to 
come in the wake of rapid and unsettling structural change. Indeed, 
the evidence runs in the other direction, with rapid urbanization 
and industrialization appearing to reduce the capacity for collective 
action of the populations most directly affected, and thereby to 
reduce their involvement in collective violence. 
The general implications of our analytic scheme also run in 
that direction. We have good reason to expect large structural - 
tran'sformations to change the character of collective violence and 
the probability of revolution through their effects on the emergence 
and decline of different contenders for power. So far the most co- 
herent general theory of those linkages we have comes from the 
Marxist tradition. We have no reason, on the other hand, to expect 
a close relationship between the pace of structural transformation 
(or even the amount of displacement and personal disruption it causes) 
and the extent of protest, conflict and collective violence. The 
mediating variables are political ones: the nature of repression, 
the established means for acquisition and loss of power, the predomi- 
nant modes of mobilization, the possibilities for coalition-making, 
the concentration or dispersion of government. 
I have to admit that the method this essay has employed in 
building up to that conclusion has some unfair facets to it. The 
discussion has often taken on the air of confident demonstration, 
ween at best it actually contains a series of illustrations of an 
\ 
incompletely-articulated theoretical scheme. Worse still, the 
discussion has, often proceeded as though "polity," "contender," and 
U 
other entities were acting realities rather than hypothetical con- 
structs. The truly responsible alternative would have been, first 
to present the full scheme as a wholly theoretical statement and, 
anly then, to review the evidence pro and con. I fear, however, 
that under those conditions all readers would fall exhausted be- 
fore the end. The high level of abstraction of the first part would 
leave them gasping and groggy; the second part would drown them in 
the sea of diverse details one would have to amass to make a reason- 
able case in the present scattered evidence. So I have fashioned 
a lifesaving compromise. 
The systematic evidence required to put the scheme to the test 
would fall into three parts. First would come the examination of 
individual polities working out from governments to the persons 
interacting with them, to see whether the behavior of men with res- 
pect to those governments falls into sufficiently coherent patterns 
. of mobilization and contention for power to 'justify the use of those 
concepts, and to determine whether the patterns are measurable in 
some reliable way. Second would come the tracing of the operation 
of those polities over considerable spans of time, in order to 
determine whether frequent changes of membership do.accelerate the 
rate of collective violence, whether challenger-mernber;coalitions 
do characteristically precede revolutions, and so on. Third--if the 
process got that far--would come systematic comparisons among similar 
and dissimilar polities in order both to make sure ,that the negative 
cases behave as predicted and to detect the major variables, producing 
differences in the experience of revolution and collective violence 
between one kind of political organization and another. We stand 
a long, long way from that third test. 
Even if the scheme does encompass the materials reviewed here, , 
it may well have a much more limited application than my discussion 
has implied. I have wqrked out the scheme with the experience of 
western Europe over the last few hundred years very much in view. 
That is an important experience, but only a small portion of man's 
total political life. The arguments embedded in the scheme tend to 
assume two conditions which are generally characteristic of modern ' 
western Europe, and'rather uncommon in world-historical perspective: 
1) the presence of relativelyrxclusive, strong, centralized instru- 
ments of government, especially in the form of states; 2) the unim- 
portance of corporate solidarities like large kin groups which cross- 
cut and penetrate the governmental structure. The first limitation 
makes the scheme fit Prussia a little more comfortably than Spain. 
The second limitation causes less uncertainty in northern Europe 
than around the Mediterranean. Outside of Europe and its immediate 
offshoots,. the difficulties multiply.- 
No doubt one could attempt to generalize the analysis by con- 
verting the importance of the states and the power of corporate 
solidarities into variables to be accounted for in their own right. 
For my part, I have too little confidence in the strength of the 
argument on its home ground and too little certainty that the word 
"revolution" retains any common meaning when extended beyond the 
world of relatively strong states and weak corporate solidarities 
to propose that extension now. The first pcroblem is to examine 
systematically the fit between the model and the range of modern 
western experience. My excuse for imposing the argument on readers 
whose primary interests may lie with Africa or Oceania is the sense 
that most areas of the world are now moving willy-nilly toward a 
condition of strong states and weak corporate solida,rities. To the 
extent that such a view of the world is mistaken, most theories of 
collective violence and revolution based on modern western exper- 
ience--including the one unfolded in this essay--will prove irrele- 
vant to the future of political conflict. 
All qualifications and apologies understood, what sorts of 
answers does this argumentation yield for the meteorological and 
engineering questions with which we began? The likelihood of 
collective violence within a given country in a given period depends 
especially on the number of mobilized challengers bidding for mem- 
bership in the politics of that country without effective coalitions 
with members of the respective polities, the number of established 
members losing position within those polities, and the extent to 
which the agents of the governments involved routinely employ vio- 
lence in the repression of collective action. If that is the case, 
the ways to raise the level of collective violence are to mobilize 
new contenders, break existing coalitions between challengers and 
members, accelerate the loss of position by established members, and 
increase the routine use of violence in repression. 
The analysis of revolutions identified four proximate condi- 
tions: 1) the emergence of coalitions of contenders making exclusive 
alternative claims to control of the government; 2) the expansion 
of commitment to those claims by members of the population under 
control of that government; 3) the formation of coalitions between 
members of the polity ?nd members of the revolutionary bloc; 4) re- 
pressive incapacity of the government's agents. A revolutionary 
strategy is therefore to mobilize new contenders with exclusive 
claims to control of the government,encourage acceptance of those 
claims by people outside the contenders, form coalitions with es- 
tablished members of the polity, and neutralize the government's 
repressive capacity. Which is, come to think of it, more or less 
what effective revolutionaries have been doing all along. 
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